scholarly journals Complexity Analysis of Pricing in a Multichannel Supply Chain with Spillovers from Online to Offline Sales

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Fengxia Mai ◽  
Jianxiong Zhang ◽  
Rui Yang ◽  
Xiaojie Sun

In recent years, many manufacturers have been selling their products to online consumers through e-tailers by adopting reselling mode and agency selling mode simultaneously. The sales from the online channels inevitably incur spillover effect to the traditional offline channels. This paper develops a dynamic pricing game model on the basis of a long-term gradient adjustment mechanism for a multichannel supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and an e-tailer and focuses on examining the impacts of spillover effect, agency fee, and adjustment speed on the stability and complexity of the dynamic game system. The results show that both a greater spillover effect and a higher agency fee can make the dynamic game system more stable, and a higher adjustment speed can destabilize the dynamic game system through period doubling bifurcation. Furthermore, it is interesting to find that the destabilization of the game system benefits the e-tailer and the supply chain while having little influence on the manufacturer, and thus the dynamic adjustment strategy may improve the supply chain efficiency.

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (16) ◽  
pp. 2050241
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Yaping Li ◽  
Zongxian Wang

Showrooming has become common practice of consumers in the context of dual-channel retailing. Under different intensities of showrooming, the manufacturer can decide whether to directly retail online (the M-R case) or resell through an e-retailer (the E-R case). Dual-channel supply chain models and dynamic game models are developed and both online selling formats are investigated. The dynamic game process of the supply chain is numerically simulated. The stability of the Nash equilibrium point is investigated by parameter basins for periodical cycles and bifurcation diagrams. The results show that the price adjustment speeds have a larger stability range in the M-R case while the service effort adjustment speed has a larger stability range in the E-R case. The stability of the systems is more sensitive to price adjustment speed than service effort adjustment speed in both supply chain structures. It is found that the systems will enter chaos through a flip bifurcation or a Neimark–Sacker bifurcation. The changes in attractors and basins of attraction indicate that both channels can reach the equilibria more easily when they choose a lower speed of retail price adjustment. The effects of showrooming on decision variables are greater in the M-R case than in the E-R case. When the showrooming effect is moderate, the manufacturer should choose the M-R case; when the showrooming effect is sufficiently large or sufficiently small, the manufacturer should choose the E-R case. We propose a wholesale price markdown strategy which can: (i) eliminate the double marginalization and coordinate the supply chain; (ii) effectively control the chaos caused by the overhigh adjustment speed of wholesale price, and restore the system to a stable state; (iii) improve the retailer’s service effort.


Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Fang Zhang ◽  
Binshuo Bao

In is very important for the corresponding author to have a linked ORCID (Open Researcher and Contributor ID) account on MTS. To register a linked ORCID account, please go to the Account Update page (http://mts.hindawi.com/update/) in our Manuscript Tracking System and after you have logged in click on the ORCID link at the top of the page. This link will take you to the ORCID website where you will be able to create an account for yourself. Once you have done so, your new ORCID will be saved in our Manuscript Tracking System automatically.”"?>this paper, two noncooperative dynamic pricing strategies are used in a supply chain. Two dynamic Stackelberg game models have been built involving both a manufacturer and a retailer assumed to be the leader in order. In the two models, the manufacturer sells national-brand (NB) product to an independent retailer or directly to consumers through a direct channel. The retailers sell a store-brand (SB) product when they sell the NB product coming from the manufacturer. Thus, there is competition both in different channels and in products with different brands. To analyze the complexity of the model, parameter bifurcation diagrams and strange attractor diagrams have been therefore plotted. The results show that the game leader has advantages when the market is stable, but it turns disadvantageous if the state falls into unstable as the game follower can quickly adjust the strategy to seize the market. The wholesale price and the direct selling price are high that they incur larger profits if the manufacturer is dominant, but it gets worse when the adjustment speed increases. While in the model where the retailer plays a dominant role, the increase in the adjustment speed is unfavorable to retailer. By controlling the total cost of the direct channel and increasing channel competition strength and brand competition strength, the manufacturers can increase their profits in the game dominated by the retailer. In addition, the stable region within the system will be narrow since the market is sensitive to the channel competition, brand competition, and advertising indifference.


