scholarly journals Research on Financial Hedging Decision Based on Exchange Rate Risk in Transnational Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Liang Wang ◽  
Xianyan Xiong ◽  
Mengmeng Hui

This paper considers a three-echelon manufacturer-retailer-supplier supply chain, the purpose of which is to investigate the influence of the bilateral exchange rate risks of import and export and the leading company’s financial hedging on the decision-makers of the supply chain. Firstly, it constructs the profit function and the financial hedging decision-making model of each member in the decentralized supply chain. Secondly, it introduces the incentive mechanism of exchange rate risk hedging in the centralized supply chain. Thirdly, from the perspective of wholesale price agreements and revenue-sharing contracts, it discusses the impact of financial hedging behavior and bilateral exchange rate risks on the decision-making process of each member through mathematical modeling. Finally, it explores the relationships of decision variables through simulation analysis. The results illustrate that (i) for decentralized and centralized decision-making, the manufacturer’s expected profit and profit variance decrease with the increase of the fluctuations of import and export exchange rates under the hedging strategy for exchange rate risks; (ii) compared with the decentralized supply chain, the manufacturer’s expected profit in the centralized supply chain decreases slightly under the revenue-sharing contract; (iii) in the centralized supply chain, if the manufacturer’s risk hedging ratio is high, its profit variance is smaller than that of the decentralized supply chain and the expected profits of the retailer and the supplier will increase significantly; and (iv) for the members of the transnational supply chain, centralized decision-making is better than decentralized decision-making.

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Jiaquan Yang ◽  
Xumei Zhang ◽  
Yating Huang ◽  
Jiafu Su ◽  
Sang-Bing Tsai ◽  
...  

The dual-channel supply chain is widely adopted by main manufacturers, potentially incurring channel conflicts between the traditional retail channel which is owned by the independent retailer and the online channel which is directly managed by the manufacturer. The purpose of this paper is to deal with the scenario where channel conflicts may arise under production capacity uncertainty, when the manufacturer tends to privilege the direct selling channel over the retail selling channel. To achieve the goal, this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, studies the scenario where the manufacturer satisfies the direct selling channel first in the presence of capacity uncertainty, employs the decision optimization and the backward induction method to find the optimal inventory decision in the direct selling channel and the optimal order quantity decision making in the retail selling channel, and designs a compensation mechanism aiming to coordinate the channel conflict in the decentralized decision-making process. Results show that the optimal decisions aiming to maximize the expected profit of each supply chain member are not able to maximize the expected profit of entire dual-channel supply chain. However, when the manufacturer compensates the retailer’s profit loss based on the unsatisfied order and, in the meantime, adjusts the wholesale price to prevent the retailer which obtains the compensation from increasing order significantly, the compensation mechanism can coordinate the decision of each supply chain member, mitigate the channel conflict, maximize the expected profit of entire dual-channel supply chain, and achieve the Pareto improvement of supply chain members’ expected profit in the decentralized decision-making process.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Xue ◽  
Ruifeng Gong ◽  
Laijun Zhao ◽  
Xiaoqing Ji ◽  
Yan Xu

Government subsidies are a common policy adopted to promote energy conservation and emission reduction. The decision-making that occurs within the green supply chain for energy-saving products under government subsidies is an area of great academic interest and game theory is becoming a popular tool in such research. In this paper, we examined centralized and decentralized decision-making models for the green supply chain and a coordinated decision-making model for revenue-sharing contracts based on game theory. We studied the effects of government subsidies on retail prices, energy conservation levels, market demand, supply chain profits, and social welfare for energy-saving products. We then compared the effectiveness of the three models using a numerical example. Our results revealed the range of contract parameters for which manufacturer and retailer profits increase. Our results show that government subsidies can significantly improve social welfare and promote the improvement of energy-saving products. Centralized decision-making generates higher profits than decentralized decisions and government subsidies were positively correlated with the level of energy conservation, product prices, and market demand. Revenue sharing contract coordination decisions can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the same effect as centralized decisions.


2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee-Lee Chong ◽  
Xiao-Jun Chang ◽  
Siow-Hooi Tan

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to delineate the factors influencing the use of financial derivatives by non-financial firms in managing their exchange rate exposure. In total, 219 non-financial firms are surveyed in regard to their financial hedging decision. Design/methodology/approach – This study is conducted via a survey and the questionnaires were sent to the treasurers and financial controller of the firms. Descriptive analysis is employed to assess the profiles of the respondents. Then, factor analysis is carried out to determine the factors influencing the use of financial derivatives in Malaysia. Findings – The results indicate that the hedging decision of non-financial firms is influenced by their assertive level toward the market and regulators and also how flexible they are for derivative instruments. The intellectual capability that firms acquire to perform hedging strategies is also vital in influencing them to make hedging decision. Practical implications – The insights of this survey would assist and prepare firms to hedge their exchange rate risk by employing financial derivatives. Knowing the influences of firms' adoption of currency derivatives would allow policy makers to formulate their policies in boosting the liquidity of Malaysian derivative market. Originality/value – This study presents findings on the factors influencing the execution of financial hedging by non-financial firms in Malaysia. Survey data are used to seek for the feedback from the market players in order to provide empirical evidence on the corporate use of financial hedging.


2014 ◽  
Vol 668-669 ◽  
pp. 1587-1590
Author(s):  
Jin Yu Ren ◽  
Yong Xian Liu ◽  
Peng Fei Zeng

To a decentralized supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and multiple independent retailers, the game models about the decentralized solution and centralized solution are developed. Comparison of the optimal solutions to two models reveals that the supply chain needs coordination. Then a coordination model on the revenue-sharing contracts is introduced. Finally, a numerical example shows that the perfect supply chain coordination and the flexible allocation of the profit can be achieved when a complementary profit-sharing agreement is included.


2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (32) ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
Ricardo Salazar Garza ◽  

This paper is about developing a nonlinear model to predict the behavior of future exchange rate based on the opinion of the economic agents participating in the dollar/peso market. Such views are treated with Fuzzy Logic and a variant of it, known as the Theory of Forgotten Effects. The aim is to find a mechanism for making coverage decisions that allow us an optimal exchange rate risk management at a lower cost than that which involves operations with traditional hedging instruments. For the period of investigation and applying this model, the results support that the collective opinions of economic experts involved in the decision making risk management of exchange rate provide better results than those using traditional methods in the future markets.


Author(s):  
C. Shi ◽  
B. Chen

Setting performance targets and managing to achieve them is fundamental to business success. As a result, it is common for managers to adopt a satisficing objective—that is, to maximize the probability of achieving some preset target profit level. This is especially true when companies are increasingly engaged in short-term relationships enabled by electronic commerce. In this chapter, our main focus is a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer, both with the satisficing objective. The supply chain is examined under three types of commonly used contracts: wholesale price, buy back, and quantity flexibility contracts. Because a coordinating contract has to be Pareto optimal regardless of the bargaining powers among the agents, we first identify the Pareto-optimal contract(s) for each contractual form. Second, we identify the contractual forms that are capable of coordination of the supply chain with the satisficing objectives. In contrast to the well-known results for the supply chain with the objectives of expected profit maximization, we show that wholesale price contracts can coordinate the supply chain with the satisficing objectives, whereas buy back contracts cannot. Furthermore, quantity flexibility contracts have to degenerate into wholesale price contracts to coordinate the supply chain. This provides an important justification for the popularity of wholesale price contracts besides their simplicities and lower administration costs. Finally, we discuss possible extensions to the model by considering different types of objectives for different agents.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document