scholarly journals The Influence of Demographic Characteristics on Employee Promotion: Research Based on Data Mining and Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Chang Zhang ◽  
Ting-jie Lv ◽  
Chun-hui Yuan ◽  
Yuan-yuan Ren ◽  
Shuo Wang
Keyword(s):  
Data Mining ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Demographic Characteristics ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Maximum Benefit ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
Resource Data ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Promotion Mechanism

The motivation of the paper is to find out the influence of demographic characteristic factors on employees’ career promotion in China’s state-owned enterprises and study the relationship between promotion mechanism and enterprise benefits. More than 6,500 pieces of human resource data from China’s state-owned enterprises were studied. Logistic regression is adopted to analyze the correlation between demographic characteristics and promotion. Meanwhile, different data mining methods are used to summarize the characteristics of promotion. On this basis, this study uses the principal-agent model of game theory to analyze the profits of employees and enterprises under different promotion mechanisms and demonstrates the conditions for enterprises to obtain the maximum benefit from the employees’ promotion. The results provide a theoretical reference for the assessment indicator selection of enterprise promotion and help executives better understand the impact of promotion mechanism on enterprises and employees. The application of results can reduce the information asymmetry in promotion incentive, prevent the emergence of adverse selection, and achieve a win-win situation for enterprises and employees.

Rule Creation in a Political Hierarchy

2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 622-643 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLIFFORD J. CARRUBBA ◽  
TOM S. CLARK
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Political Hierarchy ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Judicial Hierarchy

Principal-agent relations are replete in politics; politicians are agents of electorates, bureaucrats are agents of executives, lower courts are agents of upper courts, and much more. Commonly, principals are modeled as the rule-making body and agents as the rule-implementing body. However, principals often delegate the authority to make the rules themselves to their agents. The relationship between the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court is one such example; a considerable portion of the law (rules) is made in the lower federal courts with the Supreme Court serving primarily as the overseer of those lower courts’ decisions. In this article, we develop and test a principal-agent model of law (rule) creation in a judicial hierarchy. The model yields new insights about the relationship among various features of the judicial hierarchy that run against many existing perceptions. For example, we find a non-monotonic relationship between the divergence in upper and lower court preferences over rules and the likelihood of review and reversal by the Supreme Court. The empirical evidence supports these derived relationships. Wider implications for the principal-agent literature are also discussed.

Game Theory as a Tool for Understanding Information Services Outsourcing

1997 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramy Elitzur ◽  
Anthony Wensley
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Information Systems ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Services Outsourcing ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
And Function

In recent years, game theory has provided valuable insights into many different types of organizational arrangements. In this paper we investigate some of the ways in which game theory can help us to understand the structure and function of information systems outsourcing arrangements. We provide a brief review of two-person non-cooperative game theory. We discuss the basic concepts of dominance and Nash equilibria. In particular we stress the importance of the information structure of two-person games. We then provide a general game-theoretic interpretation of many key aspects of information systems outsourcing arrangements. In particular, we investigate the rationales behind many of the different ways of determining fees and the effects of the transfer of assets between the outsourcing company and the outsourcing vendor. Finally, we discuss how one particular type of non-cooperative two-person game might be useful as a model of information systems outsourcing arrangements. This model, the principal-agent model, has been extensively studied and in the hands of the authors has provided some initial insights into information systems outsourcing arrangements.

scholarly journals Can Citizens Affect the Performance of Their Elected Representatives? A Principal–Agent Model of Strategic Interaction in Democratic Systems

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 1194
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Lanza ◽  
Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti ◽  
Pietro Navarra
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
Motivation Crowding ◽  
Democratic Systems ◽  
Elected Representatives ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Monitoring Devices

According to standard economic theory, human beings are expected to work more and better when benefits in the form of lower costs or higher reward increase. Principal–agent theory applied to the theory of the firm relies on this relationship and states that employees should be paid according to how well they perform their tasks. In this framework, monitoring devices are introduced to control employees’ performance and determine salaries. In this paper we construct a principal–agent model to describe the relationship between citizens/voters and elected representatives in which monitoring devices are introduced to control the performance of the latter. We demonstrate that tighter controls may produce better performance but also may produce a reduction in the intrinsic motivations of elected representatives, resulting in a reduction of their work effort. These results are interpreted in the light of the motivation crowding theory.

