scholarly journals Coordinating Pricing and Advertising Decisions for Supply Chain under Consignment Contract in the Dynamic Setting

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhihui Wu ◽  
Lichao Feng ◽  
Dongyan Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Feasible Region ◽  
Comparison Analysis ◽  
On Demand ◽  
Dynamic Setting ◽  
State Dependent ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
Advertising Effort

In this paper, via the differential game method, the problems of the pricing and advertising decision are investigated by considering the effect of number of the platform users on demand. In addition, a novel contract is developed to coordinate the supply chain. Firstly, the optimal strategies of the pricing and advertising are given in the decentralized and centralized scenarios by applying the differential game theory. Also, the comparison analysis concerning on the optimal strategies is proposed in two decision scenarios. It is shown that the centralized scenario could lead to the higher advertising effort of each member and a lower retail price. Next, we construct the state-dependent contract with hope to coordinate the supply chain and then improve the performance of the supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the impacts of the price-elasticity index of demand and the effectiveness of the number of retailer’s platform users onto the feasible region of the corresponding contract.

scholarly journals Evasion-Pursuit Strategy against Defended Aircraft Based on Differential Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Qilong Sun ◽  
Minghui Shen ◽  
Xiaolong Gu ◽  
Kang Hou ◽  
Naiming Qi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Active Defense ◽  
Guidance Law ◽  
Optimal Guidance ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
One To One ◽  
The One

The active defense scenario in which the attacker evades from the defender and pursues the target is investigated. In this scenario, the target evades from the attacker, and the defender intercepts the attacker by using the optimal strategies. The evasion and the pursuit boundaries are investigated for the attacker when the three players use the one-to-one optimal guidance laws, which are derived based on differential game theory. It is difficult for the attacker to accomplish the task by using the one-to-one optimal guidance law; thus, a new guidance law is derived. Unlike other papers, in this paper, the accelerations of the target and the defender are unknown to the attacker. The new strategy is derived by linearizing the model along the initial line of sight, and it is obtained based on the open-loop solution form as the closed-loop problem is hard to solve. The results of the guidance performance for the derived guidance law are presented by numerical simulations, and it shows that the attacker can evade the defender and intercept the target successfully by using the proposed strategy.

scholarly journals Modelling cooperative advertising decisions in a manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain using game theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-176
Author(s):  
Peter Ezimadu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Subsidy Rate ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
Advertising Effort ◽  
Advertising Strategies ◽  
Channel Structures ◽  
Stackelberg Leader

This work considers cooperative advertising decisions in a manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain, where the manufacturer is taken as the Stackelberg leader, using differential game theory. The distributor and retailer are the first and the second followers, respectively. We introduce the distributor into the traditional manufacturer-retailer channel through his direct involvement in advertising as being incorporated into the non-stochastic Sethi's sales-advertising dynamics. This is used to model the awareness share dynamics in which the distributor and the retailer directly engage in advertising, while the manufacturer bypasses the distributor to subsidise only the retail advertising effort. We consider a subsidised and unsubsidised channel structures, where each structure results in a system of three nonlinear equations, which cannot be solved analytically, but only numerically. However, we show that the unique solution to each of the systems exists, provided certain conditions are satisfied. The distributor and the retailer's advertising strategies are developed for both when subsidy is provided and when it is not provided. We also obtain the manufacturer's subsidy rate and the market awareness share for both when retail advertising is subsidised and when it is not subsidised. We observe that with the provision of subsidy, the distributor reduces his advertising effort. However, the resulting increase in the retail advertising effort is larger than the reduction in the distributor's advertising commitment, thus making the channel advertising effort larger with subsidy. It further shows that to avoid being shortchanged, each player should adopt only his optimal strategy or strategies as the case may be.

scholarly journals Modeling dynamic cooperative advertising in a decentralized channel

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-566
Author(s):  
Peter Ezimadu ◽  
Chukwuma Nwozo
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Direct Involvement ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
Advertising Effort ◽  
Supply Channel ◽  
Channel Structures ◽  
Stackelberg Leader

