scholarly journals Alternative Model to Determine the Optimal Government Subsidies in Construction Stage of PPP Rail Transit Projects under Dynamic Uncertainties

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Junna Lv ◽  
Yan-ying Zhang ◽  
Wen Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Simulation Method ◽  
Urban Rail Transit ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Financial Model ◽  
Urban Rail ◽  
Common Interests ◽  
The Government ◽  
Cash Inflow ◽  
Information Incompleteness

Urban rail transit is a quasioperational project and its net cash inflow can hardly cover the investment expenditure. It is essential to determine an acceptable amount of government subsidy to ensure the financial viability of the PPP projects, so as to encourage the entry of the private partner. The partners involved in PPPs have common interests but conflict regarding the value of government subsidy. Considering the uncertainty characteristic by PPPs and information incompleteness in the decision-making process, this study presents a methodology to calculate the equitable subsidy ratio favored by both participants. This study divides the decision process into two steps. First, this study constructs a financial model and introduces an acceptable range of subsidy ratio by using the Monte Carlo simulation method. Second, this study uses the bargaining game theory to determine a particular subsidy ratio under incomplete information. To verify the applicability of the presented model, the researchers invoke an illustrative example for model validation. This research provides a referential and operational method for the government and private sectors to make government subsidy decisions for quasioperational projects.

scholarly journals Profit Maximization Model with Fare Structures and Subsidy Constraints for Urban Rail Transit

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Qing Wang ◽  
Paul Schonfeld ◽  
Lianbo Deng
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Urban Rail Transit ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Transit System ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Decision Variables ◽  
Urban Rail ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Government

This paper analyzes government subsidies based on the service design (i.e., headway) and fare structures of an urban rail transit system while considering necessary financial support from the government. To capture the interactions among the operator performance, government subsidies, and passengers in an urban rail transit system, a profit maximization model with nonnegative profit constraint is formulated to determine the optimal fare and headway solutions. Then, the social welfare that results from the operator profit maximization model is analyzed. Finally, a numerical example from Changsha, China, is employed to verify the feasibility of the proposed model. The major results consist of optimized solutions for decision variables, i.e., the fares and train headways, as well as subsidies to the operator. The fare elasticity factor under two fare structures significantly affects fares and demand. As the fare elasticity factor increases, the social welfare gradually decreases and a deficit occurs at low fares and demand, while subsidies rise from 0 to ¥24658.00 and ¥38089.16 under the flat fare and distance-based fare structures.

Research on Simulation of Evacuation in the Deep Buried Station of Urban Rail Transit

2014 ◽  
Vol 505-506 ◽  
pp. 712-718 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dei Wei Li ◽  
Fang Lin Liu ◽  
Yue Xin Wang ◽  
Wei Teng Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Safety Management ◽  
Simulation Method ◽  
Urban Rail Transit ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Evacuation Time ◽  
Urban Rail ◽  
Bottle Neck ◽  
Station Safety

For the depth of deep buried station, the safety of the station and passengers should be seriously taken into consideration. This paper analyses the features of deep buried station and the influence of these features to the station safety management. With simulation method, the maximum optimal passenger capacity and evacuation time could be calculated, and bottle-neck in the station design could be found. From the comparison of the outcome between deep buried station and normal station, deep buried stations have longer evacuation time and lower optimal passenger capacity, which should be paid special attention to in the operation.

scholarly journals Game Analysis on Urban Rail Transit Project Under Governmental Investment Regulation

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 369-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liangliang Yuan ◽  
Yousong Wang ◽  
Honghui Huang
Keyword(s):  
Research Result ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Urban Rail Transit ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Governmental Regulation ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Urban Rail ◽  
Regulatory Strategy ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

Urban rail transit is the construction project under the planning and huge investment of the government. How to effectively conduct investment regulation and control becomes the core question that the government departments are concerned about. In this paper, the relations among government, owner and contractor are studied and the static and dynamic game model is built for behaviors among each subject from the perspective of governmental investment regulation through game theory. Game analysis result shows: (1) the lower the governmental regulation cost the heavier the government's punishment for the owner due to its fail in due diligence and the more the owner's possibility of strict scrutiny; (2) the higher the owner's examination the less willing the owner to conduct narrow examination and the more contractor’s possibility to choose fraudulent conducts; (3) In case of higher income of owner and contractor under their collusion strategy and lower cost of governmental regulation, the owner and contractor can adopt collusion strategy while the government can adopt regulatory strategy. In case of lower income of owner and contractor under their collusion strategy and higher cost of governmental regulation, the owner and contractor should not adopt collusion strategy while the government should adopt regulatory strategy. The research result provides theoretical basis for the government to formulate relevant policies for investment regulation of urban rail transit project.

scholarly journals Analysis of the Evolutionary Game between the Government and Urban Rail Transit Enterprises under the Loss-Subsidy Mode: A Case Study of Beijing

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (14) ◽  
pp. 8041
Author(s):  
Chen Yan ◽  
Qiong Tong
Keyword(s):  
Cost Saving ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Cost Control ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Urban Rail Transit ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Financial Pressure ◽  
Urban Rail ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Most of the urban rail transit enterprises in China have high construction and operation costs, while the government imposes price control on their fares, making their revenues unable to cover their costs and thus causing certain losses. In order to ensure the economic sustainability of urban rail transit enterprises, the government then subsidizes their losses. In the context of loss subsidies as the main subsidy mode for urban rail transit, the government regulates whether urban rail transit enterprises waste cost in order to protect social welfare and reduce the financial pressure of subsidies. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model between government regulators and urban rail transit enterprises, establishes replicated dynamic equations to obtain the evolutionary stabilization strategies of the government and urban rail transit enterprises under different situations, and analyzes the effects of various parameters on the cost control behaviors of urban rail transit enterprises under different loss-subsidy modes through numerical simulations. The theoretical study and simulation results show the following: When only the regulatory policy is adopted, the optimal strategy of urban rail transit enterprises may be cost saving or cost wasting under different subsidy models; if only the penalty policy is adopted, the enterprises will choose the cost wasting strategy when the penalty is small, and the enterprises will choose the cost saving strategy when the penalty is large; if only the fixed proportion subsidy model is adopted, no matter how large the proportion k of government subsidies is, the urban the optimal strategy for rail transit enterprises is cost wasting. If only the regressive loss subsidy model is adopted, the different sizes of its various parameter settings will also lead to the enterprises’ choice of cost wasting strategy or cost saving strategy. Therefore, the government should formulate corresponding policies according to different cost control objectives.

Influence of Built Environment on Urban Rail Transit Connection Mode

CICTP 2020 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhao Gao ◽  
Min Yang ◽  
Guoqiang Li ◽  
Jinghua Tai
Keyword(s):  
Built Environment ◽  
Urban Rail Transit ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Urban Rail

Study on Improvement of Urban Rail Transit Access Based on Pareto-IPA Model

CICTP 2020 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yucheng Wang ◽  
Mo Chen ◽  
Zhi Dong ◽  
Liang Tian ◽  
Kuo Guan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Urban Rail Transit ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Urban Rail
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