scholarly journals Standard Setting with Considerations of Energy Efficiency Evolution and Market Competition

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Dai ◽  
Jianxiong Zhang ◽  
Shichen Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Policy Maker ◽  
Environmental Performance ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Standard Setting ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game ◽  
Optimal Reaction

EE (energy efficiency) level, an indispensable index reflecting the environmental performance of products, can be improved by the EE innovating effort of the producer. Considering both the evolution of EE level and market differentiation, we develop a Stackelberg differential game between a policy maker who sets the EE standard and multiple competing producers with different initial EE levels who decide the EE innovation simultaneously. As there exist numerous possible reactions for each producer under a given EE standard about whether to meet the EE standard or not, whether there exists an equilibrium is what we pay special attention to. We find that, under a given EE standard, there indeed exists a unique optimal reaction for each producer, and there exists an equilibrium. Moreover, we find that as green awareness or initial EE level increases, both the EE standard and EE innovation increase. Additionally, if policy maker pays more attention to consumer welfare and environmental performance rather than profit of producer, a more strict EE standard would be set. Also, both less information about the initial EE level and more competition among producers induce lower EE standard and social welfare.

scholarly journals Local Protectionism, Market Structure, and Social Welfare: China’s Automobile Market

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 112-151
Author(s):  
Panle Jia Barwick ◽  
Shengmao Cao ◽  
Shanjun Li
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Consumer Choice ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
National Level ◽  
Salient Feature ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Automobile Market ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Local Protection ◽  
The Impact

This study documents the presence of local protectionism and quantifies its impacts on market competition and social welfare in the context of China’s automobile market. A salient feature of China’s auto market is that vehicle models by joint ventures and state-owned enterprises command much higher market shares in their headquarter provinces than at the national level. Through county border analysis, falsification tests, and a consumer survey, we uncover protectionist policies such as subsidies to local brands as the primary contributing factor to the observed home bias. We then set up and estimate a market equilibrium model to quantify the impact of local protection, controlling for other demand and supply factors. Counterfactual analysis shows that local protection leads to significant consumer choice distortions and results in 21.9 billion yuan of consumer welfare loss, amounting to 41 percent of total subsidy. Provincial governments face a prisoner’s dilemma: local protection reduces aggregate social welfare, but provincial governments have no incentive to unilaterally remove local protection. (JEL L24, L32, L62, O14, O18, P25, R12)

scholarly journals Strategy and sustainability: a strategic logic for engagement with the environment

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Environmental Performance ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Senior Management ◽  
General Lack ◽  
Sustainability Reports ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Strategic Logic

Abstract While many firms today routinely publish sustainability reports, work to increase their energy efficiency and market some part of their products or services to customers who are in some way interested in their environmental performance, there still appears to be a general lack of engagement on the issue of the environment from Chief Executive Officers and members of Boards of Directors. Despite years of effort and thousands of scholarly articles, academia has yet to develop a compelling framework with which to engage Senior Management. The article proposes such a framework based on an idea called environmental sensibility and the degree of compliance a firm chooses to pursue.

scholarly journals A survey of stackelberg differential game models in supply and marketing channels

2008 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiuli He ◽  
Ashutosh Prasad ◽  
Suresh P. Sethi ◽  
Genaro J. Gutierrez
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Marketing Channels ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game

Implications of Price Matching in Supply Chain Negotiation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weixin Shang ◽  
Gangshu (George) Cai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Price Matching ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Multiple Buyers ◽  
Wholesale Pricing

Problem definition: Few papers have explored the impact of price matching negotiation (PM), in which a channel matches its price with the resulting wholesale price bargained by another channel, on firms’ performances, consumer welfare, and social welfare, with and without supply chain coordination. Academic/practical relevance: Negotiation has been widely seen in determining both uniform and discriminatory wholesale prices, which affect outcomes of competitive supply chain practices. Methodology: To characterize the PM mechanism, we use game theory and Nash bargaining theory to compare PM with simultaneous negotiation (SN) through a common-seller two-buyer differentiated Bertrand competition model. Results: Our analysis reveals that PM can benefit the seller but hurt all buyers, which is at odds with some fair wholesale pricing clauses intending to protect buyers. Under coordination with side payments, however, all firms can conditionally benefit more from PM than from SN. Despite firms’ gains, PM leads to less consumer utility and social welfare compared with SN, unless the second buyer in PM is considerably less powerful than the first buyer. Coordination further worsens PM’s negative impact on consumer utility and social welfare. Moreover, the existence of a spot market can increase the wholesale price in PM, hurting buyers, consumers, and society. Furthermore, the qualitative results about PM remain robust under an alternative disagreement point for PM, multiple buyers, and other extensions. Managerial implications: This paper delivers insights on when price matching in supply chain wholesale price negotiation can benefit a seller, buyers, consumers, and society in a variety of scenarios. It advocates how managers can use PM to their own advantages and provides rationale to decision makers for policy regulations regarding wholesale pricing.

scholarly journals Malpractice Environment vs Direct Litigation: What Drives Nursing Home Exit?

