scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Three Players on Behavioural Strategy of P2P Lending Participants: A Sustainable Operations Perspective

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Ge You ◽  
Hao Guo ◽  
Abd Alwahed Dagestani ◽  
Shuai Deng
Keyword(s):  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Sustainable Operations ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Sustainable Operation ◽  
Behavioural Strategy ◽  
P2p Lending ◽  
Behavioural Strategies

In China, most of peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms do not possess operational sustainability due to excessive defaults. To address this problem, the conflict of interests among P2P lending participants is discussed using a stakeholder approach. An evolutionary game model (EGM) of three players is developed to analyse the interactions among regulatory authorities, P2P lending platforms, and borrowers. Then, the asymptotic of the equilibrium and evolutionary stability strategies of the EGM are analysed. Results indicate that either the P2P lending platforms or borrowers will choose “noncompliant operation” or “default” strategies from a short-term perspective, and the strict supervision of the P2P lending platform in the short term is necessary for the sustainable operation of the platform. When supervision is intensified in the early stage and regulatory pressure becomes a normal state, P2P lending platforms and borrowers will actively select “compliant operation” and “repayment” strategies even if there is a lack of regulation in the future. Meanwhile, the behavioural strategies of P2P lending participants can be changed to conform to the sustainability of P2P lending by reducing the costs of strict supervision and increasing the damage caused by general supervision, reward and punishment coefficient for P2P lending platforms, repayment incentives of borrowers, and defaulting opportunity costs. Finally, suggestions for regulating the behaviours of P2P lending participants and promoting sustainability of P2P lending industry are discussed.

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Management of R&D Staff

2010 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 216-219
Author(s):  
Zheng Kui Zhu ◽  
Hai Shu Lu
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Methods ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Strategy Choice ◽  
Game Analysis

At present, by using qualitative methods, many scholars studied their motivation mechanisms and analyzed their motivation factor and processes from the perspective of behavior and psychology, but attempts to consider the interaction among the R&D staff, between the R&D staff and the enterprises have been very few. So, this paper establishes an evolutionary game models for studying motivation mechanisms of the R&D staff under the assumptions that the enterprises and the R&D staff all have bounded rationality. By using replicator dynamics equations, this paper analyses the strategy choice on the interaction between the R&D staff and the enterprises, among the R&D staff, and furthermore, discusses the evolutionary stability strategies of the R&D staff and the enterprises.

scholarly journals How does the Quantity of Disclosed Information Provided by Insurers Affect Entity Behaviors in Internet Insurance Market?: A Study Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis between Government, Insurance Companies and Consumers

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (No. 2 Oct 2019) ◽  
pp. 29-42
Author(s):  
Shao Jie
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Consumption Pattern ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
China And Japan

The emergence of internet insurance provides a new consumption pattern for insurance consumers in the e-commerce era. However, without insurers fulfilling duty of disclosure, consumers’ interests cannot be guaranteed. This paper will analyze the costs and benefits of three parties (i.e. government, insurance companies and consumers) and their strategies regarding information disclosure of insurance products on the internet. Using an evolutionary game model under bounded rationality assumptions, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) of the system are explored. The results show that (Disclosing, not Regulating, not Complain) is the best ESS and it is consumers’ buying decision not regulation that ultimately compels insurers to disclose enough information. The different current situations in China and Japan are discussed in light of the model, and some measures are suggested to promote the development of internet insurance markets in both countries.

scholarly journals Early Confirmation of Mycoplasma pneumoniae Infection by Two Short-Term Serologic IgM Examination

Diagnostics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 353
Author(s):  
Ha Eun Jeon ◽  
Hyun Mi Kang ◽  
Eun Ae Yang ◽  
Hye Young Han ◽  
Seung Beom Han ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mycoplasma Pneumoniae ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Immunoglobulin M ◽  
Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Serologic Tests ◽  
Polymerase Chain ◽  
Positive Correlations ◽  
Patient Selection Bias ◽  
Mycoplasma Pneumoniae Infection

The aim of the present study is to re-evaluate the clinical application of two-times serologic immunoglobulin M (IgM) tests using microparticle agglutination assay (MAA), an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assay in diagnosing Mycoplasma pneumoniae (MP) infection. A retrospective analysis of 62 children with MP pneumonia during a recent epidemic (2019–2020) was conducted. The MAA and ELISA immunoglobulin M (IgM) and IgG measurements were conducted twice at admission and around discharge, and MP PCR once at presentation. Diagnostic rates in each test were calculated at presentation and at discharge. The seroconverters were 39% (24/62) of patients tested by MAA and 29% (18/62) by ELISA. At presentation, the diagnostic positive rates of MAA, ELISA, and PCR tests were 61%, 71%, and 52%, respectively. After the second examination, the rates were 100% in both serologic tests. There were positive correlations between the titers of MAA and the IgM values of ELISA. The single serologic IgM or PCR tests had limitations to select patients infected with MP in the early stage. The short-term, paired IgM serologic tests during hospitalization can reduce patient-selection bias in MP infection studies.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

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