scholarly journals Pricing Strategies of a Three-Stage Supply Chain: A New Research in the Big Data Era

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Pan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
New Research ◽  
New Situation ◽  
Big Data Technology

In the Big Data era, Data Company as the Big Data information (BDI) supplier should be included in a supply chain. In the new situation, to research the pricing strategies of supply chain, a three-stage supply chain with one manufacturer, one retailer, and one Data Company was chosen. Meanwhile, considering the manufacturer contained the internal and external BDI, four benefit models about BDI investment were proposed and analyzed in both decentralized and centralized supply chain using Stackelberg game. Meanwhile, the optimal retail price and benefits in the four models were compared. Findings are as follows. (1) The industry cost improvement coefficient, the internal BDI investment cost of the manufacturer, and the added cost of the Data Company on using Big Data technology have different relationships with the optimal prices of supply chain members in different models. (2) In the retailer-dominated supply chain model, the optimal benefits of the retailer and the manufacturer are the same, and the optimal benefits of the Data Company are biggest in all the members.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhang Zhijian ◽  
Peng Wang ◽  
Miyu Wan ◽  
Junhua Guo ◽  
Jian Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern

The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effect of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain decisions and design contracts to achieve a win-win situation within the supply chain. For this study, a centralized supply chain model was established without considering the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concern. Furthermore, the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concerns were introduced into the decentralized supply chain, while the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was built. Furthermore, an innovative supply chain contract, i.e., buyback contract, with promotional cost sharing was designed to achieve supply chain coordination along with overconfidence and fairness concern. Finally, a numerical analysis was also conducted to analyze the effect of overconfidence, fairness concern, and the validity of the contract. The principal findings of the study include the positive correlation between retailers’ overconfidence and optimal order quantity, sales effort, expected utility, and profit. Although the order quantity and sales efforts were not affected by the fairness concern of the retailer, the contract achieved coordination with a win-win outcome when the level of overconfidence and fairness concern was moderate.

Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Retailer Direct Marketing

2014 ◽  
Vol 933 ◽  
pp. 902-906 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu Juan Li ◽  
Ai Jun Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Direct Marketing ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Brand Promotion ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

A two-level dual-channel supply chain model was established in which retailer had his own direct channel. Game model was constructed based on two cases of decentralized and centralized decision-making. Pricing strategies of manufacturer and retailer were studied. Impacts of different channel and different sale entities on manufacturer and retailer were examined. Results show that when channel substitution increases and market share of retailer direct channel is small, retailer should choose to give up direct channel and focus on retail channel sales and take direct channel as means of propaganda and brand promotion. When the difference of sale entities reduces, consumers can get more surplus.

scholarly journals Effects of Variable Production Rate and Time-Dependent Holding Cost for Complementary Products in Supply Chain Model

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitali Sarkar ◽  
Sun Hur ◽  
Biswajit Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Rate ◽  
Graphical Representation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Time Dependent ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Complementary Products ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Holding Cost ◽  
Variable Production

Recently, a major trend is going to redesign a production system by controlling or making variable the production rate within some fixed interval to maintain the optimal level. This strategy is more effective when the holding cost is time-dependent as it is interrelated with holding duration of products and rate of production. An effort is made to make a supply chain model (SCM) to show the joint effect of variable production rate and time-varying holding cost for specific type of complementary products, where those products are made by two different manufacturers and a common retailer makes them bundle and sells bundles to end customers. Demand of each product is specified by stochastic reservation prices with a known potential market size. Those players of the SCM are considered with unequal power. Stackelberg game approach is employed to obtain global optimum solution of the model. An illustrative numerical example, graphical representation, and managerial insights are given to illustrate the model. Results prove that variable production rate and time-dependent holding cost save more than existing literature.

Supply chain models with imperfect quality items when end demand is sensitive to price and marketing expenditure

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 725-742 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rita Yadav ◽  
Sarla Pareek ◽  
Mandeep Mittal
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Unit Price ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Screening Process ◽  
Defective Items ◽  
Imperfect Quality ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Supply Chain Model

This paper studies supply chain model for imperfect quality items under which unit price and unit marketing expenditure imposed by the buyer, regulates the demand of the item. It is presumed that with the accustomed supply chain model, all produced items are of good quality, coincidentally, it engrosses some percentage of defective items. Thus, inspection process becomes essential for the buyer to segregate the defective items, which are then sold at discounted price at the end of the screening process. In this paper, a supply chain model is ensued to substantiate the interaction and democracy of the participants in the supply chain, the buyer and seller, is pitched by non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretical approaches. In the non-cooperative method, the Stackelberg game approach is used in which one player behaves as a leader and another one as a follower. The co-operative game approach is based on a Pareto efficient solution concept, in which both the players work together to enhance their profit. Lastly, to demonstrate the significance of the theory of the paper, numerical examples including sensitivity analysis are presented.

scholarly journals A two-echelon supply chain model with price and warranty dependent demand and pro-rata warranty policy under cost sharing contract

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-75
Author(s):  
Biswarup Samanta ◽  
◽  
Bibhas Chandra Giri ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Warranty Period ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Warranty Cost ◽  
Parameter Values

In this article, a two-echelon supply chain model with a single-vendor a single-buyer is considered. The vendor's production process is imperfect and the market demand is assumed to be dependent on the buyer's selling price and warranty period. The vendor consents to return a definite portion of the buyer's purchase value, if any product is found defective within the length of warranty. The refund value or the warranty cost is considered as a function of the warranty period and the buyer's selling price of the item. This warranty cost is assumed to be fully borne by the vendor in the first model (Model I) while in the second model (Model II), it is assumed that the buyer agrees to bear a portion of the warranty cost. The proposed models are solved under decentralized scenario. We also derive and optimize the average total profit of the supply chain in order to obtain the optimal decisions of the centralized model. We consider a Stackelberg game between the vendor and the buyer in the decentralized scenario, where the vendor is assumed to be the leader and the buyer as the pursuer. Through numerical study, it is observed that, with respect to all the key decisions of the models, Model II provides better outcomes than Model I. Sensitivity analysis is also carried out to examine the impacts of changes of parameter-values on the optimum decisions.

scholarly journals Single-Manufacturer Multi-Retailer Supply Chain Models with Discrete Stochastic Demand

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (15) ◽  
pp. 8271
Author(s):  
Yaqing Xu ◽  
Jiang Zhang ◽  
Zihao Chen ◽  
Yihua Wei
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Dynamic Programming Method ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Stochastic Demands ◽  
Demand Models

Although there are highly discrete stochastic demands in practical supply chain problems, they are seldom considered in the research on supply chain systems, especially the single-manufacturer multi-retailer supply chain systems. There are no significant differences between continuous and discrete demand supply chain models, but the solutions for discrete random demand models are more challenging and difficult. This paper studies a supply chain system of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers with discrete stochastic demands. Each retailer faces a random discrete demand, and the manufacturer utilizes different wholesale prices to influence each retailer’s ordering decision. Both Make-To-Order and Make-To-Stock scenarios are considered. For each scenario, the corresponding Stackelberg game model is constructed respectively. By proving a series of theorems, we transfer the solution of the game model into non-linear integer programming model, which can be easily solved by a dynamic programming method. However, with the increase in the number of retailers and the production capacity of manufacturers, the computational complexity of dynamic programming drastically increases due to the Dimension Barrier. Therefore, the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) approach is introduced, which significantly reduces the computational complexity of solving the supply chain model.

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