scholarly journals Fresh-Keeping Effort and Channel Performance in a Fresh Product Supply Chain with Loss-Averse Consumers’ Returns

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bojun Gu ◽  
Yufang Fu ◽  
Yanling Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Return Policy ◽  
Numerical Studies ◽  
Buyback Contract ◽  
Fresh Products

We consider a fresh product supply chain consisting of one fresh product supplier and one e-tailer. Supplier sells fresh products through e-tailer in an online market, and the e-tailer offers a full-refund return policy to loss-averse consumers and exerts a fresh-keeping effort to keep the product at the optimum freshness level. By developing an analytical model, we derive the optimal price, quantity, and fresh-keeping effort jointly and verify that it is unique in the centralized setting. Based on the comparison, we demonstrate that the e-tailer’s profit is greater with fresh-keeping effort than without it; therefore, the e-tailer has an incentive to engage in fresh-keeping effort. We also show that the return rate is independent of the fresh-keeping effort and consumers’ loss aversion. In the decentralized setting, we first characterize the optimal wholesale price by the numerical study and then find that although the buyback contract still works, the revenue-sharing contract fails to achieve channel coordination under our model formulation. Furthermore, we develop a revenue- and cost-sharing contract that can coordinate the supply chain by designing a new contractual mechanism. Our numerical studies offer the Pareto improvement regions under the buyback and revenue- and cost-sharing contracts in which the supplier and e-tailer can earn more expected profits compared with being under wholesale price contract.

scholarly journals Coordinating a Supply Chain with a Loss-Averse Retailer and Effort Dependent Demand

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liying Li ◽  
Yong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Special Class ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Gain Loss ◽  
Decision Making Behavior ◽  
Dependent Demand

This study investigates the channel coordination issue of a supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a loss-averse retailer facing stochastic demand that is sensitive to sales effort. Under the loss-averse newsvendor setting, a distribution-free gain/loss-sharing-and-buyback (GLB) contract has been shown to be able to coordinate the supply chain. However, we find that a GLB contract remains ineffective in managing the supply chain when retailer sales efforts influence the demand. To effectively coordinate the channel, we propose to combine a GLB contract with sales rebate and penalty (SRP) contract. In addition, we discover a special class of gain/loss contracts that can coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate the expected supply chain profit between the manufacturer and the retailer. We then analyze the effect of loss aversion on the retailer’s decision-making behavior and supply chain performance. Finally, we perform a numerical study to illustrate the findings and gain additional insights.

scholarly journals Coordinating a Supply Chain with a Loss-Averse Retailer under Yield and Demand Uncertainties

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiwei Luo ◽  
Dongguo Shao ◽  
Wei Liu ◽  
Zhuomin Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Preference ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Random Yield ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Quantity Flexibility ◽  
A Chain

This paper investigates the channel coordination of a supply chain (SC) consisting of a loss-averse retailer and a risk-neutral supplier under yield and demand uncertainties. Three existing contracts are analyzed. Our results demonstrate that the buyback (BB) and quantity flexibility (QF) contracts can not only coordinate the supply chain but also lead to Pareto improvement for each player, while the wholesale price (WP) contract fails to coordinate the chain due to the effects of double marginalization and risk preference. For comparison, a chain with a risk-neutral retailer is also analyzed. Furthermore, numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the coordination contracts, and the impacts of loss aversion and random yield on the decision-making behaviors and system performance are then discussed.

scholarly journals Coping with Loss Aversion and Risk Management in the Supply Chain Coordination

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 4364
Author(s):  
Wei Liu ◽  
Han Zhao ◽  
Shiji Song ◽  
Wenxuan He ◽  
Xiaochen Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Confidence Level ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Buyback Contract ◽  
Optimal Order Quantity

In this paper, we apply a combined revenue sharing and buyback contract to investigate the channel coordination of a two-echelon supply chain with a loss-averse retailer. Since loss-averse decision makers usually take on more risks, the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) measure is introduced to hedge against it and the retailer’s objective is to maximize the CVaR of utility. We obtain the retailer’s optimal order quantity under the combined contract. It is shown that there is a unique wholesale price coordinating the supply chain if the retailer’s confidence level is less than a threshold that is independent of contract parameters. Moreover, a complete sensitivity analysis of parameters is carried out. In particular, the retailer’s optimal order quantity and coordinating wholesale price decreases as the loss aversion or confidence level increases, while it increase as the buyback price or sharing coefficient increases. Furthermore, there exists the situation where the combined contract can coordinate the chain even though neither the revenue sharing nor buyback contract can when the contract parameters are constrained.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination with a Loss-Averse Retailer and Combined Contract