2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (09) ◽  
pp. 1650146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lijian Sun ◽  
Junhai Ma

Under the industrial background of dual-channel, volatility in demand of consumers, we use the theory of bifurcations and numerical simulation tools to investigate the dynamic pricing game in a dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse behavior and incomplete information. Due to volatility of demand of consumers, we consider all the players in the supply chain are risk-averse. We assume there exist Bertrand game and Manufacturers’ Stackelberg in the chain which are closer to reality. The main objective of the paper is to investigate the complex influence of the decision parameters such as wholesale price adjustment speed, risk preference and service value on stability of the risk-averse supply chain and average utilities of all the players. We lay emphasis on the influence of chaos on average utilities of all the players which did not appear in previous studies. The dynamic phenomena, such as the bifurcation, chaos and sensitivity to initial values are analyzed by 2D bifurcation phase portraits, Double Largest Lyapunov exponent, basins of attraction and so on. The study shows that the manufacturers should slow down their wholesale price adjustment speed to get more utilities, if the manufacturers are willing to take on more risk, they will get more profits, but they must keep their wholesale prices in a certain range in order to maintain the market stability.


Kybernetes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (8) ◽  
pp. 1494-1523
Author(s):  
Rofin T.M. ◽  
Biswajit Mahanty

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of price adjustment speed on the stability of Bertrand–Nash equilibrium in the context of a dual-channel supply chain competition. Design/methodology/approach The paper considers a dual-channel supply chain comprising a manufacturer, a traditional retailer and an online retailer. A two-dimensional discrete dynamical system is used to examine the Bertrand competition between the retailers. The retailers are assumed to follow bounded rational expectations. Local stability of Bertrand–Nash equilibrium is investigated with respect to the price adjustment speed. Findings As the price adjustment speed increases, the stability of Bertrand–Nash equilibrium is lost, leading to complex chaotic dynamics. The results showed that chaotic dynamics deteriorates the profit of the retailers. The authors also found that the chaos can be controlled using an adaptive adjustment mechanism and the retailers enjoy higher profit when the chaos is controlled. Practical implications This study helps retail managers to choose an appropriate price adjustment speed to maximize profit. Originality/value The heterogeneity of the retailers is not considered in the studies involving dynamics of retailer competition. This paper contributes to the literature by considering the operational difference between a traditional retailer and an online retailer, i.e. price adjustment speed. In addition, the study establishes a link between price adjustment speed and profit.


Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianbo Zhu ◽  
Qianqian Shi ◽  
Peng Wu ◽  
Zhaohan Sheng ◽  
Xiangyu Wang

This paper considers a repeated duopoly game of prefabrication contractors in mega infrastructure projects and assumes the contractors exhibit bounded rationality. Based on the theory of bifurcation of dynamical systems, a dynamic price competition model is constructed considering different competition strategies. Accordingly, the stability of the equilibrium point of the system is discussed considering different initial market capacities, and numerical simulation is performed. The results show the system has a unique equilibrium solution when initial capacity is high and the parameters meet certain conditions. The contractors’ price adjustment strategy has an important influence on system stability. However, an overly aggressive competition strategy is not conducive to system stability. Moreover, the system is sensitive to initial parameter values.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Ye Duan ◽  
Zenglin Han ◽  
Hailin Mu ◽  
Jun Yang ◽  
Yonghua Li

At present, the problems of homogenization and low quality in China’s iron and steel industry are particularly prominent and the ability of the enterprises to cope with change is insufficient. Adopting product differentiation strategy and dynamic adjustment strategy can allow steel enterprises and the industry to better adapt to future changes. By introducing the product differentiation degree (substitution coefficient) and the bounded rationality strategy to simulate these two strategic means, this paper constructs an extended two-stage dynamic game model to analyse the dynamic game scenarios and steel market stability in China. As new findings, we report the following: (1) The system is more likely to fall into an unbalanced state when multiple enterprises adopt the policy of dynamic output adjustment simultaneously. (2) Enterprises with large output and small output have different output adjustment policies. When enterprises with big-scale output adopt a bit larger adjustment policies, enterprises with small output will be strongly impacted, and the available adjustment space will be sharply compressed. (3) The gradual increase in the difference between products reduces the stability of the market. (4) When product differentiation and bounded rationality strategies coexist, the steel market may fall into an unbalanced state when the degree of product difference increases excessively and the enterprise adopts more drastic output adjustment policies. Therefore, there are pros and cons to product differentiation strategy and bounded rationality adjustment strategy. When each steel oligopoly enterprise formulates a production plan, it needs to comprehensively consider the output changes of the other enterprises and carefully weigh the strategic issues.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daoming Dai ◽  
Xuanyu Wu ◽  
Fengshan Si

