scholarly journals Behavioral Analysis of Subjects for Green Technology Innovation: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Yongquan Guo ◽  
Hua Zou ◽  
Zhu Liu
Keyword(s):  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Strategic Choice ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Simulation Software ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Green Technologies ◽  
Technology Application ◽  
Technology Applications ◽  
The Government

The application of green technologies can reduce environmental hazards and promote sustainability. The connotation of green technology innovation has two main aspects: the first aspect is the generation of green technology from nothing to something, and the other aspect is the improvement and upgrading of existing green technology; these two aspects are related. However, from the existing research, there are relatively few studies on the process of green technology innovation from these two aspects at the same time. If green technology is not studied from this perspective, the evolutionary process and influencing factors of green technology from generation to development cannot be clarified, which is not conducive to the development of green technology and the realization of the goal of environmental friendliness. Research considers the green innovation process from R&D to upgrading linkages and analyses the roles of government departments, green technology R&D institutions, and green technology application enterprises in green technology innovation. In addition, the green technology application enterprises are considered to promote technology enhancement through technology application feedback with green technology R&D institutions. The evolutionary game model of three subjects was established, the strategic evolution process of different subjects was analyzed, the influence of each element on the strategic choice of different subjects was explored, and the stability analysis of strategic choice was conducted using simulation software. The study shows the following: (1) The greater the government’s punishment and support to green technology R&D institutions, the more favorable it is for green technology R&D institutions to carry out green technology R&D. (2) In green technology applications, if the government has no direct interest relationship with green technology application enterprises, the enterprises will choose negative response behavior. (3) The greater the technology enhancement gains of green technology R&D institutions and the greater the feedback gains of technology applications actively carried out by enterprises in response to the government’s call, the more the government departments tend to support green technology R&D.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

scholarly journals How to Promote Compliance Management in the Electricity Market? An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Cheng Chen ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Yuanyuan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises' choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies' choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Government Supervision and Private Sector Ecological Technology Innovation Behavior for Water Environment Treatment PPP Projects on the basis of Public Participation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huimin Li ◽  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Lelin Lv ◽  
Qing Xia ◽  
Lunyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Water Environment ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Innovation Behavior

Ecological technology innovation with environmental benefits as the core has become an inevitable choice for water environment treatment PPP projects (WETP-PPP), and government supervision and public participation are essential driving factors for eco-technological innovation. To explore the influence of the public participation on the behavior of government and private sector in the WETP-PPP, this study constructed an asymmetric evolutionary game model of government supervision and private sector ecological technology innovation behavior under public participation. The main contribution of this study is to explore the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior in different scenarios. The results showed that the government can reduce the supervision cost by increasing the public's active participation and improving environmental regulation measures to achieve a win-win situation of economic and environmental performance.

scholarly journals Profit Distribution and Stability Analysis of Joint Distribution Alliance Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Under the Background of Green and Low-Carbon

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renbin Han ◽  
Mengke Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Environmental Benefit ◽  
Logistics Industry ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
The Government

Abstract Joint distribution is an advanced logistics organization model for improving the quality and efficiency of express logistics industry and achieve high-quality development of logistics, but the distribution of common profit has always been a key obstacle to the effective development of joint distribution. Based on the background of green and low-carbon, this paper explores a fairer and more reasonable profit distribution scheme. The profit game between the government and the two types of member enterprises is analyzed. By focusing on how the government plays a role in inducing the joint distribution alliance to bring the green and low-carbon requirements into the profit distribution, the strategy evolution process of the three parties, the factors affecting the profit distribution and the stability of alliance are discussed through the establishment of "government-member enterprise A-member enterprise B" tripartite evolutionary game model. Finally, the evolutionary game model is numerically simulated based on system dynamics. It is found that: (1) It is necessary for the government to guide and motivate the alliance to create internal incentives and constraints. The effect of government subsidies and rewards to member enterprises is greater than the penalties for member enterprises. (2) The member enterprises are likely to conspire together to defraud government subsidies and rewards, carry out "free riding" and other speculative activities, which makes it necessary for the government and the alliance to establish supervision mechanism, information disclosure mechanism, and property rights protection system. (3) The willingness of member enterprise to positively cooperate will increase with the increase of the additional benefit coefficient, the proportion of profit distribution and the importance of environmental benefit factor; and will decrease with the increase of the cost of promoting green distribution operations.

scholarly journals Research on Cooperative Behavior of Green Technology Innovation in Construction Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game

Buildings ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Qing’e Wang ◽  
Wei Lai ◽  
Mengmeng Ding ◽  
Qi Qiu
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
Cooperative Evolution ◽  
Cooperative Strategies ◽  
Punishment Mechanism

