scholarly journals Pricing and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions in a Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer under Carbon Tax Regulation

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yangang Feng ◽  
Jiaxin Shen ◽  
Xiaomei Li

Carbon tax is an emission regulation, which widely used to curb the carbon emissions generated from firms. In the context of carbon tax policy, firms need to determine an optimal carbon reduction level and optimal product prices. To address firms’ decision-making challenges, this paper considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer under carbon tax policy; it establishes a Stackelberg game model with a risk-averse retailer and a risk-neutral manufacturer who is the leader of the game. The paper studies the influence of the government’s carbon tax policy and retailer’s risk-averse attitude on the optimal decision of the supply chain. The result shows that when the retailer is risk aversion, the degree of risk aversion of the retailer is positively correlated with the wholesale price of the manufacturer and unit carbon emission reduction, and within a certain range of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, it is positively correlated with the price of products; with the increase of the carbon tax rate imposed by the government, the retail price of unit products, the wholesale price of the manufacturer, and the carbon emission reduction of unit products also increase. Finally, the results are verified by numerical examples.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Chao-qun Han ◽  
Hua-ying Gu ◽  
Li-hui Sui ◽  
Chang-peng Shao

Since the tax of carbon emission is popular and consumers are exhibiting low-carbon preference, the green manufactures have to spend more extra cost on investing carbon emission reduction (CER) technology to decrease the carbon emission. To encourage the manufacture’s CER investment efforts, this paper explores the impact of carbon tax, CER cost, and consumers’ low-carbon preference on low-carbon decision-making and designs a revenue-sharing contract (RS) by constructing Stackelberg models. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, this paper finds that the supply chain would benefit from the increment of consumer’s environmental awareness but be depressed by the increase of the CER investment cost factor. Additionally, there exists a unique optimal carbon tax to make CER degree the maximum. Furthermore, RS can effectively promote manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions and also improve the supply chain efficiency.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Guangzhou Yan ◽  
Qinyu Song ◽  
Yaodong Ni ◽  
Xiangfeng Yang

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper studies the pricing and recycling decision problems in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) containing a manufacturer, a downstream retailer, and a third-party recycling left. The manufacturer is subjected to the cap-and-trade regulation and determines the wholesale price of products and carbon emission reduction rate. The retailer determines its resale price to meet customer demands. The third-party recycling left determines the collection rate of recycling and remanufacturing used products. The new product demands, total carbon emissions, and recovery of these products are characterized as uncertain variables due to lack of historical data or insufficient data collected for research. By constructing three decentralized game models, we explore the equilibrium solutions under the corresponding decision-making situation and the corresponding analytical solutions. Finally, numerical experiments are performed to show the total profit of supply chain members for each structure and some special insights are drawn.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6445
Author(s):  
Jingci Xie ◽  
Jianjian Liu ◽  
Xin Huo ◽  
Qingchun Meng ◽  
Mengyu Chu

Due to growing concerns for environmental problems and food quality, consumers pay more attention to the carbon emission and freshness of fresh food. The booming e-commerce also accelerates the development of the dual-channel supply chain. In the dual-channel supply chain of fresh food, the carbon emission and freshness of fresh food are becoming important factors affecting consumers’ purchase demand. This paper focuses on the optimal decision of carbon emission reduction and pricing, which is investigated by a Stackelberg game-theoretic approach in three dual-channel supply chain sales models (retailer dual channel, producer dual channel, and mixed dual channel). A two-stage fresh food supply chain system composed of a producer and a retailer is explored. The sensitivity analysis and the comparison of three dual-channel models are carried out. The results show the following: (1) the sales price, carbon emission reduction, market demand, producer’s profit, retailer’s profit, and supply chain’s profit of fresh food under the three dual-channel supply chains show the same change on different levels of consumers’ low-carbon preference coefficient and freshness level, respectively; (2) the optimal decision of carbon emission reduction and pricing, demand, and profit of the three dual-channel models need to be determined according to the value of consumers’ purchasing preferences for the retailer’s offline channel. The paper gives some enlightenment to the decision-making members in the fresh dual-channel supply chain.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Linming Qi ◽  
Lu Liu ◽  
Liwen Jiang ◽  
Zicheng Wang ◽  
Weiliang Zhao

Many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with capital constraints often have no access or find it costly to obtain a loan from a bank; the retailer tends to borrow money from other enterprises in the supply chain by trade credit financing. We consider an emission-dependent supply chain with one emission-dependent manufacturer and one capital-constrained retailer in need of financing to explore the optimal operational and environmental strategies of a low-carbon supply chain under trade credit financing. We use a Stackelberg game model to depict the low-carbon supply chain. We analyse the optimal carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity in the equilibrium state. The impacts of key parameters, such as the retailer’s internal working capital, the manufacturer’s risk-aversion degree, and the carbon-trading price on the supply chain operation, are analysed. The results show that the retailer’s capital constraint causes the carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity to improve synchronously. The supply chain achieves a win-win outcome for both the manufacturer and the retailer when the capital-constrained retailer is funded via trade credit from the manufacturer. The in-depth development of financing is beneficial to the manufacturer but is a disadvantage for the retailer. When the initial carbon-emission quota is low, the manufacturer benefits from a relatively lower carbon-trading price. Otherwise, a higher carbon-trading price is better for the manufacturer. The “carbon-trading price trap” ensures that the retailer’s profit is minimal. We further investigate the scenario in which the manufacturer is risk averse and find that the retailer will purchase fewer products and that the manufacturer will gain less profit to decrease the carbon-emission reduction effort. The manufacturer’s risk aversion is unfavourable to both the economic and environmental outcomes of the whole supply chain. This research provides strategic support for a low-carbon supply chain to carry out operational decisions in the context of enterprise capital constraint. To examine the theoretical results, the data used in the existing literature are further used to simulate the corresponding conclusions. Our research enriches the existing supply chain finance literature and provides decision support for the supply chain core enterprise.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 1661 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weisheng Deng ◽  
Lu Liu

The need for low-carbon development has become a social consensus. Increasing numbers of enterprises implement carbon emission reduction by using carbon cap-and-trade mechanisms to cater to consumers and practice social responsibility. From the manufacturer’s perspective, they can implement carbon emission reduction investment by themselves or outsource it to the retailer or energy service company (referred as ESCO). To explore the best carbon emission reduction mode selection strategy, we built and compared three carbon emission reduction modes—manufacturer emission reduction, retailer emission reduction, and ESCO emission reduction—by using Stackelberg game models. The joint decisions of operation, finance, and environment were obtained by using the backward induction approach. The impacts of key parameters were analyzed, such as the retailer’s initial capital amount and the decision-makers’ risk aversion degree on the low carbon supply chain operation. Our results show that the optimal carbon emission reduction mode for the manufacturer is changed as the retailer’s initial capital amount changes. Carbon emission reduction by the ESCO (retailer) becomes the dominant strategy for both the economy and environment when the cost advantage (cash investment ratio) of the ESCO (retailer) carbon emission reduction mode is sufficiently high (low). Overall, decision-makers’ risk aversion is detrimental to both the economic and environmental developments of the supply chain. We also designed contracts to realize the coordination of risk-neutral, risk-averse, capital-adequate, and capital-constrained low-carbon supply chains. These results give guidance for decision-makers to better manage the low-carbon supply chain in the context of fully considering the influential factors of risk aversion and capital constraint.


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