scholarly journals Decision-Making of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain in the Context Government Policy: A Dynamic Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Qianwen Li ◽  
Guohu Qi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Total Carbon ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Government

To analyze the effect of government reward-penalty policies (RPPs) on the decisions of a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), this paper endogenizes government decision variables to maximize social welfare and builds four decision-making models (without RPP, with carbon emission RPP, with recycling amount RPP, and with double RPP) by using a Stackelberg dynamic game between the government and supply chain members. The research results show that, (1) in the four models, there exist optimal prices and reward-penalty coefficients to maximize the supply chain members’ profits and social welfare. (2) Comparing with model W, under most conditions, three government RPPs decrease the demand for new products and increase the demand for remanufactured products. Comparing the case without RPP, R’s profit decreases, and when the carbon emission cap is very big and the lowest recycling amount is very small, M’s profit increases. (3) In most cases, the three government RPPs can effectively control the total carbon emission and increase the social welfare, but they damage the benefits of retailers and consumers. With the increase of the carbon emission intensity of remanufactured products, the government can implement the double RPP, the carbon emission RPP, and the recycling amount RPP in turn.

Carbon emission reduction and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain with outsourcing remanufacturing

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Na Wang ◽  
Yulin Zhang ◽  
Jing Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Total Carbon ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Impact

PurposeOutsourcing remanufacturing is a major form of remanufacturing, and emission reduction is an important part of a manufacturer's production. This paper aims to investigate carbon emission reduction strategies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with outsourcing remanufacturing and design a contract to coordinate the CLSC.Design/methodology/approachThe authors establish two-period game models between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and third-party remanufacturer (TPR) in different scenarios, including decentralized decision, centralized decision and coordinated decision. Furthermore, the authors study the optimal decisions by maximizing the profit model. The authors also investigate the impact of a carbon tax and emission reduction on the optimal decisions through comparative analysis.FindingsEmission reduction increases the quantity of new products and the OEM's profit. However, emission reduction decreases the outsourcing fee, which is not conducive to remanufacturing; thus, the TPR's profit does not necessarily increase. Compared with a decentralized scenario, the output of remanufactured products and the total profit increase. When the acceptance level of remanufactured products is high enough or when emissions from remanufacturing are low enough, the total carbon emissions are reduced in the centralized scenario. For the coordination of the CLSC, the OEM needs to increase the outsourcing fee and the TPR needs to share part of the emission reduction costs.Research limitations/implicationsThe TPR can choose three different remanufacturing strategies, namely, no remanufacturing, partial remanufacturing or full remanufacturing. For the majority of firms, it is difficult to remanufacture all used products. Therefore, the analysis is based only on partial remanufacturing.Practical implicationsThe results provide insights for remanufacturing and emission reduction decisions, as well as a decision basis for the cooperation between the OEM and TPR.Originality/valueThe authors combine the OEM's carbon emission reduction with outsourcing remanufacturing, and investigate the impact of technological spillover on the TPR's profit.

scholarly journals To be raised up or kicked out? Insights for the recycler in closed-loop supply chain with the regulation of government

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinxin Xu ◽  
Qunli Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Recovery Rate ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
The Government ◽  
Regulation Model ◽  
Rate Threshold

In order to improve the recovery rate of waste products and maximize the social welfare, this paper investigates the problem of government setting a recovery rate threshold for the recycler in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with the information asymmetry. By establishing the government incentive regulation model, the government can disclose the true recovery cost of the recycler and guide the recycler to make an reasonable effort. In this study, our model obtains the best recovery rate threshold for the recycler from the perspective of maximizing social welfare. Then, we conduct some sensitivity analyses and explore the impacts of related factors on the strategies-making of government and supply chain players. The results of the study indicates that the recovery rate threshold set not only depends on the operation efficiency of the recycler, it also affected by the consumers behavior and the production efficiency of manufacturer. The government should not pursue a high recovery rate blindly, more attention should be paid to control the cost of effort made by the recycler. With the increasing of the negative utility for the recycler to make effort, the government will improve the recovery threshold, otherwise, the threshold will decrease. The results facilitate scientific incentive mechanism development, and provide a reference for promoting CLSC operations.

scholarly journals Government incentive mechanism of closed-loop supply chain based on information asymmetry

