scholarly journals Research on Coordination of Fresh Produce Supply Chain in Big Market Sales Environment

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juning Su ◽  
Jiebing Wu ◽  
Chenguang Liu

In this paper, we propose two decision models for decentralized and centralized fresh produce supply chains with stochastic supply and demand and controllable transportation time. The optimal order quantity and the optimal transportation time in these two supply chain systems are derived. To improve profits in a decentralized supply chain, based on analyzing the risk taken by each participant in the supply chain, we design a set of contracts which can coordinate this type of fresh produce supply chain with stochastic supply and stochastic demand, and controllable transportation time as well. We also obtain a value range of contract parameters that can increase profits of all participants in the decentralized supply chain. The expected profits of the decentralized setting and the centralized setting are compared with respect to given numerical examples. Furthermore, the sensitivity analyses of the deterioration rate factor and the freshness factor are performed. The results of numerical examples show that the transportation time is shorter, the order quantity is smaller, the total profit of whole supply chain is less, and the possibility of cooperation between supplier and retailer is higher for the fresh produce which is more perishable and its quality decays more quickly.

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiarong Luo ◽  
Xu Chen

This paper investigates the coordination of a supply chain consisting of a loss-averse supplier and a risk-neutral buyer who orders products from the supplier who suffers from random yield to meet a deterministic demand. We derive the risk-neutral buyer’s optimal order policy and the loss-averse supplier’s optimal production policy under shortage-penalty-surplus-subsidy (SPSS) contracts. We also analyze the impacts of loss aversion on the loss-averse supplier’s production decision making and find that the loss-averse supplier may produce less than, equal to, or more than the risk-neutral supplier. Then, we provide explicit conditions on which the random yield supply chain with a loss-averse supplier can be coordinated under SPSS contracts. Finally, adopting numerical examples, we find that when the shortage penalty is low, the buyer’s optimal order quantity will increase, while the supplier’s optimal production quantity will first decrease and then increase as the loss aversion level increases. When the shortage penalty is high, the buyer’s optimal order quantity will decrease but the supplier’s optimal production quantity will always increase as the loss aversion level increases. Furthermore, the numerical examples provide strong evidence for the view that SPSS contracts can effectively improve the performance of the whole supply chain.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Wang ◽  
Shiji Song ◽  
Cheng Wu

This paper studies an option contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one risk-neutral supplier and two risk-averse retailers engaged in promotion competition in the selling season. For a given option contract, in decentralized case, each risk-averse retailer decides the optimal order quantity and the promotion policy by maximizing the conditional value-at-risk of profit. Based on the retailers’ decision, the supplier derives the optimal production policy by maximizing expected profit. In centralized case, the optimal decision of the supply chain system is obtained. Based on the decentralized and centralized decision, we find the coordination conditions of the supply chain system, which can optimize the supply chain system profit and make the profits of the supply chain members achieve Pareto optimum. As for the subchain, we also find the coordination conditions, which generalize the results of the supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. Our analysis and numerical experiments show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium between two retailers, and the optimal order quantity of each retailer increases (decreases) with its own (competitor’s) promotion level.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11361
Author(s):  
Yangyang Huang ◽  
Zhenyang Pi ◽  
Weiguo Fang

Barter has emerged to alleviate capital pressure, maximize the circulation of goods, and facilitate the disposal of excess inventory. This study considers a two-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a capital-constrained retailer with trade credit, in which the retailer exchanges unsold products for needed subsidiary products on a barter platform. The retailer’s optimal order quantity and the manufacturer’s wholesale price are derived, and the influences of barter and other factors on the equilibrium strategy and performance of the supply chain are examined; these results are verified and supplemented by numerical simulation. We find that the retailer can increase profit by bartering when facing highly uncertain demand, that the retailer’s optimal order quantity increases with the supply rate and demand for subsidiary products, and that both manufacturer and retailer benefit from the high supply rate of subsidiary products. However, barter induces the manufacturer to raise the wholesale price to prevent its profit from being harmed. In addition, the manufacturer suffers from the retailer’s initial capital.


Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoqing Liu ◽  
Felix T. S. Chan ◽  
Xinsheng Xu

This paper studies the optimal order decisions for the loss-averse newsvendor problem with backordering and contributes to the risk hedging issue in the newsvendor model. The Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) measure is applied to quantify the potential risks for the loss-averse newsvendor in a backordering setting, and we obtain the optimal order quantity for a loss-averse newsvendor to maximize the CVaR of utility. It is found that the optimal order quantity to maximize the CVaR objective could be bigger or smaller than the expected profit maximization (EPM) order quantity, which provides an alternative explanation on decision bias in the newsvendor model. This study also reveals that the optimal order quantity for a loss-averse newsvendor to maximize expected utility with backordering is smaller than the EPM order quantity, which implies that backordering encourages the loss-averse newsvendor to order fewer items. Sensitivity analyses are performed to investigate the properties of the optimal order quantities and managerial insights are suggested. This paper provides a novel method for the risk management of the loss-averse newsvendor model and presents several new ordering policies for the retailers in practice.


Author(s):  
R. P. Tripathi ◽  
S. S. Misra

In most of the classical inventory models the demand is considered as constant. In this paper the model has been framed to study the items whose demand and deterioration both are constant. The authors developed a model to determine an optimal order quantity by using calculus technique of maxima and minima. Thus, it helps a retailer to decide its optimal ordering quantity under the constraints of constant deterioration rate and constant pattern of demand.


Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhang Zhijian ◽  
Peng Wang ◽  
Miyu Wan ◽  
Junhua Guo ◽  
Jian Liu

The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effect of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain decisions and design contracts to achieve a win-win situation within the supply chain. For this study, a centralized supply chain model was established without considering the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concern. Furthermore, the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concerns were introduced into the decentralized supply chain, while the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was built. Furthermore, an innovative supply chain contract, i.e., buyback contract, with promotional cost sharing was designed to achieve supply chain coordination along with overconfidence and fairness concern. Finally, a numerical analysis was also conducted to analyze the effect of overconfidence, fairness concern, and the validity of the contract. The principal findings of the study include the positive correlation between retailers’ overconfidence and optimal order quantity, sales effort, expected utility, and profit. Although the order quantity and sales efforts were not affected by the fairness concern of the retailer, the contract achieved coordination with a win-win outcome when the level of overconfidence and fairness concern was moderate.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sun Guohua

This paper develops a dynamic model in a one-supplier-one-retailer fresh agricultural product supply chain that experiences supply disruptions during the planning horizon. The optimal solutions in the centralized and decentralized supply chains are studied. It is found that the retailer’s optimal order quantity and the maximum total supply chain profit in the decentralized supply chain with wholesale price contract are less than that in the centralized supply chain. A two-part tariff contract is proposed to coordinate the decentralized supply chain with which the maximum profit can be achieved. It is found that the optimal wholesale price should be a decreasing piecewise function of the final output. To ensure that the supplier and the retailer both have incentives to accept the coordination contract, a lump-sum fee is offered. The interval of lump-sum fee is given leaving both the supplier and the retailer better off with the two-part tariff contract.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Honglin Yang ◽  
Ya Yu ◽  
Yong Zha ◽  
Jijun Yuan

In real supply chain, a capital-constrained retailer has two typical payment choices: the up-front payment to receive a high discount price or the delayed payment to reduce capital pressure. We compare with the efficiency of optimal decisions of different participants, that is, supplier, retailer, and bank, under both types of payments based on a game equilibrium analysis. It shows that under the equilibrium, the delayed payment leads to a greater optimal order quantity from the retailer compared to the up-front payment and, thus, improves the whole benefit of the supply chain. The numerical simulation for the random demand following a uniform distribution further verifies our findings. This study provides novel evidence that a dominant supplier who actively offers trade credit helps enhance the whole efficiency of a supply chain.


2013 ◽  
Vol 694-697 ◽  
pp. 3428-3433
Author(s):  
Fei Hu

An inventory model was developed to determine an ordering policy for the retailer under conditions of allowable shortage and two levels of delay permitted. We present a simple algebraic method to replace the use of differential calculus for determining the retailer's optimal ordering policy. A theorem is presented to obtain the optimal order quantity, and numerical examples are given to illustrate the results obtained in this paper.


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