scholarly journals The Green Product’s Pricing Strategy in a Dual Channel considering Manufacturer’s Risk Attitude

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Junjie Ma ◽  
Wenchao Yu ◽  
Shuxia Li ◽  
Linghong Zhang ◽  
Shaobin Zang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Environmental Awareness ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Demand Forecast ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Dual Channel

This paper develops a two-echelon green supply chain that consists of one green manufacturer and one retailer. The green manufacturer has both online direct and offline retail channels. Considering manufacturer’s risk attitude and product’s green level, the paper constructs centralized and decentralized game models when the online channel’s demand is uncertain. Furthermore, this paper analyzes the impacts of a set of factors, including consumer environmental awareness (CEA), product green level, and risk attitude on decision-making in the supply chain. Finally, we present numerical examples. The main findings are as follows: the manufacturer and the retailer will benefit from the improvement of CEA; hence, they could invest more to obtain more profits by improving CEA; manufacturer’s risk attitude has a negative impact on the pricing and profits of the supply chain; as such, the members of the supply chain should improve the accuracy of their demand forecast, so as to minimize risks and losses resulting from uncertainty in demand.

Price and Carbon Emissions Level Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain: Insights from Carbon Labelling

2013 ◽  
Vol 572 ◽  
pp. 668-671
Author(s):  
Yong Hong Cheng ◽  
Zhong Kai Xiong ◽  
Yu Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Environmental Awareness ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Purchasing Behavior ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Initial Carbon

To analyze the effects of carbon labelling on firms production and marketing decisions, as well as consumers purchasing behavior, we consider a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer and assume the market demand is both price-and carbon emissions level-sensitive, then the optimal decisions policies for pricing and carbon emissions level are discussed under decentralized and centralized decision-making. Interestingly, our results show that only when the initial carbon emissions level of the product is less than a certain threshold, as consumers environmental awareness increasing, the amount of carbon emissions per unit of output produced will decrease. On the contrary, the carbon emissions level will increase. Moreover, we found that when consumers environmental awareness maintains the same level, the centralized decision-making is more conducive to reduce carbon emissions and improve whole supply chain performance. Finally, some numerical examples are given to verify the research results.

scholarly journals A Cross-Channel Return Policy in a Green Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Spillover Effect

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2171
Author(s):  
Huanyong Zhang ◽  
Huiyuan Xu ◽  
Xujin Pu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Return Policy ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Willingness To Buy ◽  
Differential Pricing ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

With the advent of the era of “New Retail”, many manufacturers and retailers have begun to provide cross-channel return services to increase competitiveness. Our study takes return policy into a green dual-channel supply chain, wherein a manufacturer creates and sells green products simultaneously. We investigate the pricing and greening strategies for the supply chain players in the cases of providing and not providing cross-channel return service by employing the Stackelberg model under the hypothesis of a consistent pricing strategy. By comparing the equilibrium results of two cases, we find that the retailer will cooperate with the manufacturer to employ the cross-channel return policy when the spillover effect is greater than a threshold. Additionally, the green level of products is higher than before. The threshold decreases with consumers’ sensitivity to green products, which implies that the manufacturer is motivated to conduct marketing programs to enhance consumers’ willingness to buy green products. Moreover, we propose a contract to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we discuss the scenarios if the supply chain implements a differential pricing strategy. Interestingly, the green level and the profits of the whole supply chain are greater than that under a consistent pricing strategy. However, the profits of the retailer are lower than profits in the other scenario, which is not beneficial to creating a stable green supply chain.

scholarly journals Reverse logistics pricing strategy for a green supply chain: A view of customers' environmental awareness

2019 ◽  
Vol 217 ◽  
pp. 197-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daqiang Chen ◽  
Joshua Ignatius ◽  
Danzhi Sun ◽  
Shalei Zhan ◽  
Chenyu Zhou ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Reverse Logistics ◽  
Environmental Awareness ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Green Supply Chain

scholarly journals Dynamic vs. Static Wholesale Pricing Strategies in a Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongzhao Wang ◽  
Xiaojie Sun
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
High Energy ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Wholesale Pricing

With the improvement of social environmental awareness, the dual-channel green product sales mode has been widely used by many manufacturing firms. In this paper, we consider a dual-channel green supply chain where one manufacturer produces a green product and sells it through one retail channel and its own direct channel. Consumers in the two channels have different perceptions of the product energy efficiency level due to different purchasing experiences. The product energy efficiency level evolves over time and is characterized as a dynamic variable. By developing and solving the Stackelberg differential game problems under the dynamic and static wholesale pricing strategies, respectively, we obtain the main results in this paper. First, the manufacturer has more incentives to invest in green innovation when more consumers buy the green product through the direct channel. Second, the manufacturer prefers to adopt the dynamic wholesale pricing strategy in most cases and prefers the static one only when the consumers in both channels have relatively high energy efficiency perceptions. By introducing the transfer payment contract, we show that the static wholesale pricing strategy may be the better choice, which leads to a win-win outcome for both members. Finally, sensitivity analysis further provides some managerial insights and verifies the robustness of the results.

scholarly journals Decision and Coordination in a Dual-Channel Three-Layered Green Supply Chain

Symmetry ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zilong Song ◽  
Shiwei He ◽  
Baifeng An
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Performance ◽  
Fresh Produce ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Sustainable Performance ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Social And Environmental Performance

This paper investigated, for the first time, the game and coordination of a dual-channel, three-layered, green fresh produce supply chain, with regard to its economic, social, and environmental performance. Considering that the market demand is dual-channel priced and sensitive to the degree of greenness and the freshness-level, four game models, under different scenarios have been established. These included a centralized scenario, a decentralized scenario, and two contractual scenarios. The equilibrium solutions under the four scenarios were characterized. From the perspective of a sustainable development, the economic, social, and environmental performance of the supply chain was analyzed. To enhance the supply chain performance, two contract mechanisms were designed and the conditions for a multi-win outcome were obtained. Accordingly, many propositions and management implications were provided. The results showed that, (1) compared to the centralized supply chain case, the performance of the decentralized supply chain case is inferior; (2) in addition to increasing the concentration of the supply chain decisions, the two contracts proposed can effectively coordinate the green supply chain and improve its sustainable performance; and (3) the performance of the supply chain is positively driven by the consumers’ sensitivity to greenness degree and the freshness level of fresh produce. This paper fills a research gap and helps the participants of the channel recognize the operational decision principle of a complex green supply chain, in order to achieve a higher and a long-term sustainable-development performance.

scholarly journals Decision-making for Green Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concern Based on Trade Credit

IEEE Access ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
Haoxiong Yang ◽  
Enlu Shao ◽  
Yuanyuan Gong ◽  
Xiaolin Guan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Fairness Concern

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

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