scholarly journals Multistage Attack Graph Security Games: Heuristic Strategies, with Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thanh H. Nguyen ◽  
Mason Wright ◽  
Michael P. Wellman ◽  
Satinder Singh
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Attack Graphs ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Attack Graph ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Heuristic Strategies ◽  
Security Games ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Security Game

We study the problem of allocating limited security countermeasures to protect network data from cyber-attacks, for scenarios modeled by Bayesian attack graphs. We consider multistage interactions between a network administrator and cybercriminals, formulated as a security game. This formulation is capable of representing security environments with significant dynamics and uncertainty and very large strategy spaces. We propose parameterized heuristic strategies for the attacker and defender and provide detailed analysis of their time complexity. Our heuristics exploit the topological structure of attack graphs and employ sampling methods to overcome the computational complexity in predicting opponent actions. Due to the complexity of the game, we employ a simulation-based approach and perform empirical game analysis over an enumerated set of heuristic strategies. Finally, we conduct experiments in various game settings to evaluate the performance of our heuristics in defending networks, in a manner that is robust to uncertainty about the security environment.

scholarly journals The Price of Usability: Designing Operationalizable Strategies for Security Games

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Marie Mc Carthy ◽  
Corine M. Laan ◽  
Kai Wang ◽  
Phebe Vayanos ◽  
Arunesh Sinha ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Optimization Problem ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Static Solution ◽  
Mixed Integer ◽  
Integer Optimization ◽  
Security Personnel ◽  
Security Games ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Security Game

We consider the problem of allocating scarce security resources among heterogeneous targets to thwart a possible attack. It is well known that deterministic solutions to this problem being highly predictable are severely suboptimal. To mitigate this predictability, the game-theoretic security game model was proposed which randomizes over pure (deterministic) strategies, causing confusion in the adversary. Unfortunately, such mixed strategies typically involve randomizing over a large number of strategies, requiring security personnel to be familiar with numerous protocols, making them hard to operationalize. Motivated by these practical considerations, we propose an easy to use approach for computing  strategies that are easy to operationalize and that bridge the gap between the static solution and the optimal mixed strategy. These strategies only randomize over an optimally chosen subset of pure strategies whose cardinality is selected by the defender, enabling them to conveniently tune the trade-off between ease of operationalization and efficiency using a single design parameter. We show that the problem of computing such operationalizable strategies is NP-hard, formulate it as a mixed-integer optimization problem, provide an algorithm for computing epsilon-optimal equilibria, and an efficient heuristic. We evaluate the performance of our approach on the problem of screening for threats at airport checkpoints and show that the Price of Usability, i.e., the loss in optimality to obtain a strategy that is easier to operationalize, is typically not high.

scholarly journals Attack Graph Analysis for Network Anti-Forensics

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rahul Chandran ◽  
Wei Q. Yan
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Graph Analysis ◽  
Test Bed ◽  
Network Attacks ◽  
Attack Graphs ◽  
Defense Strategies ◽  
Attack Graph ◽  
Attack Path ◽  
First Time

The development of technology in computer networks has boosted the percentage of cyber-attacks today. Hackers are now able to penetrate even the strongest IDS and firewalls. With the help of anti-forensic techniques, attackers defend themselves, from being tracked by destroying and distorting evidences. To detect and prevent network attacks, the main modus of operandi in network forensics is the successful implementation and analysis of attack graph from gathered evidences. This paper conveys the main concepts of attack graphs, requirements for modeling and implementation of graphs. It also contributes the aspect of incorporation of anti-forensic techniques in attack graph which will help in analysis of the diverse possibilities of attack path deviations and thus aids in recommendation of various defense strategies for better security. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time network anti-forensics has been fully discussed and the attack graphs are employed to analyze the network attacks. The experimental analysis of anti-forensic techniques using attack graphs were conducted in the proposed test-bed which helped to evaluate the model proposed and suggests preventive measures for the improvement of security of the networks.

scholarly journals Behavioral and Game-Theoretic Security Investments in Interdependent Systems Modeled by Attack Graphs

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 1585-1596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mustafa Abdallah ◽  
Parinaz Naghizadeh ◽  
Ashish R. Hota ◽  
Timothy Cason ◽  
Saurabh Bagchi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Attack Graphs ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Security Investments

scholarly journals A game theoretic approach reveals that discretizing clinical information can reduce antibiotic misuse

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Diamant ◽  
Shoham Baruch ◽  
Eias Kassem ◽  
Khitam Muhsen ◽  
Dov Samet ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Antibiotic Prescription ◽  
Clinical Information ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Optimal Output ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

AbstractThe overuse of antibiotics is exacerbating the antibiotic resistance crisis. Since this problem is a classic common-goods dilemma, it naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic analysis. Hence, we designed a model wherein physicians weigh whether antibiotics should be prescribed, given that antibiotic usage depletes its future effectiveness. The physicians’ decisions rely on the probability of a bacterial infection before definitive laboratory results are available. We show that the physicians’ equilibrium decision rule of antibiotic prescription is not socially optimal. However, we prove that discretizing the information provided to physicians can mitigate the gap between their equilibrium decisions and the social optimum of antibiotic prescription. Despite this problem’s complexity, the effectiveness of the discretization solely depends on the type of information available to the physician to determine the nature of infection. This is demonstrated on theoretic distributions and a clinical dataset. Our results provide a game-theory based guide for optimal output of current and future decision support systems of antibiotic prescription.

A Game-theoretic Analysis of Hybrid Threats

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Pieter Balcaen ◽  
Cind Du Bois ◽  
Caroline Buts
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Hybrid Threats
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