scholarly journals Comparison of Cooperation Modes in a Two-Period Closed-Loop Supply Chain System considering Green Manufacturing

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Chunmei Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Provider ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Green Manufacturing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Game Theoretical Approach ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Better Than

In order to improve the efficiency of collection and green manufacturing level in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system, the manufacturer invests green manufacturing efforts in product design and production process and intends to cooperate with other CLSC members to achieve excellent performance. In a two-period CLSC system consisting of one manufacturer, one retailer, and one third-service provider, a game-theoretical approach is adopted to compare the optimal decisions and profits of the three green manufacturing cooperation modes, namely, the manufacturer cooperates with the retailer and third-service provider, respectively, and the noncooperation mode is a benchmark. Moreover, the impact of different cooperation modes on CLSC decision-making is analyzed as well. The results indicate that the influence of difference among cooperation modes on CLSC decision is significant, and cooperation is always better than noncooperation. From the perspective of consumers as well as recycling and profit, although the collection rate of used products is not the highest when the manufacturer cooperates with the retailer, the price of product is the lowest and the green property of product is the most obvious; thus, this is regarded as the suitable cooperation mode after a comprehensive analysis. Besides, a coordination mechanism is designed to solve the inefficiency caused by double marginalization. Finally, numerical examples are presented to intuitively observe the relationships between decisions and profits and the impact of different parameters on them in the three modes, and some management inspirations are proposed ultimately.

scholarly journals Warranty Decision Model and Remanufacturing Coordination Mechanism in Closed-Loop Supply Chain: View from a Consumer Behavior Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Ji Zhang ◽  
Chenliang Li ◽  
Yizhao Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Service

The remanufacturing warranty strategy has become an effective mechanism for reducing consumer risk and stimulating market demand in closed-loop supply chain management. Based on the characteristics of consumers’ behavior of purchase decisions, this paper studies the warranty decision model of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under the Stackelberg game model. The present study discussed and compared the decision variables, including remanufacturing product pricing, extended warranty service pricing, warranty period and supply chain system profit. The research shows that consumers’ decision-making significantly affirms the dual marginalization effect of the supply chain system while significantly affecting the supply chain warranty decision; the improved revenue sharing contract and the two charge contracts respectively coordinates the manufacturer-led and retail-oriented closed-loop supply chain system, which effectively implements the Pareto improvement of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services. In the present study, the model is verified and analyzed by numerical simulation.

Study on Discrimination Pricing Model of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Product Remanufacturing

2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 663-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Product ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions

With awareness of environmental protection strengthens and constraints of regulations and laws to environmental protection increasing, more and more enterprises focus on the closed-loop supply chain management. Considering difference between new product and remanufactured product, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with manufacturers recycling used products directly from the consumers based on game theory. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profit of centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. At last, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the two-part tariff contract.

Research on Coordination in the Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Remanufacturing

2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 319-322
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Product ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions

Based on game theory, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with retailer recycling used products from the consumers incorporating difference between new product and remanufactured product. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profits of centralized coordinated and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. Finally, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the profit sharing contract.

scholarly journals How Retailer Co-Opetition Impacts Pricing, Collecting and Coordination in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (18) ◽  
pp. 10025
Author(s):  
Xinyi Li ◽  
Guoxuan Huang ◽  
Jie Chu ◽  
Benrong Zheng ◽  
Kai Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Bertrand Competition ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Electronic Manufacturing ◽  
Sustainable Performance ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Impact

The cooperative and competitive (i.e., co-opetition) behavior between retailers plays a significant role in the development of operations and marketing strategies in a supply chain. Specifically, retailers’ co-opetition relationship pivotally influences the sustainable performance in a closed-loop supply chain. This study examines the impact of retailer co-opetition on pricing, collection decisions and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers. Based on observations in some industries (e.g., electronic manufacturing, fabric and textile, etc.), the cooperative and competitive relationships between retailers can be classified into the following three different modes: Bertrand competition, Stackelberg competition, and Collusion. In this paper, we establish a centralized and three decentralized game-theoretic models under these three co-opetition modes and characterize the corresponding equilibrium outcomes. The results indicate that the Bertrand competition mode yields the highest return rate, which is also superior to the other two modes for both the manufacturer and the supply chain system in terms of profitability. However, it can be shown that which mode benefits the retailers would depend on the degree of competition between the retailers and the relative remanufacturing efficiency. Interestingly, we find that the retailer’s first-move advantage does not necessarily lead to higher profits. In addition, we design a modified two-part tariff contract to coordinate the decentralized closed-loop supply chains under three different retailer co-opetition modes, and the results suggest that the optimal contractual parameters in the contracts highly rely on the remanufacturing efficiency and the competition degree between the two retailers. Several managerial insights for firms, consumers and policy makers are provided through numerical analysis.

scholarly journals A Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Based on Third-Party Recycling

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (19) ◽  
pp. 5335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiafu Su ◽  
Chi Li ◽  
Qingjun Zeng ◽  
Jiaquan Yang ◽  
Jie Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