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qunli Wu ◽  
Xinxin Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Collection Efficiency ◽  
Scientific Policy ◽  
Recovery Efficiency ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Aimed at the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of the manufacturer, the retailer and consumers in the waste products market, this paper studies how the government handles the adverse selection problem on the hidden recovery costs of the retailer and deals with the moral hazard problem on the level of retailer's hidden efforts. A government incentive regulation aiming at maximizing social welfare has been established based on the incentive theory in this paper. A list of contracts with transfer payments is presented to reveal the retailer's collection efficiency and motivate the retailer to make the optimal investment. Further, the impact of related factors on the recovery cost and social welfare level according to the numerical simulation are verified. The results show that under the government regulation, only by reporting the true recovery technology type information to the government can the retailer maximizes the profit. In addition, the retailer with high recovery efficiency can obtain both retained profit and additional information rent. Finally, as the retailer makes efforts to improve the recovery level, it also increases investment cost, which affects the enthusiasm of enhancing the retailer's recovery efficiency. Therefore, the government should not blindly pursue the improvement of recycling efficiency regardless of the cost, but should pay more attention to the control of recycling equipment and technology cost.The results facilitate scientific policy development, and provide a reference for promoting closed-loop supply chain operations.

scholarly journals Pricing, carbon emission reduction and recycling decisions in a closed-loop supply chain under uncertain environment

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Guangzhou Yan ◽  
Qinyu Song ◽  
Yaodong Ni ◽  
Xiangfeng Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Reduction Rate ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Total Carbon ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper studies the pricing and recycling decision problems in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) containing a manufacturer, a downstream retailer, and a third-party recycling left. The manufacturer is subjected to the cap-and-trade regulation and determines the wholesale price of products and carbon emission reduction rate. The retailer determines its resale price to meet customer demands. The third-party recycling left determines the collection rate of recycling and remanufacturing used products. The new product demands, total carbon emissions, and recovery of these products are characterized as uncertain variables due to lack of historical data or insufficient data collected for research. By constructing three decentralized game models, we explore the equilibrium solutions under the corresponding decision-making situation and the corresponding analytical solutions. Finally, numerical experiments are performed to show the total profit of supply chain members for each structure and some special insights are drawn.</p>

scholarly journals Modelling dual-channel closed-loop supply chain considering production diseconomies

2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09002
Author(s):  
Shan Liu ◽  
Yan Xing ◽  
Fengmin Yao ◽  
Dongyan Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Waste Product ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Direct Sales ◽  
Coordination Strategies ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Optimal Pricing Strategy

This paper studies the pricing selection and coordination strategies for dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) considering production diseconomies. Under the centralized and decentralized decision-making, the decision models of CLSC of retailer recycling was constructed, the effects of the manufacturer’s production diseconomy and the sales competition between manufacturer and retailer on new product pricing and waste product recycling were analysed, the optimal pricing strategy of dual-channel CLSC was given, and a “two-part tariff” coordination contract was established based on centralized decision-making. The results indicate that the profits of each member are negatively correlated with the production diseconomy and positively correlated with the degree of sales competition, the direct sales volume of manufacturer is always more than twice that of retailer, and the stronger the competition degree is, the more obvious the advantage is. Further, within the range of contract parameters that the dominant manufacturer and retailer are willing to accept, the “two-part tariff” contract can effectively realize the coordination of dual-channel CLSC.

scholarly journals Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8602
Author(s):  
Haitao Chen ◽  
Zhaohui Dong ◽  
Gendao Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Collection Rate ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This study establishs a dual channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model under a government–penalty mechanism (RPM) consisting a dual-channel manufacturer, a retailer, and the government. We consider a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer, and the government rewards or punishes manufacturers on the basis of the collection rate of used products. This paper analyzes the influence of government RPM on the optimal decisions, the relationship between the two sales channels, and the total social welfare of the supply chain system. We find that the government RPM can improve the stability of the dual-channel supply chain and the collection rate of the used products. Moreover, we are the first to provide a method of deriving the optimal government RPM through a numerical example.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

A multi-objective model for sustainable closed-loop supply chain of perishable products under two carbon emission regulations

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Saman Esmaeilian ◽  
Dariush Mohamadi ◽  
Majid Esmaelian ◽  
Mostafa Ebrahimpour
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Life Cycle ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Perishable Products ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Trade Model

Purpose This paper aims to minimize the total carbon emissions and costs and also maximize the total social benefits. Design/methodology/approach The present study develops a mathematical model for a closed-loop supply chain network of perishable products so that considers the vital aspects of sustainability across the life cycle of the supply chain network. To evaluate carbon emissions, two different regulating policies are studied. Findings According to the obtained results, increasing the lifetime of the perishable products improves the incorporated objective function (IOF) in both the carbon cap-and-trade model and the model with a strict cap on carbon emission while the solving time increases in both models. Moreover, the computational efficiency of the carbon cap-and-trade model is higher than that of the model with a strict cap, but its value of the IOF is worse. Results indicate that efficient policies for carbon management will support planners to achieve sustainability in a cost-effectively manner. Originality/value This research proposes a mathematical model for the sustainable closed-loop supply chain of perishable products that applies the significant aspects of sustainability across the life cycle of the supply chain network. Regional economic value, regional development, unemployment rate and the number of job opportunities created in the regions are considered as the social dimension.

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