This work deals with cooperative advertising in a manufacturer-retailer supply channel using differential game theory. It considers the manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader and the retailer as the follower. It incorporates the manufacturer?s advertising effort into Sethi?s sales-advertising dynamics, and considers its effect on the retail advertising effort, the awareness share, the players? payoffs, and the channel payoff. These are achieved by considering two channel structures: a situation where retail advertising is subsidized, and a situation where it is not. In both situations, it obtains the Stackelberg equilibrium, which characterizes the effects of the manufacturer?s advertising effort, including the relationships between the manufacturer?s advertising effort and the retailer?s advertising effort. The work shows that the direct involvement of the manufacturer in advertising is worthwhile.

scholarly journals Differential Game Analysis of Optimal Strategies and Cooperation in Omni-Channel Organic Agricultural Supply Chain

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qifan Hu ◽  
Bing Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Consumer Preferences ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Online Retailer ◽  
Organic Products ◽  
Income Ratio ◽  
Decision Mode

This paper aims to investigate the optimal strategies for both centralized and decentralized modes in a two-echelon omni-channel organic agricultural supply chain (OASC) which consists of one farmer cooperative and one online retailer. Furthermore, the contracts of cooperation between the members in OASC are discussed. Based on both theory differential game and bi-level programming, we utilize the Nerlove–Arrow model and Stackelberg model to examine five cases of decision modes for both agents in the OASC. Then, we achieve the optimal strategies where the specified sets of organic growing effort, organic traceability technology effort, propaganda input, and service input can guarantee the maximization of the related profits. As a result, we could obtain the values of the corresponding optimal profits. For the centralized decision mode, the farmer cooperative and the online retailer make decisions with the goal of maximizing the overall profits of the OASC. Meanwhile, for the decentralized decision mode with four different cases, each member will independently make a decision with the goal of maximizing his own profit respectively. In detail, as for the fully decentralized decision mode, no contracts exist in OASC; regarding the decentralized decision mode with an information traceability cost sharing contract, two members pay the information traceability cost together; and for the decentralized decision mode with a revenue sharing contract, two members share the revenue together; as to the decentralized decision mode with a comprehensive contract, there are two cooperative ways that information traceability cost sharing and revenue sharing can be achieved. In addition, we also considered factors such as the consumer preferences of organic products and the cross influence between channels in models. Finally, through sensitivity analysis and comparison of optimal strategies and profits, we found that: (1) high consumer preferences of organic products and high cross influence between channels are profitable; and (2) the choice of contract is influenced by the relative size of the offline marginal income ratio and the online marginal income ratio.

scholarly journals Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism and Differential Game Model Construction of Mask Emergency Supply Chain Cooperation Based on COVID-19 Outbreak

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1115
Author(s):  
Shufan Zhu ◽  
Kefan Xie ◽  
Ping Gui
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Production Technology ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Dynamic Adjustment ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
The Impact

Incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mask supply chain into our framework and taking mask output as a state variable, our study introduces the differential game to study the long-term dynamic cooperation of a two-echelon supply chain composed of the supplier and the manufacturer under government subsidies. The study elaborates that government subsidies can provide more effective incentives for supply chain members to cooperate in the production of masks compared with the situation of no government subsidies. A relatively low wholesale price can effectively increase the profits of supply chain members and the supply chain system. The joint contract of two-way cost-sharing contract and transfer payment contract can promote production technology investment efforts of the supply chain members, the optimum trajectory of mask production, and total profit to reach the best state as the centralized decision scenario within a certain range. Meanwhile, it is determined that the profits of supply chain members in the joint contract can be Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision scenario. With the increase of production technology investment cost coefficients and output self-decay rate, mask outputs have shown a downward trend in the joint contract decision model. On the contrary, mask outputs would rise with growing sensitivity of mask output to production technology investment effort and increasing sensitivity of mask demand to mask output.

Coordinating a supply chain with green innovation in a dynamic setting

4OR ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiao Zhang ◽  
Jianxiong Zhang ◽  
Wansheng Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Dynamic Setting

Operation decision of logistics service supply chain: considering interruption probability in emergencies

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangsheng Zhang ◽  
Xiao Wang ◽  
Zhiqing Meng ◽  
Qirui Zhang ◽  
Kexin Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Social Reputation ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

PurposeTo remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.Design/methodology/approachRegarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.FindingsThe results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.Originality/valueFirst, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.

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