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 586
Author(s):  
Wei Liu ◽  
Shiji Song ◽  
Ying Qiao ◽  
Han Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Confidence Levels ◽  
Quantity Flexibility ◽  
Quantity Flexibility Contract

This paper studies the supply chain coordination where the retailer is loss-averse, and a combined buyback and quantity flexibility contract is introduced. The loss-averse retailer’s objective is to maximize the Conditional Value-at-Risk of utility. It is shown the combined contract can coordinate the chain and a unique coordinating wholesale price exists if the confidence level is below a threshold. Moreover, the retailer’s optimal order quantity, expected utility and coordinating wholesale price are decreasing in loss aversion and confidence levels, respectively. We also find that when the contract parameters are restricted, the combined contract may coordinate the supply chain even though neither of its component contracts coordinate the chain.

Return Policy and Buyback Contract in Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (11) ◽  
pp. 8165-8170
Author(s):  
Jariya Seksan ◽  
Kannapha Amaruchkul
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Return Policy ◽  
Buyback Contract

scholarly journals Supply chain contracting coordination for fresh products with fresh-keeping effort

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (3) ◽  
pp. 538-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Zheng ◽  
Petros Ieromonachou ◽  
Tijun Fan ◽  
Li Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Decision Variable ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

Purpose Fresh product loss rates in supply chain operations are particularly high due to the nature of perishable products. The purpose of this paper is to maximize profit through the contract between retailer and supplier. The optimized prices for the retailer and the supplier, taking the fresh-keeping effort into consideration, are derived. Design/methodology/approach To address this issue, the authors consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier (i.e. wholesaler) for two scenarios: centralized and decentralized decision making. The authors start from investigating the optimal decision in the centralized supply chain and then comparing the results with those of the decentralized decision. Meanwhile, a fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract are designed. Numerical examples are provided, and managerial insights are discussed at the end. Findings The results show that the centralized decision is more profitable than the decentralized decision; a fresh product supply chain (FPSC) can only be coordinated through a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract; the optimal retail price, wholesale price and fresh-keeping effort can all be achieved; and the profit of a FPSC is positively related to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness and negatively correlated with their sensitivity to price. Research limitations/implications This research is based on the assumption that demand is relatively stable. It has not addressed when demand is stochastic. Practical implications The findings would be useful for managers in fresh food sector in terms of how to deal with suppliers in order to maximize total profit while also provide freshest food to the customers. Originality/value Few studies have considered fresh-keeping effort as a decision variable in the modelling of supply chain. In this paper, a mathematical model for the fresh-keeping effort and for price decisions in a supply chain is developed. In particular, fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract are examined simultaneously in the study of the supply chain coordination problem.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Management with Nash Bargaining Loss-Averse Reference Dependence

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (24) ◽  
pp. 3154
Author(s):  
Wentao Yi ◽  
Zhongwei Feng ◽  
Chunqiao Tan ◽  
Yuzhong Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Efficiency Coefficient

This paper investigates a two-echelon green supply chain (GSC) with a single loss-averse manufacturer and a single loss-averse retailer. Since the Nash bargaining solution exactly characterizes endogenous power and the contribution of the GSC members, it is introduced as the loss-averse reference point for the GSC members. Based on this, a decision model of the two-echelon GSC with loss aversion is formulated. The optimal strategies of price and product green degree are derived in four scenarios: (a) the centralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the CD scenario; (b) the decentralized decision scenario with rational GSC members, namely the DD scenario; (c) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the manufacturer’s share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD(∆m ≥ πm) scenario; (d) the decentralized decision scenario with the GSC members loss-averse, where the retailer’s share is below its own loss-averse reference point, namely the DD(∆r ≥ πr) scenario. Then, a comparative analysis of the optimal strategies and profits in these four scenarios is conducted, and the impacts of loss aversion and green efficiency coefficient of products (GECP) on the GSC are also performed. The results show that (i) GECP has a critical influence on the retail price and the wholesale price; (ii) the GSC with loss aversion provide green products with the lowest green degree; (iii) the retail price, the wholesale price and product green degree are decreasing monotonically with the loss aversion level of the GSC member without incurring loss; (iv) furthermore, the effect of the loss aversion level of the GSC member with incurring loss on the optimal strategies is related to GECP and the gap between the GSC members’ loss aversion levels.