In this paper, we investigate a supply chain consisting of an OEM (i.e., original equipment manufacturer) and a CM (contract manufacturer), in which the OEM decides design effort level and marketing level, and the CM makes decision on product manufacturing effort level. We establish a three-dimensional discrete dynamic model with time delay. Firstly, the sufficient conditions for Neimark–Sacker bifurcation are obtained by using different combinations of decision delay periods as bifurcation parameters, and the effect of the adjustment speeds of decision variables on the system stability and impact of time delay on the system stability are discussed, respectively. Secondly, we perform numerical simulation of this model from the perspective of entropy theory. Finally, we propose two methods to control chaos. Results show that when the time delay or the adjustment speed of decision variable exceed a certain threshold, the system will be led into a chaotic state and the entropy of the system will increase. For alleviating the negative effects of chaotic systems, we introduce control parameters to make efficient control on the chaos. At the critical point, the critical value of the adjustment speed of design effort level (or marketing level) of OEM increases as the adjustment speed of the manufacturing effort level of CM decreases, and vice versa.


Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Qiu-xiang ◽  
Zhang Yu-hao ◽  
Huang Yi-min

We study a dual-channel supply chain which consists of one dual-channel manufacturer and one traditional retailer considering fairness concern. The manufacturer takes the market share as one of its business objectives in the competition game. We are devoted to establishing a vertical Nash game model and analyzing the price evolution of the model via the method of complexity theory and take adaptive adjustment control method to control the system’s chaotic state. The results show that an excessive price adjustment speed will hurt the system’s stability as well as profit of the supply chain. A high level fair caring for retailer will push the system to fall into chaos earlier, while a higher level fair caring for manufacturer will enlarge the stability region of the system. Setting the different objectives by the manufacturer will cause drastic competition in dual-channel supply chain. The research of this paper is of great significance to the decision-makers’ price decision and supply chain operation management.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daoming Dai ◽  
Xuanyu Wu ◽  
Fengshan Si

AbstractThe development of COVID-19 vaccine is highly concerned by all countries in the world. So far, many kinds of COVID-19 vaccines have entered phase III clinical trial. However, it is difficult to deliver COVID-19 vaccines efficiently and safely to the areas affected by the epidemic. This paper focuses on vaccine transportation in a supply chain model composed of one distributor and one retailer (clinic or hospital), in which the distributor procures COVID-19 vaccines from the manufacturer and then resells them to the retailer. Distributor detects the activity level of the vaccines, and retailer is responsible for transportation of the vaccines. Firstly, we establish a difference equations model with time-delay. Secondly, we investigate the impact of time-delay on the stability of vaccine supply chain. In addition, we explore the influence of decision adjustment speed of the distributor (or retailer) on the stability of vaccine supply chain. Finally, we verify the theoretical results by a two-dimensional bifurcation diagram, the largest Lyapunov exponent, entropy, and domain of attraction. The results show that when the decision delay-time or the adjustment speed of decision variables exceeds a certain threshold, it brings a negative impact on the stability of vaccine supply chain system. The stability domain of the system shrinks as customers’ sensitivity to cold chain transportation decreases and by contrast expends as customers’ sensitivity to vaccine prices decreases. When the vaccine supply chain is in a state of chaos, the effect of external control over the system is superior to that of internal control over the system.


Author(s):  
Eric B. Halfmann ◽  
C. Steve Suh ◽  
N. P. Hung

The workpiece and tool vibrations in a lathe are experimentally studied to establish improved understanding of cutting dynamics that would support efforts in exceeding the current limits of the turning process. A Keyence laser displacement sensor is employed to monitor the workpiece and tool vibrations during chatter-free and chatter cutting. A procedure is developed that utilizes instantaneous frequency (IF) to identify the modes related to measurement noise and those innate of the cutting process. Instantaneous frequency is shown to thoroughly characterize the underlying turning dynamics and identify the exact moment in time when chatter fully developed. That IF provides the needed resolution for identifying the onset of chatter suggests that the stability of the process should be monitored in the time-frequency domain to effectively detect and characterize machining instability. It is determined that for the cutting tests performed chatters of the workpiece and tool are associated with the changing of the spectral components and more specifically period-doubling bifurcation. The analysis presented provides a view of the underlying dynamics of the lathe process which has not been experimentally observed before.


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