scholarly journals Coordination of Supply Chain with a Dominant Retailer under Demand Disruptions

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Li ◽  
Xiaofang Liu ◽  
Jun Wu ◽  
Fengmei Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Sales Promotion ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Research Questions ◽  
Original Contract ◽  
Dominant Retailer ◽  
The Impact

We develop a coordination model of a one-manufacturer multi-retailers supply chain with a dominant retailer. We consider the impact of a dominant retailer on the market retail price and his sales promotion opportunity and examine how the manufacturer can coordinate such a supply chain by revenue-sharing contract after demand disruptions. We address the following important research questions in this paper. (i) How do we design an appropriate revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain with a dominant retailer without demand disruptions? (ii) When demand is disrupted with variations in market scale and price sensitive coefficient, can the original contract still be valid? (iii) How do the demand disruptions affect the coordination mechanism under different disruption scenarios and how should the new contract change? Finally, we generate important insights by both analytical and numerical examples.

scholarly journals Optimal coordination and service level of the supply chain in the sharing economy: the perspective of social responsibility

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Guo ◽  
Yanli Guo
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Social Risks ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Optimal Coordination

AbstractThe sharing economy has changed people’s lives. These changes have accelerated the pace of life and improved the quality of life, but have also had some negative effects. For example, in China, in the supply chain of the takeout delivery platform, the service deliverer often violates traffic rules to shorten the delivery time. This phenomenon has aroused widespread concern in society. From the perspective of sustainable operation of platform enterprises and reducing social risks, this issue is worthy of in-depth study. First, this study analyses the optimal decision-making about pricing and service efforts, then discusses the supply chain coordination mechanism under a revenue-sharing contract, and finds that the platform’s service level is related to the efforts of deliverers and the elasticity of demand/service. However, under a traditional revenue-sharing contract, the economic returns are not enough to motivate deliverers to avoid violations of traffic regulations; When the increase of cost caused by the improvement of service level is not fully covered by the revenue sharing from the platform, they have a strong incentive to break the rules even if the optimal coordination can be achieved in the supply chain. Second, this study reconstructs the revenue-sharing contract by adding social responsibility to the objective function of the platform enterprises and designs contingent rewards to regulate behaviours of service deliverers. The results indicate that when the contingent reward factor reaches a certain level, the optimal effort of the service deliverers is constrained within a reasonable range, which can to some extent reduce the occurrence of illegal behaviour. Our findings offer fresh insights on coordination of supply chain in the sharing economy, identify new direction for future research on CSR, and provide managers of platform enterprises with suggestions for regulating the behaviour of partners and balance the economic and social benefits.

scholarly journals Carbon Emission Reduction Decision and Revenue-Sharing Contract with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference and CER Cost under Carbon Tax

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Chao-qun Han ◽  
Hua-ying Gu ◽  
Li-hui Sui ◽  
Chang-peng Shao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Theoretical And Numerical Analysis ◽  
The Impact

Since the tax of carbon emission is popular and consumers are exhibiting low-carbon preference, the green manufactures have to spend more extra cost on investing carbon emission reduction (CER) technology to decrease the carbon emission. To encourage the manufacture’s CER investment efforts, this paper explores the impact of carbon tax, CER cost, and consumers’ low-carbon preference on low-carbon decision-making and designs a revenue-sharing contract (RS) by constructing Stackelberg models. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, this paper finds that the supply chain would benefit from the increment of consumer’s environmental awareness but be depressed by the increase of the CER investment cost factor. Additionally, there exists a unique optimal carbon tax to make CER degree the maximum. Furthermore, RS can effectively promote manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions and also improve the supply chain efficiency.

scholarly journals Study on Supply Chain considering Anticipated Regret under Price Discount

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Nian Zhang ◽  
Bin Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Anticipated Regret ◽  
Price Discount ◽  
Price Discounts ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

The aim of this study is to research the impact of consumer regrets on the supply chain caused by the company’s “discount promotion.” This paper introduces the theory of anticipated regret and price discount into the supply chain. By quoting the negative utility formula of consumers’ anticipated regret under price discount, it quantitatively describes the demand function of the original product and the discount product. The model under centralized and decentralized decision making is constructed, and revenue-sharing contract is adopted to coordinate the supply chain. The conclusions are as follows. (1) Affected by the anticipated regret under the price discount, the price of the product increases first and then decreases with the regret sensitivity coefficient and consumer heterogeneity sensitivity increases. In addition, the price under the leadership structure of the manufacturer is the highest. (2) Price discounts enhance consumers’ perception of anticipated regret. Under the stimulation of price discounts, the price of products increases first and then decreases. (3) The revenue-sharing contract could not coordinate the supply chain, and the introduction of a profit-sharing mechanism is achieved the Pareto improvement of the supply chain.

scholarly journals Coordinating a Green Agri-Food Supply Chain with Revenue-Sharing Contracts Considering Retailers’ Green Marketing Efforts