The dynamic evolution game model is built by using evolutionary game theory, and the evolutionarily stable strategy is analyzed by matlab2018b software in this paper. The cooperation willingness, sharing level, income distribution, and punishment mechanism are comprehensively considered in this model, and numerical simulations of the influence of various influencing factors on the cooperation strategy selection of green technology innovation for construction enterprises are carried out. Then, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward. The results of evolutionary game analysis show that the cooperation willingness, sharing level, income distribution, and punishment mechanism have a significant impact on the cooperative evolution direction of green technology innovation for construction enterprises, separately. Stronger cooperation willingness or higher relative value of positive spillover, or reasonable income distribution can promote partners to adopt active cooperative strategies, while appropriately increasing punishment intensity can prevent opportunistic behaviors and improve the probability of success of cooperative innovation.

scholarly journals TEKNOLOGI HIJAU: SOLUSI UNTUK PELESTARIAN SUMBER AIR

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nefilinda Nefilinda
Keyword(s):  
Waste Water ◽  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Global Warming ◽  
Water Resources ◽  
Waste Water Treatment ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Green Technologies ◽  
Treatment Technology ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

This study aims to determine how these green technologies is a solution to preserve water resources. The research method is literature. The results obtained are: climate change caused by global warming are already being felt its impact in people's lives. If no preventive efforts, the impact of global warming in the future is a very serious threat to the lives of all the creatures on earth. In the face of the impact of Global Warming necessary mitigation efforts and adaptation that involves the community, such as water resource conservation technology with plant biology (bio-park), domestic waste water treatment technology with ecological sanitation (Ecosan), flower garden waste water (waste water garden), sanitation garden (sanita) and the concept of green technology (green tecnology). Green technology is one of adaptation and mitigation of the impact of Global Warming which is in line with the principle of sustainable development (sustainable development). Various Green Technology in the field of preservation of water resources and wastewater treatment has been available to be applied in the construction. Suggestions in this study are: for the government to attempt to campaign for the use of green technology and for the community also can use green technology in order to minimize global warming ranging from the household.Keywords: green technology and conservation of water resources

Game Behavior Analysis of Social Proportion on Low Carbon Energy Technology Innovation Risk

2013 ◽  
Vol 807-809 ◽  
pp. 892-896 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shi Zhao ◽  
Ke Fan Xie
Keyword(s):  
Technological Innovation ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Social Risk ◽  
Energy Technology ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
The Government ◽  
Low Carbon Energy

With the prominence of energy crisis and environmental pollution problem, low carbon energy technology innovation is becoming the key of global economy sustainable development. But, for the particularity of technology, the low carbon energy technology innovation has enormous risk. Therefore proportion of low carbon energy technology innovation risk through social channels slowly becomes the crux to promoting the development of low carbon energy technology innovation. As the core subjects in risk proportion of technological innovation, enterprises and social risk-sharing organizations all start to select and adjust their strategy in exploration and trial and error and to seek equilibrium point of interest, thus form a dynamic game process. In this paper, the premise of bounded rationality assumptions of evolutionary game theory has been used as an analytical tool to construct evolutionary game model of social proportion of technological innovation risk, and thus to the stability analysis for both the main strategy of evolution. Results of the evolutionary game analysis show that the participation of a third promoting force play a decisive role in the operation and development of social proportion system of technological innovation risk, thus this paper raised conceptions and recommendations for the government that they should take part in the risk prevention system of low carbon energy technology innovation as a conductor and coordinator.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model of Collaborative Innovation Between Enterprises and Colleges Under Government Participation of China

SAGE Open ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 215824402199485
Author(s):  
Nina Su ◽  
Zhuqin Shi ◽  
Xianqi Zhu ◽  
Yunsheng Xin
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Higher Learning ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Institutions Of Higher Learning ◽  
Innovation Cost ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Reasonable Range ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Ideal

The three-party evolutionary game model of government, enterprises, and institutions of higher learning is established, and the dynamic evolution process of collaborative innovation behavior is discussed under the two strategies of “incentive” and “non-incentive” chosen by the government. The results show that under the premise of stronger innovation consciousness of the government and institutions and smaller the innovation cost of enterprises, the system is easier to reach the ideal state. The incentive degree of government should be controlled within a reasonable range to prevent enterprises from falling into a bad state because of the temptation of economic interests.

Study on Participant Behavior Game of Electronic Products Reverse Supply Chain Based on ECP

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 411-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingbao Wang ◽  
Zhiping Du ◽  
Hong Duan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Simulation Method ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Electronic Products ◽  
The Government ◽  
Differential Equation Method ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Abstract In this paper, a game model composed of three subjects — government, manufacturer and consumer has been built by using Evolutionary Game Theory on the basis of analyzing the trilateral game strategy of waste mobile reverse supply chain based on ECP; an evolutionary equilibrium model is to be sought for by utilizing the replication dynamic differential equation method; and the trilateral game strategy’s revolutionary trend and consistency have been analyzed by means of SD simulation method when government implements the static or dynamic reward and punishment strategy. The finding results reveal that, under the static reward and punishment strategy, the revolutionary process of trilateral game strategy is always unstable whether the initial behavior strategy is unitary or mixed. Therefore, it is more reasonable for the government to adopt the strategy of dynamic reward and punishment, and it is also stable and reciprocal for all the stakeholders when implementing this strategy.

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