Taking an environment-friendly green closed-loop supply chain as the research object, this work established a two-stage closed-loop supply chain game model. Considering the influence of the environmental protection input on the whole supply chain, there are different decisions among the participants in the supply chain, and the different choices will have impacts on the benefits of the whole supply chain when manufacturers select a closed-loop supply chain model of third-party recycling. Hence, this work compared and analyzed the impact of centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making on the returns and pricing strategies of each participant. Finally, an optimized cooperative mechanism decision model considering a cost profit sharing contract was further designed. The model is conducive to obtaining the maximum profit value in centralized decision-making and avoids the negative impact of a “double marginal effect” on supply chain income in decentralized decision-making, and finally, improves the overall coordination and profit of a green closed-loop supply chain. The numerical examples are conducted to verify the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed models. This work provides a helpful decision support and guidance for enterprises and the government on the used products recycling decisions to better manage the green closed-loop supply chain.

scholarly journals Pricing strategy of closed-loop supply chain under disruptions

Filomat ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (15) ◽  
pp. 4059-4072 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Xu ◽  
Jiaguo Liu ◽  
Yongli Li ◽  
Xuelong Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Depth Study ◽  
Contract Costs ◽  
The Impact

The aim of this paper is to understand how disruptions effect on closed-loop supply chain, and how to achieve the coordination of closed-loop supply chain under disruptions situation for the whole supply chain system. Design/methodology/approach- This paper analyzed the effect caused by the disruptions of the closed-loop supply chain from both supply and demand , and applied the established margin profits sharing contract to achieve coordination under the disruptions. Findings- From both supply side and demand side, it drew how the disruptions affect the closed-loop supply chain. When the disruptions have less effect on the forward and reverse cost of closed-loop supply chain, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain is controllable; when the disruptions have lager effect on the forward and reverse cost of closed-loop supply chain, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain is uncontrollable. Research limitations/implications- In this paper, the contract costs are ignored for zero. While in actual situation, to maintain the efficient implementation of this contract must spend considerable cost. Sometimes the cost may be too high to become hinder between manufacturers and retailers. This paper also does not make in-depth study on this issue, so it will be further study in the future. Originality/value- This paper also designed a set of differential profit sharing contract based on revenue sharing contract mechanism. The contract is easy to be managed, easy to be operated, making the closed-loop supply chain system can achieve coordination whether in steady state or under disruptions.

Research on Pricing Strategy of the Closed-Loop Supply Chain in Heterogeneous Market

2012 ◽  
Vol 236-237 ◽  
pp. 321-325
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Product Pricing ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Optimum Production

This paper constructs a closed-loop supply chain system with the manufacturer recycling waste products from the retailer based on game theory in heterogeneous market in which the price of the new product is different from that of the remanufactured product. The optimal pricing decisions of the supply chain without remanufacturing and the closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing are obtained. Through theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, we obtain the optimum production and pricing strategies, and analyze the impact of the consumers’ acceptance for the remanufactured product on product pricing, which provides a basis for the closed-loop supply chain’s production decisions.

scholarly journals Analysis of the impact of COVID-19 on the coupling of the material flow and capital flow in a closed-loop supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-22
Author(s):  
W. Duan ◽  
H. Ma ◽  
D.S. Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Material Flow ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Capital Flow ◽  
Simulation Software ◽  
Dynamics Simulation ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
The Impact

The complex and changeable external social and economic environment has a significant impact on the sustainable development of the closed-loop supply chain. In particular, the occurrence of uncertain emergencies increases the risk of interruption of the closed-loop supply chain, making it insufficient to analyze its complex changes from the perspective of material flow alone. Based on this analysis, the paper constructs a closed-loop supply chain material flow and capital flow coupling system composed of manufacturers, sellers and recyclers to explore the impact of material flow sudden interruption on the closed-loop supply chain system when an uncertain emergency occurs. In this paper, based on the closed-loop supply chain system coupled with logistics and capital flow, a system dynamics simulation model was established by using Vensim simulation software to analyze the impact of COVID-19 epidemic on manufacturers, sellers and recyclers under five scenarios. The results show that when COVID-19 outbreaks occur, the material flow of each main enterprise in the closed-loop supply chain is more easily influenced than the capital flow. At the same time, it can be found that the recyclers in the main enterprises of the closed-loop supply chain are more easily influenced by the material flow. The model constructed in this paper has applicability and can be used for related studies of closed-loop supply chain under other emergencies, but the scene design should be carried out according to the characteristics of emergencies themselves.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Pricing and Collection Rate for Remanufacturing Industry considering Capacity Constraint in Recycling Channels

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lang Xu ◽  
Jia Shi ◽  
Jihong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Capacity Constraint ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Competition Intensity ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Collection Rate

This paper explores the decision-making and coordination mechanism of pricing and collection rate in a closed-loop supply chain with capacity constraint in recycling channels, which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. On the basis of game theory, the equilibriums of decisions and profits in the centralized and decentralized scenarios are obtained and compared. Through the performance analysis of a different scenario, a higher saving production cost and lower competition intensity trigger the members to engage in remanufacturing. Furthermore, we try to propose a two-part tariff contract through bargaining to coordinate supply chain and achieve a Pareto improvement. The results show that when the capacity constraints in recycling channels exceed a threshold, the decisions and profit will change. Additionally, for closed-loop supply chain, the selling price is more susceptible to the influence of capacity constraint in recycling channel than the members’ profit.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document