scholarly journals Decentralized Supply Chains under Random Price-Dependent Demand: Noncooperative Equilibria vs. Coordination with Cost-Sharing Contracts

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yanpeng Sun ◽  
Cheng Ma ◽  
Qi Sun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Lost Sales ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Equilibrium Response ◽  
Buy Back ◽  
Dependent Demand

It is common for a supplier to sell products to multiple retailers. In this paper, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of a decentralized supply chain with multiple retailers facing a random price-dependent demand in the additive form. Here, we consider two kinds of demand functions: the distribution of the demand depends only on the retailer’s own retail price (noncompeting retailers) and not only on his own retail price but also on that of the other retailers (competing retailers). We present appropriate wholesale price, buy-back, and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts to coordinate the total supply chain, so that when all the retailers adopt their equilibrium response, the supply chain system coordination is also achieved. Furthermore, the coalition formation among retailers is also analyzed. We find that with buy-back and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts and linear price-dependent demand function, retailers always prefer being in the grand coalition to forming any other coalition.

Contracting Emissions Reduction Supply Chain Based on Market Low-Carbon Preference and Carbon Intensity Constraint

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (02) ◽  
pp. 2050003
Author(s):  
Jiaping Xie ◽  
Jing Li ◽  
Ling Liang ◽  
Xu Fang ◽  
Guang Yang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Carbon Intensity ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Carbon Emissions Reduction ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
The Impact

Carbon emissions reduction has become a frequently discussed topic in industry and academia. However, how can reduction effects be enhanced with dominant brand and downstream manufacturer? This paper incorporates emissions reduction into a green supply chain which considers consumers’ low-carbon preference behavior and government intensity regulations, in order to discuss the impacts of consumers’ environmental awareness and government constraints on optimal emissions reduction and profit, respectively. The paper first constructs three reduction models on the basis of reality: independent reduction by manufacturer, contractual reduction by brand and collaborative reduction by both. Then it concludes the optimal decisions and compare the models. The results show that both the profits and emissions reduction will be decreased with the strengthened carbon intensity constraint, but the cost-sharing contract can mitigate this negative effect on dominant brand and society. Meanwhile, the acceptable range of cost-sharing ratio will be smaller with a lower cost coefficient of emissions reduction and a higher consumers’ preference. Furthermore, government should design the incentive method or regulate the carbon market to improve the social welfare level. Lastly, a numerical study is conducted, the impact of several key factors on supply chain performance and model selection are presented for management decisions.

Coordinating Vulnerable Supply Chains with Option Contracts

2021 ◽  
pp. 2050053
Author(s):  
Zhongyi Liu ◽  
Shengya Hua ◽  
Guanying Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Option Contract ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Disruption Risk

We investigate vulnerable supply chain coordination with an option contract in the presence of supply chain disruption risk caused by external and internal disturbances. The supply chain consists of a single risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. We characterize the retailer’s order quantity decision under the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) criterion and the supplier’s production decision. The results show that facing disruption risk and risk-aversion, both the retailer and the supplier would be more prudent to order and produce less than the risk-neutral scenario, inducing damage to the supply chain performance. The number of options purchased is decreasing in disruption risk and the risk-aversion of the retailer. The supplier will increase production as the disruption risk decreases or the shortage penalty increases. When the supplier does not know the risk-aversion of the retailer, the former will produce more and bear a higher overstock risk. We also investigate conditions that facilitate vulnerable supply chain coordination and find that the existence of risk-aversion and disruption risk restrict the option price and exercise price to lower price levels. Finally, we compare the option contract with wholesale price contract from the supplier’s and retailer’s perspectives through a numerical study.

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