scholarly journals Electoral competition in the elections of the representative local self-government bodies in Chelyabinsk: before and after the 2014 reform

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 69-82
Author(s):  
Oleg Vydrin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Municipal Elections ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Observation Units ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First Time ◽  
The City

Introduction. The article examines the dynamics of electoral competition over four electoral cycles from 2005 to 2019 as exemplified by forming representative bodies of local self-government in the city of Chelyabinsk. Particular attention is paid to the impact that the transition of Chelyabinsk to a twotier model of forming local self-government bodies in 2014 had on the electoral competition. The purpose of the paper is to study the dynamics of electoral competition in municipal elections in Chelyabinsk before and after the 2014 reform. Methods. The empirical basis of the study is the database “Electoral competition in the elections of municipal deputies of Chelyabinsk (2005—2019)”, which includes 414 observation units. The analysis of the empirical material is carried out according to the method of G.V. Golosov’s triangle of relative sizes, proposed for classifying party systems and adapted for analyzing elections in single-mandate constituencies. Scientific novelty. The author suggests a methodology for analyzing electoral competition in singlemandate constituencies. For the first time, the phenomenon of “controlled competition” is analyzed on the basis of 4 municipal elections cycles. Results. The analysis makes it possible to speak about fluctuations in electoral competition, its decline in 2009 and 2014 compared to the 2005 elections and increasing by the 2019 elections Conclusions. The “controlled competition” was formed in Chelyabinsk in the period preceding the reform of 2014. The reform introduced a level of local self-government, the effectiveness and necessity of which is not obvious with the existing design of the electoral system. In the course of the reform, the principal-agent model of relations between local self-government bodies and state authorities was finally consolidated. The reform contributed to conserving the “controlled competition”.

scholarly journals Analysis of Enterprise Sustainable Crowdsourcing Incentive Mechanism Based on Principal-Agent Model

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 3238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guohao Wang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
New Product Development ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Innovation Process ◽  
Product Development Process ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Internal Resources ◽  
Model And Simulation ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
The Impact

The utilization of crowdsourcing to acquire distant knowledge is increasing. In the new product development process, sustainable crowdsourcing is an effective way to exploit both external and internal resources to boost enterprise innovation quality and the efficiency of the competitive edge of macro tasks in a relatively long cycle. The challenge of sustainable crowdsourcing is how to design a proper incentive mechanism to achieve the maximum initiator profit and, at the same time, satisfy the solver’s motivation so that they can continuously participate in the innovation process. In two situations, including a single motivation and multiple motivations of the solver, this paper analyzed the impact of a few factors on the initiator’s profit and the incentive coefficient for the solver based on the Principal–Agent Model. From the model and simulation results, the solver’s incentive coefficient is positively correlated to the solver’s work quality and negatively correlated to the uncertainty of the enterprise operation, the solver’s Effort Cost, the solver’s degree of risk aversion, etc. If the initiator is more sensitive to the benefits of the solver’s intrinsic motivation, the monetary incentive will be higher. The research results provide a theoretical basis to quantify the initiator’s expected profit and design a proper incentive plan for the solver. Finally, the conclusions offer practical guidance for enterprise to execute incentive plans for sustainable crowdsourcing from the perspective of the solver’s motivation.

The Impact of Anxiety Caused by COVID-19 on Consumer Behaviour

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-270
Author(s):  
H. Mustafa Paksoy ◽  
Yakup Durmaz ◽  
Filiz Çopuroğlu ◽  
B. Dilek Özbezek
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Consumer Behaviour ◽  
Demographic Variables ◽  
Demographic Characteristics ◽  
Statistical Techniques ◽  
Demographic Information ◽  
Correlation And Regression Analysis ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

The main purpose of this study is to examine the effect of anxiety that people experience due to the rapidly spreading Covid-19 on consumer behaviour. The sub-objectives of this study are to test the relationship among the anxiety caused by Covid-19, consumer behaviour and socio-demographic variables. In line with this purpose, qualitative research was conducted on 251 academicians working in Gaziantep University. Demographic information form, Death Anxiety Scale developed by Thorson and Powell (1992) and Consumer Behaviour Scale developed by Ang (2001) were conducted on the participants for data collection. The questionnaire was carried out online. The data obtained from the study were analyzed with statistical techniques such as factor analysis, correlation and regression analysis, independent sample T-test, and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The findings of the study showed that the deprivation and suffering dimensions of the anxiety caused by Covid-19 have significant effects on the dimensions of consumer behaviour. It has also been found that there are significant differences among the socio-demographic characteristics of the participants, the anxiety caused by Covid-19 and consumer behaviour.

