scholarly journals Ananlysis of Carbon Emission Reduction and Power Dominance between Single Manufacturer and Single Retailer in Regulatory Cap and Trade System

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liang-jie Xia ◽  
Hua-wei Zhi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Side Payment ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Product Demand

In the cap and trade system, the paper analyses the Stackelberg game between the power asymmetrical retailer and manufacturer and designs a side-payment self-enforcing contract to resolve some arguments that the existing research overemphasizes spontaneity of participation in side-payment contracts design based on supply chain coordination and does not consider rationality and fairness of allocation of profit increment. Also, the numerical analysis was given. The research shows some important conclusions: in the supply chain, the dominant manufacturer is not able to encourage the retailer to improve its promotion level by increasing its carbon cutting level, but the optimal emission reduction level increases with the dominant retailer’s promotion level; the optimal promotion level, emission reduction, and product demand in a retailer leading supply chain are higher than those in a supply chain dominated by manufacturer; with the new side-payment self-enforcing contract, decentralized decision according to individual rationality incurs a collective reason effect in the centralized setting.

scholarly journals Strategies for Capital Constrained Timber and Carbon Sink Supply Chain under the Cap-and-Trade Scheme

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 4380
Author(s):  
Xinyue Yang ◽  
Ye Song ◽  
Mingjun Sun ◽  
Hongjun Peng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Sink ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Emission Rights ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Reduction Costs

We consider a capital constrained timber and carbon sink supply chain under the cap-and-trade scheme, where the forest company produces timber and carbon sink. We consider two subsidy modes: financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests and financing subsidy to the manufacturer’s emission reductions. We apply a Stackelberg model and mainly consider the impact of subsidies on the profits and the strategies of the supply chain members. The results show that when the government gives a financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests, it is conducive to promoting the expansion of carbon sink forests, as well as the enhancement of the forest company’s profit. However, a larger supply of carbon sinks generates a lower price, which leads to the manufacturer reducing the technical emission reduction level and purchasing more carbon emission rights instead. On the other hand, when the manufacturer receives a financing subsidy for the technical emission reduction costs, its production becomes cleaner than before, and the profits of the forest company and the manufacturer increase.

scholarly journals Profit Distribution Model for Construction Supply Chain with Cap-and-Trade Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Wenfei Lu ◽  
Qianwen Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
General Contractor ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Pure Competition

Cap-and-trade has become one of the most widely used carbon emission limitation methods in the world. Its constraints have a great impact on the carbon emission reduction decisions and production operations of supply chain enterprises, as well as profit distribution. In the construction supply chain, there are few studies on the profit distribution and emission reduction decisions considering cap-and-trade policy. This paper investigates the profit distribution model of a two-echelon construction supply chain consisting of a general contractor and a subcontractor with cap-and-trade policy. Using game theory and Shapley value method, the optimal emission reduction decisions and profit distribution under three cooperation modes of pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation are obtained, respectively. The research shows that the profits of the construction supply chain are increasing in pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation scenarios, and the emission reduction amount of the construction supply chain in the case of pure cooperation is greater than that of pure competition and co-opetition. The carbon emission reduction amount under the co-opetition scenario is not always greater than that under the pure competition scenario, which depends on the emission reduction cost coefficient relationship of general contractor and subcontractor. When the cost coefficient of emission reduction of the general contractor is less than that of the subcontractor, the emission reduction amount under pure competition is larger than that under co-opetition. A numerical study is carried out to verify the conclusions and illustrated the profits of the supply chain decreased with the increase of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, and had nothing to do with the emission reduction efficiency of enterprises.

