scholarly journals Two-Player Location-Price Game in a Spoke Market with Linear Transportation Cost

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Chen ◽  
Qiankun Song

This paper investigates the location game of two players in a spoke market with linear transportation cost. A spoke market model has been proposed, which is inspired by the Hotelling model and develops two-player games in price competition. Using two-stage (position and price) patterns and the backward guidance method, the existence of price and location equilibrium results for the position games is proved.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Chen ◽  
Qiankun Song ◽  
Luqing Rong ◽  
Zhenjiang Zhao

This paper researches a location-price game in a dual-circle market system, where two circular markets are interconnected with different demand levels. Based on the Bertrand and Salop models, a double intersecting circle model is established for a dual-circle market system in which two players (firms) develop a spatial game under price competition. By a two-stage (location-then-price) structure and backward induction approach, the existence of price and location equilibrium outcomes is obtained for the location game. Furthermore, by Ferrari method for quartic equation, the location equilibrium is presented by algebraic expression, which directly reflects the relationship between the equilibrium position and the proportion factor of demand levels. Finally, an algorithm is designed to simulate the game process of two players in the dual-circle market and simulation results show that two players almost reach the equilibrium positions obtained by theory, wherever their initial positions are.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Haolong Liu ◽  
Xin Su ◽  
Xiaohui Wang ◽  
Xiao Li

The disordered price competition among various agricultural business agents leads to chaos of agricultural products’ prices, which makes it difficult for customers to form stable price expectation and correct brand cognition, restricting the sales of agricultural products with regional brands. Based on the Salop circular market model with bounded rationality and delayed feedback, this paper discusses the complexity in price competition of agricultural products with regional brands. It is found that when the price adjustment speed of agricultural business agents exceeds the stability region, the pricing system of agricultural products with regional brands would appear the phenomenon of periodic bifurcation or chaos. The delayed feedback controlling mechanism of price adjustment could make the pricing system in the chaos state turn to the equilibrium state. Therefore, the price fluctuation of agricultural products with regional brands needs reasonable control from the industrial associations and government departments.


Optimization ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 64 (11) ◽  
pp. 2477-2493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto A. Pinto ◽  
Telmo Parreira

2011 ◽  
Vol 135-136 ◽  
pp. 274-278
Author(s):  
Lan Xia ◽  
Ting Ting Song

As market competition intensifies, Price competition as the most common and effective way of market competition among operators is quite active. Used game theory, analysis price game and inter-enterprise competition by Bertrand model, and illustrated the importance of product differentiation and build the core competitiveness by case.


2013 ◽  
Vol 59 (No. 8) ◽  
pp. 341-347
Author(s):  
P. Fousekis ◽  
D. Panagiotou

The objective of the present paper is to analyze the location-price competition in circular markets where the power lies with the buyers. To this end, it considers two alternative market structures. Namely, the pure ones, where the buyers of a primary commodity are private firms, and mixed ones, where a private firm competes against a producer’s co-operative. According to the results, the pure-strategy location equilibrium in both cases involves a distance between the two players larger or equal to 1/4. Nevertheless, the equilibriums are qualitatively different. In the pure duopsony, a large distance is required to prevent a price war while in the mixed duopsony, the private firm tries to stay away from the co-op in order to ensure a strictly positive profit.    


2014 ◽  
Vol 136 (8) ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Ross Morrow ◽  
Joshua Mineroff ◽  
Kate S. Whitefoot

Researchers in decision-based design (DBD) have suggested that business objectives, e.g., profits, should replace engineering requirements or performance metrics as the objective for engineering design. This requires modeling market performance, including consumer preferences and competition between firms. Game-theoretic “design-then-pricing” models—i.e., product design anticipating future price competition–provide an important framework for integrating consumer preferences and competition when design decisions must be made before prices are decided by a firm or by its competitors. This article concerns computational optimization in a design-then-pricing model. We argue that some approaches may be fundamentally difficult for existing solvers and propose a method that exhibits both improved efficiency and reliability relative to existing methods. Numerical results for a vehicle design example validate our theoretical arguments and examine the impact of anticipating pricing competition on design decisions. We find that anticipating pricing competition, while potentially important for accurately forecasting profits, does not necessarily have a significant effect on optimal design decisions. Most existing examples suggest otherwise, anticipating competition in prices is important to choosing optimal designs. Our example differs in the importance of design constraints, that reduce the influence the market model has on optimal designs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1975-1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
Biswajit Sarkar ◽  
◽  
Bijoy Kumar Shaw ◽  
Taebok Kim ◽  
Mitali Sarkar ◽  
...  

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Conrad

Abstract The objective of our approach is to develop a model that captures horizontal product differentiation under environmental awareness with price competition whereby environmentally friendly products are costlier to produce. As an example, we refer to automobile producers offering cars with a gasoline-powered engine and one with a natural gas-powered engine. The network of petrol stations provides the complementary good. We use a two-stage game in prices and characteristics to analyse the market structure. In order to find out whether a private decision on the type of engine coincides with a socially optimal product differentiation, we determine the position of the two types of engine by a welfaremaximizing authority.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Feng Yang

In the early stages of a major public emergency, decision-makers were troubled by the timely distribution of a large number of donations. In order to distribute caring materials reasonably and efficiently, considering the transportation cost and time delay cost, this paper takes the humanitarian logistics management as an example to study the scheduling problem. Based on the actual situation of insufficient supply during the humanitarian logistics management, this paper using optimization theory establishes a two-stage stochastic chance constrained (TS-SCC) model. In addition, due to the randomness of emergency occurrence and uncertainty of demand, the TS-SCC model is further transformed into the two-stage robust counterpart (TS-RC) model. At the same time, the validity of the model and the efficiency of the algorithm are verified by simulations. The result shows that the model and algorithm constructed are capable to obtain the distribution scheme of caring materials even in worst case. In the TS-BRC (with box set) model, the logistics service level increased from 89.83% to 93.21%, while in the TS-BPRC (with mixed box and polyhedron set) model, it increases from 90.32% to 94.96%. Besides, the model built in this paper can provide a more reasonable dispatching plan according to the actual situation of caring material supply.


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