scholarly journals The Formation Mechanism of Green Dairy Industry Chain from the Perspective of Green Sustainable Development

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Hongli Chen ◽  
Xiuli Liu
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dairy Industry ◽  
Dairy Farmers ◽  
Industry Chain ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Bilateral Cooperation ◽  
The Government

By constructing an evolutionary game model of green dairy industry chain from the perspective of green sustainable development, this paper analyzed the evolution process of strategy selection of dairy farmers and dairy enterprises under the supervision of the government. The study found the following. (1) In the absence of supervision, even if the initial cooperation willingness of dairy farmers and dairy enterprises is strong, once the additional cost of their input of “green production” is less than the additional benefit, they will eventually choose noncooperative strategy. (2) In the case of government supervision, when the government punishment or subsidy is not strong enough, the strategic choice of dairy farmers and dairy enterprises will fluctuate repeatedly, and the game equilibrium cannot be reached. However, when the government punishments and subsidies are strong enough, dairy farmers and dairy enterprises will choose to cooperate in their own interests. At this time, government subsidies have a greater impact on the evolution of bilateral cooperation than government punishments. (3) The reduction of green production cost can promote the formation of the green dairy industry chain, which is conducive to the green dairy industry chain system to achieve an ideal equilibrium state.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game of green manufacturing mode of enterprises under the influence of government reward and punishment

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 416-430
Author(s):  
A.L. Awaga ◽  
W. Xu ◽  
L. Liu ◽  
Y. Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Market Competition ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Production Mode ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Regulation Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Manufacturing Mode ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Green production mode is an advanced manufacturing mode. However, due to the environmental externality of green production, it is different for a pure market mechanism to promote the evolution of green operation mode of manufacturing enterprises. Government regulation is very important. This paper establishes an evolutionary game model of whether manufacturing enterprises choose to implement green production mode when the government implements two different mechanisms of reward and punishment. Considering the complexity of strategy selection of enterprises' green production behaviour under market competition, the method constructs the simulation analysis model of enterprises' green product production behaviour with multi-subject participation. We can simulate the influence of these factors on the strategic choice of both parties (enterprises and governments) by changing the different influence factors, and studying the evolutionary law of different government guidance and regulation strategies on the production behaviour of green products. These factors include government incentives, penalties, reputations, costs, differences in the cost of implementing green production on the corporate side, corporate reputation, and false rewards or penalties. By the computer implementation of multi-subject modelling, the results show that enterprises' green product production behaviour needs the government's guidance and regulation. When formulating relevant policies, the government should combine various guidance and regulation strategies and fully consider the influence of market competition.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Government Supervision and Private Sector Ecological Technology Innovation Behavior for Water Environment Treatment PPP Projects on the basis of Public Participation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huimin Li ◽  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Lelin Lv ◽  
Qing Xia ◽  
Lunyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Water Environment ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Innovation Behavior

Ecological technology innovation with environmental benefits as the core has become an inevitable choice for water environment treatment PPP projects (WETP-PPP), and government supervision and public participation are essential driving factors for eco-technological innovation. To explore the influence of the public participation on the behavior of government and private sector in the WETP-PPP, this study constructed an asymmetric evolutionary game model of government supervision and private sector ecological technology innovation behavior under public participation. The main contribution of this study is to explore the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior in different scenarios. The results showed that the government can reduce the supervision cost by increasing the public's active participation and improving environmental regulation measures to achieve a win-win situation of economic and environmental performance.

scholarly journals Evaluating the Power Grid Investment Behavior in China: From the Perspective of Government Supervision

Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 4192
Author(s):  
Yanbin Li ◽  
Feng Zhang ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Bingkang Li ◽  
Zhen Li
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Power System ◽  
Power Grid ◽  
Power Industry ◽  
Evaluation Index System ◽  
Investment Behavior ◽  
System Reform ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government

