scholarly journals The Impact of Service and Channel Integration on the Stability and Complexity of the Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianheng Zhou ◽  
Xingli Chen

This paper constructs a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Considering channel integration and service cooperation, two dynamic Stackelberg game models are established: one without unit profit allocation M and the other one with unit profit allocation Mε. In two dynamic models, we analyze the influence of relevant parameters on the stability and complexity of the dynamic system and system profit by nonlinear system theory and numerical simulation. We find that the higher adjustment parameters can cause the system to lose stability, showing double period bifurcation or wave-shape chaos. The stable region becomes larger with increase in service value and value of unit profit sharing. Besides, when the system is in chaotic state, we find that the profit of the system will fluctuate or even decline sharply; however, keeping the parameters in a certain range is helpful in maintaining the system stability and is conducive to decision-makers to obtain steady profits. In order to control the chaos phenomenon, the state feedback method is employed to control the chaotic system well. This study provides some valuable significance to supply chain managers in channel integration and service cooperation.

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.


Author(s):  
Qin Zhang ◽  
Zijian He ◽  
Junhai Ma

Consumers' strategic purchasing behavior has a great influence on the pricing and sales of new products. In order to study the impact of strategic consumers on the sales of 5G mobile phones, we establish a two-period pricing model. The supply chain contains two manufacturers, a communications operator and a mobile phone retailer. Cases where two manufacturers have the same or different pricing rights are researched by using the Stackelberg game and the Nash game model. Our research results are as follows:(1) We obtain the optimal 5G communication fees in two periods and find out how they change with the proportion of consumers changing. (2) We figure out the profits of the supply chain in two periods and analyze them. We find that the communication operator earns more than the others most of the time. (3) We investigate how the proportion of strategic consumer impact on supply chain profits and conclude that the optimal price and demand in a period will decrease as the proportion of consumers who only purchase products in the other period increases.


Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Huimin Xiao ◽  
Youlei Xu ◽  
Shiwei Li

This paper incorporates fairness concerns and consumer reference price effects into a two-echelon building-material closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. By establishing four differential game models, we investigate the sustainable operations and cooperation of this supply chain. The four game models are a Nash noncooperative game, Stackelberg game with cost sharing, Stackelberg game with fairness concerns and cost sharing, and centralized decision model. By using dynamic models and optimal control theory, we obtain the two members’ optimal equilibrium strategies in the supply chain. Analytical results show that the consumer reference price effect has a positive impact on the manufacturer’s effort level, retailer’s publicity level, and product brand goodwill, which can improve the supply chain performance. The retailer’s partial commitment to cost sharing can enhance the production enthusiasm of the manufacturer, improve the brand reputation of the product, and enhance the two members’ individual profitability. The distributional fairness concerns of the manufacturer not only prevent the manufacturer and retailer from achieving Pareto improvement but also lead to the decline of the manufacturer’s effort level and profitability. The research conclusions of this paper can provide some insights into the cooperation and sustainable development of the supply chain.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (154) ◽  
pp. 20190129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Chen ◽  
Matthew J. Wade ◽  
Jan Dolfing ◽  
Orkun S. Soyer

Methane-producing microbial communities are of ecological and biotechnological interest. Syntrophic interactions among sulfate reducers and aceto/hydrogenotrophic and obligate hydrogenotrophic methanogens form a key component of these communities, yet, the impact of these different syntrophic routes on methane production and their stability against sulfate availability are not well understood. Here, we construct model synthetic communities using a sulfate reducer and two types of methanogens representing different methanogenesis routes. We find that tri-cultures with both routes increase methane production by almost twofold compared to co-cultures and are stable in the absence of sulfate. With increasing sulfate, system stability and productivity decreases and does so faster in communities with aceto/hydrogenotrophic methanogens despite the continued presence of acetate. We show that this is due to a shift in the metabolism of these methanogens towards co-utilization of hydrogen with acetate. These findings indicate the important role of hydrogen dynamics in the stability and productivity of syntrophic communities.