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Cui ◽  
Siwei Guo ◽  
Hao Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Food Supply ◽  
Agricultural Sector ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Marketing ◽  
Personal Health ◽  
Food Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Serious environmental issues have drawn the attention of the agricultural sector. Consumers’ concerns about their personal health and food safety have stimulated the demand for green agri-food, which has also made it important to focus on the green agri-food supply chain to improve the food quality and reduce the associated environmental concerns. This paper discusses coordination issues of the green agri-food supply chain under the background of farmers’ green farming and retailers’ green marketing, and the impact of a revenue-sharing contract on key decisions of supply chain participants. On the basis of the two-echelon green agri-food supply chain composed of a farmer and a retailer, a revenue-sharing contract was established that takes the cost of farmer’s green farming and retailer’s green marketing into account. Through the comparison of the model results, it is concluded that the revenue-sharing contract is beneficial to not only increase the greening level, but also improve both the farmer’s profit and the retailer’s profit. Moreover, the effectiveness of the revenue-sharing contract is positively correlated with consumers’ sensitivity to the greening level. Finally, the conclusion is verified by numerical simulation and some management suggestions are given.

scholarly journals A Coordination Mechanism of Supply Chain with a Retailer and Two Competitive Suppliers

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Zhi-yang Liu ◽  
Yong Liu ◽  
Hui Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Negotiation Model ◽  
Decision Variables ◽  
Conflict Problem ◽  
Dominant Retailer ◽  
The Impact

To deal with coordination problem of a supply chain consisting of two competitive suppliers and a dominant retailer, considering these factors such as cooperation effort degrees and competition on the supply chain members, we establish a two-stage model considering cooperation effort degrees and competition of the suppliers from the perspectives of decentralized decision and centralized decision and exploit it to discuss the optional decisions and explore the impact of cooperation effort degrees on the profits of supply chain members. Then, we use a group negotiation model to establish a coordination mechanism. The results reveal that the decision variables and overall profit of the supply chain of suppliers and retailers under centralized decisions are better than those under the decentralized decisions. Besides, the degree of competition and price sensitivity have positive and negative effects on the efforts of suppliers and retailers, respectively. Meanwhile, the degree of cooperation between suppliers and retailers affects the profits of supply chain members and the whole supply chain in different degrees. Finally, the proposed value-added profit distribution mechanism can effectively deal with conflict problem and guarantee supply chain members and supply chain to maximize their profits and adopt the centralized decision.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination under Inventory Inaccuracy with RFID Technology

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quansheng Lei ◽  
Yin Zhang ◽  
Lingyu Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Economic Viability ◽  
Rfid Technology ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Dependent Demand

In this paper we consider a two-echelon supply chain under price-dependent demand market and we use RFID to eliminate the effect of inventory inaccuracy. Models are built to evaluate the economic viability and coordination conditions. We analyze two scenarios in which the supply chain is defined, the integrated one and the decentralized one, respectively. For the integrated, we compare the different supply chain revenue with and without RFID technology and then determine the optimal inventory decisions. For the decentralized, we mainly focus on the coordination mechanism by revenue sharing contract under Stackelberg game. By seeking appropriate contract parameters, the supply chain can finally be coordinated while all partners are better off. Furthermore, numerical examples are given to verify our proposition.

scholarly journals Coordinating Three-Level Supply Chain by Revenue-Sharing Contract with Sales Effort Dependent Demand

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinghua Pang ◽  
Yuer Chen ◽  
Yulu Hu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Experiments ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Improve Performance ◽  
Quantity Discount ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Dependent Demand

Revenue-sharing contract is a kind of mechanism to improve performance or to achieve perfect coordination of supply chain. Considering a three-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a distributor, and a retailer who faces a stochastic and sales effort dependent demand, the paper analyzes the impact of sales effort on supply chain coordination and expounds the reasons why traditional revenue-sharing contract cannot coordinate supply chain in this condition. Given three cases: only the retailer bears the sales effort cost, only the manufacturer bears the sales effort cost, and the retailer bears the sales effort cost with the manufacturer, the paper proposes an improved revenue-sharing contract based on quantity discount policy to coordinate the supply chain. It illustrates that improved revenue sharing contract can coordinate supply chain by implementing it in one transaction or two transactions of three-level supply chain. The model of improved revenue-sharing contract is optimized, respectively, by addition form and multiplication form with sales effort dependent demand. Formulas are given to determine the optimal contract parameters. Finally, numerical experiments are given to test the accuracy of the model of improved revenue-sharing contract.

scholarly journals Designing a Revenue Sharing Contract under Information Asymmetry

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 820-834
Author(s):  
Jaimini Bhattacharyya ◽  
Rahul R. Marathe ◽  
G. Srinivasan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Simulation Experiment ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Sales Revenue ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
The Impact

In a supply chain coordinated by a revenue sharing contract, under-reporting of sales revenue has been a common practice amongst retailers who always have private information about the market demand. In this article, we aim to design a mechanism to mitigate this problem. One may design a contract to elicit truthful information from the retailer while maximizing supplier’s payoff. However, we find that such contracts fail to coordinate the supply chain, when the market demand is high. Hence, we study an audit-based revenue sharing contract. First, we design a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of retailer’s decisions on the subsequent choices made by the supplier. We find that the audit probability chosen by the supplier increases with the gap between retailer’s order quantity and the sales reported by the retailer. We follow this up with a simulation experiment which incorporates the findings of our laboratory experiment. Audit cost and the penalty announced by the supplier for not reporting true sales turned out to be important in making decisions for both the players. We also find the threshold auditing cost beyond which auditing is not economically viable for the supplier.

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