Power grid investment behavior (PGIB) is a necessary prerequisite to ensure safe and reliable power supply. The supervision of PGIB is an important measure to reduce electricity price. It helps to release the dividends of the new power system reform and promote the sustainable development of the power industry. However, for a long time, China’s regulation of PGIB was relatively weak, lacking clear supervision awareness and effective supervision methods. On the basis of clarifying the contents of PGIB supervision, this paper establishes an evaluation index system for the compliance of PGIB from the government supervision perspective, involving four dimensions and 14 secondary indicators. Furthermore, a hybrid evaluation model based on the combined decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory method (DEMATEL-ANP), analytical network process method, and vague set is proposed. The results reveal that the control over cost and efficiency of the PGIB in China is not enough. According to the results, this paper puts forward the indicators that close attention should be paid to and the work priorities in China’s supervision of PGIB, which has certain practical value for the implementation of new power system reform and the sustainable development of Chinese power industry.

scholarly journals The Relationship among Government, Enterprise, and Public in Environmental Governance from the Perspective of Multi-Player Evolutionary Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (18) ◽  
pp. 3351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingxin Chen ◽  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Pandu R. Tadikamalla ◽  
Xutong Gao
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Wastes ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Research Results ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Positive Effect

Environmental governance is an important component of the national governance system. China’s current environmental problems are particularly complex. How to let the government, enterprises, and the public participate in environmental governance is the key to enhance the ability of environmental governance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the interaction and influencing factors among enterprise pollution control, government supervision, and public participation are analyzed, and the empirical analysis is carried out based on China’s 30 provincial panel data from 2009 to 2018. The research results show that government supervision has a positive effect on the environmental governance and can urge enterprises to actively perform pollution control. The effect of government supervision is constrained by the income and cost of enterprises, and the penalties for passive pollution control should be raised. At the same time, improving the government’s reputation loss can effectively stimulate the government’s environmental supervision behavior. Public participation significantly promotes the governance effect of three industrial wastes, and the enthusiasm of public participation is closely related to participation cost and psychological benefits. Public participation can replace government supervision to a certain extent. The interaction between government and public has a positive effect on environmental governance. The research results will help to build an effective environmental governance system and improve environmental governance performance and public satisfaction.

scholarly journals Government Supervision Mode Selection in the Promotion Period of Prefabricated Construction Using Evolutionary Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Shuwei Jing ◽  
Zhuangyi Zhang ◽  
Junai Yan
Keyword(s):  
Behavior Pattern ◽  
Mode Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Practical Case ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Supervision Mode ◽  
Minimum Probability ◽  
The Government ◽  
Speculative Behavior

Aiming at the speculative behavior of some developers who seek private interests in the promotion period of prefabricated construction, this research combines the actual situation, objectively and reasonably determines the parameters in the model, and builds an evolutionary game model to study the choice of government supervision mode in different situations, from the perspective of government supervision. The results showed that the choice of government supervision mode has great connection with the probability of identifying developers’ speculative behavior when the government adopts node supervision. When the probability is greater than the developers’ speculative value, the government will choose node supervision, while the developers will not adopt speculative behavior. Conversely, there will be a periodic behavior pattern in the evolutionary system, and the choice of government supervision mode is related to the value of each parameter. At the same time, the minimum probability of identifying speculative behavior that keeps the optimal situation stable is obtained. On this basis, the paper takes a practical case to discuss the influence of different parameter variations on the choice of government supervision mode and makes numerical simulations; then it puts forward some specific suggestions for government to restrain the speculative behavior of developer.

Efficient supervision strategy for illegal dumping of construction and demolition waste: A networked game theory decision-making model

2021 ◽  
pp. 0734242X2110320
Author(s):  
Chenyu Liu ◽  
Chunxiang Hua ◽  
Jianguo Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Forest Fires ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Small World ◽  
Economic Benefits ◽  
Construction And Demolition Waste ◽  
Demolition Waste ◽  
Illegal Dumping ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government