2011 ◽  
Vol 133 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Erich Devendorf ◽  
Kemper Lewis

In distributed design processes, individual design subsystems have local control over design variables and seek to satisfy their own individual objectives, which may also be influenced by some system level objectives. The resulting network of coupled subsystems will either converge to a stable equilibrium or diverge in an unstable manner. In this paper, we study the dependence of system stability on the solution process architecture. The solution process architecture describes how the design subsystems are ordered and can be either sequential, parallel, or a hybrid that incorporates both parallel and sequential elements. In this paper, we demonstrate that the stability of a distributed design system does indeed depend on the solution process architecture chosen, and we create a general process architecture model based on linear systems theory. The model allows the stability of equilibrium solutions to be analyzed for distributed design systems by converting any process architecture into an equivalent parallel representation. Moreover, we show that this approach can accurately predict when the equilibrium is unstable and the system divergent when previous models suggest that the system is convergent.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Gao ◽  
Xiong Wang ◽  
Qiuling Yang ◽  
Qin Zhong

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.


Author(s):  
Piotr Komorowski ◽  
Dariusz Filip

Financial system stability is considered a public good. The main role of the financial safety network is to stabilise the system. Information and statistical activities of institutions which belong to the safety network are the tools which may improve the stability. We need to stress that most decisions are based on information, in particular decisions on investment or speculation, hence by providing information and statistical data these institutions indirectly enhance the overall stability of the system. An overview and analysis of selected studies addressing financial system stability helped the authors draw theoret- ical and practical conclusions as to the stability itself and the impact of information and statistics upon its improvement.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Liangyan Zhao ◽  
Peng Guo ◽  
...  

As a weapon for economic development, green finance plays an important supporting and promoting role in the economic recovery and transformation of enterprises in the post-epidemic era. By constructing a dual-channel supply chain model, this paper considers two situations in which manufacturers participate in carbon trading and green finance loans, and uses Stackelberg game to study the impact of different situations on participants’ profits and emission reduction decisions. The results show that: under the carbon trading mechanism, the carbon emission reduction level of the manufacturer is inversely proportional to the relevant price, and the demand and profit of the two channels increase with the increase in emission reduction; when carbon trading and green financial loans are carried out at the same time, participants have lower profits, but with the increase in emission reductions, it is still a growing trend.


Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lufeng Dai ◽  
Xifu Wang ◽  
Xiaoguang Liu ◽  
Lai Wei

Manufacturers add online direct channels that inevitably engage in channel competition with offline retail channels. Since price is an important factor in consumers' choice of purchasing channel, pricing strategy has become a popular topic for research on dual-channel competition and coordination. In contrast to previous research on pricing strategies based on the full rationality of members, we focus on the impact of retailers' fairness concerns on pricing strategies. In this study, the hybrid dual-channel supply chain consists of one manufacturer with a direct channel who acts as the leader and a retailer who acts as the follower. First, we use the Stackelberg game approach to determine the equilibrium pricing strategy for a fair caring retailer. Simultaneously, we consider a centralized dual-channel supply chain as the benchmark for a comparative analysis of the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, we study pricing strategies when the retailer has fairness concerns and determine the complete equilibrium solutions for different ranges of the parameters representing cross-price sensitivity and fairness. Finally, through numerical experiments, the pricing strategies, the profit and utility of the manufacturer and retailer, and the channel efficiency of the supply chain are compared and analysed for two scenarios. We find that fairness concerns reduce the manufacturer's profits, while for the most part, the retailers’ profit can be improved; however, the supply chain cannot achieve complete coordination.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Fenglian Wang ◽  
Chia-Huei Wu ◽  
Sang-Bing Tsai ◽  
Yi-Zhang Jiang

The fierce competition among enterprises and disordered market price competition have affected the development of the whole regional economy. Government tax subsidies have always been regarded as the advantages of enterprise development, but the mechanism of the influence of government tax on regional economic development, especially the impact on market price, has not been explored. Based on the Bertrand competition, applying chaos control theory, considering the government revenue rate, the influence of government tax on the price behavior and market price stability is analyzed, and then the numerical simulation is carried out. The research shows that the price adjustment of enterprises is a complicated process and government tax is helpful to the stability of market price. The government tax rate increasing can increase the stable region of price equilibrium and reduce the bifurcation and chaos of the price game system.


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