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 004695801878799
Author(s):  
R. Tamara Konetzka ◽  
Hari Sharma ◽  
Jeongyoung Park
Keyword(s):  
Nursing Home ◽  
Nursing Homes ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
For Profit ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

An ongoing concern about medical malpractice litigation is that it may induce provider exit, potentially affecting consumer welfare. The nursing home sector is subject to substantial litigation activity but remains generally understudied in terms of the effects of litigation, due perhaps to a paucity of readily available data. In this article, we estimate the association between litigation and nursing home exit (closure or change in ownership), separating the impact of malpractice environment from direct litigation. We use 2 main data sources for this study: Westlaw’s Adverse Filings database (1997-2005) and Online Survey, Certification and Reporting data sets (1997-2005). We use probit models with state and year fixed effects to examine the relationship between litigation and the probability of nursing home closure or change in ownership with and without adjustment for malpractice environment. We examine the relationship on average and also stratify by profit status, chain membership, and market competition. We find that direct litigation against a nursing home has a nonsignificant effect on the probability of closure or change in ownership within the subsequent 2 years. In contrast, the broader malpractice environment has a significant effect on change in ownership, even for nursing homes that have not been sued, but not on closure. Effects are stronger among for-profit and chain facilities and those in more competitive markets. A high-risk malpractice environment is associated with change of ownership of nursing homes regardless of whether they have been directly sued, indicating that it is too blunt an instrument for weeding out low-quality nursing homes.

scholarly journals Energy Efficiency Standards

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Abdel Fattah Alshadafan
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Standard Setting ◽  
Democratic Governance ◽  
Actual Practice ◽  
International Electrotechnical Commission ◽  
Nation State ◽  
Technical Expertise ◽  
International Standard ◽  
Energy Efficiency Standards

The decrease in the regulative power of states has generated a governance gap that has been filled by, among others, international standard-setting bodies. In these bodies, private technical experts shape the rules that govern commonly used technologies as well as influence various societal outcomes. The legitimacy of such regulatory outsourcing is largely based on a variety of quasi-democratic mechanisms and principles, which these bodies have endeavored to make central to the standard-setting processes. This paper examines these legitimacy-seeking aspirations by comparing the normative claims with the actual practice of developing the international techno-policy standard for TVs by the International Electrotechnical Commission, based on interviews with stakeholders and numerous public and internal documents. The findings suggest that the process is inadequate if the goal is not just to bundle technical expertise but also to meet the standards of democratic governance. The study thus contributes to the literature on standard-setting and legitimacy beyond the nation-state.

scholarly journals Capacity Choice and Government Regulation in a Vertical Industry

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 513-524
Author(s):  
Junlong Chen ◽  
Yajie Wang ◽  
Jiali Liu
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Excess Capacity ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Government Failure ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
The Social ◽  
Capacity Choice ◽  
The Government

This paper sets up an industry competition model consisting of two upstream enterprises and two downstream enterprises. Then we rely on the model to explore how non-regulation and different regulatory policies (maximizing the total profits of the upstream enterprises, the social welfare of the upstream industry or the overall social welfare) affect the following factors: the excess capacity, enterprise profits, consumer surpluses, social welfare in the upstream and downstream enterprises and the overall social welfare. The following conclusions are drawn from our research. First, whether and how the government regulates the capacity choice greatly affect the equilibrium outcomes, as well as the welfare distribution among the upstream enterprises, downstream enterprises, and consumers. The specific effects are dependent on market demand and enterprise cost. Second, the government should formulate its regulatory policies on capacity choice based on the overall social welfare of the entire supply chain. If the government aims to maximize the profits of the upstream enterprises, the social welfare of the downstream industry will be negatively affected. Third, excess capacity does not necessarily suppress social welfare. Under certain conditions, the worst scenario of excess capacity may occur under the pursuit of the maximal overall social welfare. Excess capacity may arise from various causes, rather than market competition or government regulation alone. Excess capacity cannot be attributed solely to government failure. These conclusions have some significance for optimizing capacity regulation policies.

Part III Tests of Abuse, 8 The Consumer Harm Test

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nazzini Renato
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Product Innovation ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Vertical Foreclosure

This chapter studies the consumer harm test. The consumer harm test asks whether the conduct of the dominant undertaking results in higher prices, lower output, or reduced product innovation. The test is not necessarily the manifestation of a consumer welfare objective of the competition rules but is consistent with the achievement of long-term social welfare. Therefore, the test may be applied under Article 102 even if this provision does not aim at maximizing some measure of consumer welfare but long-term social welfare. The chapter then looks at the consumer harm test in vertical foreclosure, focusing on refusal to supply and margin squeeze. Proof of consumer harm is required in all vertical foreclosure cases and not only when the refusal to supply relates to intellectual property rights.

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