While the construction industry has brought substantial economic benefits to society, it has also generated substantial construction and demolition waste (CDW). Illegal dumping, which refers to dumping CDW in an unauthorized non-filling location, has become widespread in many countries and regions. Illegally dumping CDW destroys the environment, causing groundwater pollution and forest fires and causing significant economic impacts. However, there is a lack of research on the decision-making behaviours and logical rules of the main participants, construction contractors and the government in the illegal CDW dumping process. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model on a small-world network considering government supervision to portray the decision-making behaviours of illegal dumping participants and conducts a numerical simulation based on empirical equations to propose an effective supervision strategy for the government to manage illegal CDW dumping efficiently. It is found that the illegal dumping behaviours of contractors are mainly affected by the intensity of government supervision, the cost of fines and the income of illegal dumping; while for government, a supervision strategy is found to be necessary, and a supervision intensity of approximately 0.7 is the optimal supervision probability given supervision efficiency. Notably, under a low-level supervision probability, increasing the penalty alone does not curb illegal dumping, and a certain degree of supervision must be maintained. The results show that in addition to setting fines for illegal dumping, the government must enforce a certain level of supervision and purify the market environment to steadily reduce illegal dumping.

scholarly journals The Behavior Mechanism of the Urban Joint Distribution Alliance under Government Supervision from the Perspective of Sustainable Development

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 6232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Na Zhang ◽  
Xiangxiang Zhang ◽  
Yingjie Yang
Keyword(s):  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Distribution Operations ◽  
The Government

Urban joint distribution is closely related to the national economy and people’s livelihood, and governments and enterprises play an active role in the process of urban joint distribution. From the perspective of government regulations, this paper explores the mechanism and evolution law of the behavior of an urban joint distribution alliance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, a model of homogeneous enterprises participating in urban joint distribution operations under the guidance of government regulations is constructed. The mechanism and follow-up of alliance behavior are analyzed through the simulation of the relationship between parameters. It is found that, firstly, from the perspective of government regulations, in the early stage of the implementation of urban joint distribution projects, when the benefits of synergetic cooperation of enterprise alliances are relatively low and the costs are relatively high, it is necessary for the government to formulate incentive policies to improve government subsidies or to increase the penalties for non-cooperation of enterprises; Once a benign logistics environment and market mechanism are formed, the cooperation benefits increase, and the costs decrease, the government can then withdraw its supervision. Secondly, in the process of establishing urban joint distribution alliance under government supervision, it is better for the enterprises to actively achieve alliance cooperation and obtain government subsidies instead of passively accepting government supervision and paying penalties, in order to promote the formation of logistics ecological environment and market mechanism.

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Government Supervision and Dairy Enterprise in the Process of Product Recall in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wang ◽  
Chang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Trend ◽  
Product Recall ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Voluntary Recall ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
The Government ◽  
Recall System

On the basis of stating recall and regulation mode, this paper analyzes long-term evolutionary trend between dairy enterprise and government supervision on bounded rationality with evolutionary game. The authors use Python matplotlib to simulate research results. Studies show that it is helpful to build a standard recall system of defect and dairy products. This system should reduce the costs of government supervision. In addition, in case of mandatory recall, it should strengthen punishment intensity of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise, increase more losing costs of dairy enterprise, and decrease external environment benefits of dairy enterprise. In case of voluntary recall, the system should encourage various strategies and subsidy of the government supervision branch on dairy enterprise and amplify social influence of dairy enterprise. Especially, the paper puts forward detailed strategies for dairy enterprise.

scholarly journals Does Massive Placement of Bicycles Win the Market for the Bicycle-Sharing Company in China?

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (13) ◽  
pp. 5279
Author(s):  
Jialing Zhao ◽  
Hongwei Wang ◽  
Yuxin Huang ◽  
Yuan Meng
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Dominant Role ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Market Expansion ◽  
Government Enterprise ◽  
The Government ◽  
Decision Making Behavior ◽  
Strategic Balance

The rise of bicycle-sharing stimulated companies’ investment in a large number of bicycles in the market. However, it is important to balance the massive placement of bicycles in the market and the company’s sustainable development. This paper is motivated to identify a strategic balance between market expansion and the sustainable development of the company. Based on the information asymmetry and evolutionary game theory, a tripartite game model was established for the government, enterprise, and consumer. This study identified five evolutionary stability strategies (ESSs) of these three parties under specific conditions by analyzing their decision-making behavior. The results indicated that the number of bicycles in the market placed by a bicycle-sharing enterprise was not directly proportional to its profit. The quantity of bicycles needed on the market was influenced by the government and consumers. It also found that government regulation plays a dominant role in the development of the bicycle-sharing company regarding the number of bicycles needed in the market.

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