scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cross-Regional Coordinated Governance of Major Public Health Emergencies: The Example of the Spread of the COVID-19 Outbreak

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Yao Xiao ◽  
Qiao Peng ◽  
Wanting Xu
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Regional Governance ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
The Cross ◽  
Asymmetric Game ◽  
Peripheral Regions

Cross-regional governance of government often faces various problems, which often brings great loss to the society. The global outbreak of the novel coronavirus pneumonia (NCP) in early 2020 has not only caused serious economic and social losses to various countries but also put the current public health event governance system to a severe test. The cross-regional character and spillover effects of public health outbreak governance often make it difficult to coordinate cross-regional governance. In this context, this paper adopts a regional evolutionary game analysis framework and studies the cross-regional governance of public health emergencies by constructing a symmetric game of peripheral regions and an asymmetric game of core-peripheral regions. The marginal contribution of this paper is to attempt to construct a symmetric game model for peripheral regions and an asymmetric game model for core and peripheral regions using an evolutionary game approach to study the behavioral strategies of multiple regions in the governance of public health emergencies, and it is found that when the regional spillover effects and governance costs are small or the economic and social damages caused by public health emergencies are large, all regions will choose to conduct coordinated governance. Otherwise, there will be regions that choose to “free-ride.” This “free-rider” mentality has led to the failure in achieving good cross-regional collaborative governance of public health emergencies, resulting in a lack of efficiency in the overall governance of public health in society. However, when the spillover effect of regional governance exceeds a certain critical value, the result of the regional governance game is also the socially optimal result, when public health emergencies are effectively governed. At the same time, the relevant findings and analytical framework of this paper will provide a policy reference for the cross-regional governance of the current new crown epidemic.

scholarly journals Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Zhiqi Xu ◽  
Yukun Cheng ◽  
Shuangliang Yao
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Health Emergency ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Negative Behaviors ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Theoretical Support ◽  
Safety And Health

Public health emergencies are more related to the safety and health of the public. For the management of the public health emergencies, all parties’ cooperation is the key to preventing and controlling the emergencies. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, we formulate a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving the local government, the enterprises, and the public, for the public health emergency, e.g., COVID-19. The evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions of the tripartite evolutionary game are explored, and the effect from different factors on the decision-makings of participants for public health emergencies is also analyzed. Numerical analysis results show that formulating reasonable subsidy measures, encouraging the participation of the public, and enforcing the punishment to enterprises for their negative behaviors can prompt three parties to cooperate in fighting against the epidemic. Our work enriches an understanding of the governance for the public health emergency and provides theoretical support for the local government and related participants to make proper decisions in public health emergencies.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public–private partnership projects

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Jinbo Song ◽  
Hehui Yuan ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public

PurposeWith the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.FindingsFirst, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.Originality/valueIn this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of Chinese cross border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology in supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 03078
Author(s):  
KunYang Liu ◽  
Yong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Technological Revolution ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Technical Ability ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
Mathematical Derivation

Blockchain technology is considered to be the representative technology of the fourth technological revolution, and logistics and supply chain field has been considered as the main application direction in the next step by industry and academia. In order to study the behavior and intention of Chinese cross-border logistics enterprises to introduce blockchain into internal supply chain, this paper constructs a model of cross-border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology on the basis of bounded rationality based on the game model, this paper attempts to find out the factors that affect the introduction of blockchain into the internal supply chain through mathematical derivation and numerical analysis. The game results show that the willingness of cross-border logistics enterprises to adopt blockchain is closely related to the technical ability of blockchain, the incremental performance after the introduction of blockchain, the conversion cost of blockchain technology, and other factors. Enterprises should coordinate various factors and choose to adopt blockchain technology according to their own situation.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Capital-Constrained Supplier’s and Manufacturer’s Financing Schemes

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Suyong Zhang ◽  
Panos. M. Pardalos ◽  
Xiaodan Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Risk ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Interaction Mechanism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategy Selection ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Purchase Order ◽  
Financing Strategy ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
Financing Schemes

Purchase order financing (POF) and buyer direct financing (BDF) are both innovative financing schemes aiming to help financial constrained suppliers secure financing for production. In this paper, we investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers’ financing strategy selection and manufacturers’ loans offering strategy adoption under two innovative financing schemes. We developed an evolutionary game model to effectively investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers and manufacturers and analyzed the evolutionary stable strategies of the game model. Then we used system dynamics to present the performance of the evolutionary game model and took a sensitivity analysis to verify the theoretical results. The main conclusions are as follows: in the supply chain, to deal with the noncooperation among suppliers and manufacturers on innovative financing schemes, the revenue of manufacturers, the rate of manufacturer loan, and the proper financial risk factor should be relatively high.

The Game Analysis for Financial Fraud Behavior of CPAs under the Shareholder Selecting Pattern

2014 ◽  
Vol 926-930 ◽  
pp. 4032-4036
Author(s):  
Ping Chen ◽  
Shuang Liang Tian
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Financial Fraud ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Audit Independence

CPAs enjoy higher audit independence under the shareholders selecting pattern, which is widely used in developed countries. According to the characteristics of shareholders selecting pattern, as well as that of listing companies’ managers and CPAs, we established asymmetric evolutionary game model between managers and CPAs, and researched the paths and the mechanism which two players’ behavior evolved respectively. Based on this, we discussed the forming conditions of financial fraud.

The Application of MATLAB Simulation Technology on Evolutionary Game Analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 1619-1621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Te Zhu ◽  
Cheng Hao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The United States ◽  
Simulation Software ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Engineering Analysis ◽  
Matlab Simulation ◽  
Simulation Technology ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Analysis And Design ◽  
Logistics Enterprises

System simulation software MATLAB is developed by the United States Mays Walker Corporation (Mathwork) for the study of engineering analysis and design process. On the basis of discussion on MATLAB simulation software, this paper introduces the evolutionary game model, and take the evolutionary game model between logistics enterprises and SMEs as an example , Showing the application of MATLAB simulation technology on evolutionary game.

scholarly journals Study on Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game of Emergency Management of Public Health Emergencies Based on Dynamic Rewards and Punishments

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (16) ◽  
pp. 8278
Author(s):  
Ruguo Fan ◽  
Yibo Wang ◽  
Jinchai Lin
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Emergency Management ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
And Control ◽  
Reward And Punishment

In the context of public health emergency management, it is worth studying ways to mobilize the enthusiasm of government, community, and residents. This paper adopts the method of combining evolutionary game and system dynamics to conduct a theoretical modeling and simulation analysis on the interactions of the behavioral strategies of the three participants. In response to opportunistic behavior and inadequate supervision in the static reward and punishment mechanism, we introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism that considers changes in the social environment and the situation of epidemic prevention and control. This paper proves that the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuation problem in the evolutionary game process under static scenarios and achieve better supervision results through scenario analysis and simulation experiments.

scholarly journals The evolutionary game analysis of cross-regional ecological compensation - based on the perspective of the main functional area

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 04043
Author(s):  
PAN He-si ◽  
LIU Hong-zhi
Keyword(s):  
Carrying Capacity ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Ecological Environment ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Functional Area ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Upper Limit

Under the new normal, the carrying capacity of ecological environment in China has reached or approached the upper limit. The root cause is the lack of an endogenous mechanism for the protection and compensation of forest resources. Therefore, clarifying the game relationship between stakeholders can help to break through the dilemma. An evolutionary game model between beneficiary regions and the protected regions was constructed, based on the “restraint-encouragement” mechanism of the central government.The results show that in cross-regional ecological compensation, the optimal strategy of “ protectioncompensation” depend on the net profits of local governments and the central government's fines.

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