A predictive analytics of physicians prescription and pharmacies sales correlation using data mining

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 346-363
Author(s):  
Babak Sohrabi ◽  
Iman Raeesi Vanani ◽  
Nastaran Nikaein ◽  
Saeideh Kakavand
Keyword(s):  
Data Mining ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Pharmaceutical Industry ◽  
Predictive Analytics ◽  
Customer Relationship ◽  
Sales Managers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose In the pharmaceutical industry, marketing and sales managers often deal with massive amounts of marketing and sales data. One of their biggest concerns is to recognize the impact of actions taken on sold-out products. Data mining discovers and extracts useful patterns from such large data sets to find hidden and worthy patterns for the decision-making. This paper, too, aims to demonstrate the ability of data-mining process in improving the decision-making quality in the pharmaceutical industry. Design/methodology/approach This research is descriptive in terms of the method applied, as well as the investigation of the existing situation and the use of real data and their description. In fact, the study is quantitative and descriptive, from the point of view of its data type and method. This research is also applicable in terms of purpose. The target population of this research is the data of a pharmaceutical company in Iran. Here, the cross-industry standard process for data mining methodology was used for data mining and data modeling. Findings With the help of different data-mining techniques, the authors could examine the effect of the visit of doctors overlooking the pharmacies and the target was set for medical representatives on the pharmaceutical sales. For that matter, the authors used two types of classification rules: decision tree and neural network. After the modeling of algorithms, it was determined that the two aforementioned rules can perform the classification with high precision. The results of the tree ID3 were analyzed to identify the variables and path of this relationship. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is one of the first studies to provide the real-world direct empirical evidence of “Analytics of Physicians Prescription and Pharmacies Sales Correlation Using Data Mining.” The results showed that the most influential variables of “the relationship between doctors and their visits to pharmacies,” “the length of customer relationship” and “the relationship between the sale of pharmacies and the target set for medical representatives” were “deviation from the implementation plan.” Therefore, marketing and sales managers must pay special attention to these factors while planning and targeting for representatives. The authors could focus only on a small part of this study.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MONOTOWNS AND CITY-FORMING ENTERPRISES THROUGH THE PRISM OF GAME THEORY

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 1671-1678
Author(s):  
O.V. Karpets ◽  
◽  
N.V. Gontar’ ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Financial Assistance ◽  
Social Infrastructure ◽  
Territorial Development ◽  
The Social ◽  
Single Industry ◽  
Market Factors ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Town

The paper analyzes the relationship between a city-forming enterprise and local authorities in creating social infrastructure facilities and their functioning in a single-industry town. City-forming enterprises significantly determine the effectiveness of particular territories - single-industry towns, while exerting a comprehensive impact on their socio-economic situation and territorial development. Due to the peculiarities of their location and functioning, city-forming enterprises often assume obligations to create and maintain social infrastructure facilities. In this paper, we will consider the players’ interest in social infrastructure facilities functioning, and will also determine the impact of its development level on the activities of a city-forming enterprise and a single-industry town. In the article, through the application of game theory, the interests and strategies of behavior of the two main players on the issue of creating new or financing old objects of the social infrastructure of a monotown are considered. In the model proposed by the authors, two players are considered. Player A is the town-forming enterprise, and Player B is the local government. Each of the players has two strategies of behavior, the first strategy is to provide financial assistance to social infrastructure facilities, and the second is not to provide financial assistance. Having created a matrix of results, we will determine the payoffs of the players, which will further help us find the Nash equilibrium and determine the Pareto efficiency. Additionally, the work will consider the duality of the results, which will demonstrate the inconsistency of the functioning of the model when using only the rules of game theory and taking into account only market factors without taking into account real social conditions.

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