Emission-Dependent Production for Environment-Aware Demand in Cap-and-Trade System

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (01) ◽  
pp. 67-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lili Zhu ◽  
Juanjuan Zhou ◽  
Yuanyuan Yu ◽  
Jiaang Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Environmental Awareness ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Product Demand ◽  
Target Production ◽  
Environmental Administration ◽  
The Impact

This paper focuses on the impact of ‘cap-and-trade’ mechanism and customer’s environmental awareness on emission-dependent manufacturer. Carbon emission cap from the perspective of government will be confirmed. In the ‘cap-and-trade’ system, emission permit becomes one of the key factors of production for emission-dependent firms. If the cap is insufficient to satisfy the target production, extra permit should be purchased via trading, otherwise, the remaining permit will be sold to other firms. Since the product demand has been influenced due to the consideration of customer environmental awareness, the production will be decided by analyzing the produced decision-making process of the emission-dependent firm in this case. Base on the consideration of improving environment benefits, carbon emission cap of this kind of manufacturer will be determined. Additionally, numerical analysis is considered. We found that it is profitable for the manufacturer investing; meanwhile, the emission intensity of this manufacturer is ameliorative. And emission reduction investment should be encouraged by the environmental administration in some way of preferential policy.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing, Ordering, and Coordination for Prefabricated Building Supply Chain with Power Structure and Flexible Cap-and-Trade

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (19) ◽  
pp. 2426
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Menglin Liu ◽  
Lu Gan ◽  
Chong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Prefabricated Building

Under the increasing pressure of global emission reduction, prefabricated buildings are becoming more and more popular. As prefabricated building manufacturers and assemblers are emerging in the market, how do they make decisions of pricing, ordering, and emission reduction? In this paper, game theory is used to make the decisions for the prefabricated building supply chain with flexible cap-and-trade and different power structures, i.e., using prefabricated building manufacturers as the leader, using the vertical Nash equilibrium, and using prefabricated building assemblers as the leader. The two-part tariff contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and to improve the supply chain performance. Moreover, we discuss the influence of different power structures and the two-part tariff contract on the optimal decisions and profits. Finally, numerical analysis is used to verify the conclusions. This indicates that the supply chain leaders will gain a higher profit and that the power structure has a significant influence on the two-part tariff contract, which will result in an unfair distribution of profit. High carbon trading prices benefit carbon emission reduction. Consumer low-carbon awareness has a positive effect on carbon emission reduction and supply chain performance.

scholarly journals Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction and Sales Promotion in Dyadic Supply Chain in Presence of Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liangjie Xia ◽  
Longfei He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Sales Promotion ◽  
Side Payment ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost

The paper studies how the combination of the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction and the retailer’s emission reduction relevant promotion impacts the performances of a dyadic supply chain in low-carbon environment. We consider three typical scenarios, that is, centralized and decentralized without or with side-payment. We compare measures of supply chain performances, such as profitabilities, emission reduction efficiencies, and effectiveness, in these scenarios. To improve chain-wide performances, a new side-payment contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and numerical experiments are also conducted. We find the following. (1) In decentralized setting, the retailer will provide emission cutting allowance to the manufacturer only if their unit product profit margin is higher enough than the manufacturer’s, and the emission reduction level of per unit product is a monotonically increasing function with respect to the cost pooling proportion provided by the retailer; (2) the new side-payment contract can coordinate the dyadic supply chain successfully due to its integrating sales promotion effort and emission reduction input, which results in system pareto optimality under decentralized individual rationality but achieves a collective rationality effect in the centralized setting; (3) when without external force’s regulation, consumers’ low-carbon awareness is to enhance consumers’ utility and decrease profits of supply chain firms.

Stackelberg game based co-firing biomass with coal under carbon cap-and-trade regulation

2021 ◽  
pp. 0958305X2110415
Author(s):  
Zongtang Xie ◽  
Hongxia Liu
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Trade Regulation ◽  
Social Welfare Maximization ◽  
Emission Quota ◽  
Interactive Algorithm

Coal-fired power industry is under enormous pressure to accomplish carbon emission reduction targets. This paper proposes a bi-level multi-objective model for co-firing biomass with coal under carbon cap-and-trade regulation which considers a leader-follower Stackelberg game between the authority and the coal-fired power plants. The upper level regards social welfare maximization and allocation satisfaction maximization as its multiple objectives, while the lower level attempts to maximize the profits of each coal-fired power plant. The inherent uncertainty prompts the motivation for employing fuzzy set theory to characterize the uncertain parameters and determine their exact values. A case study from Shandong Province, China is provided to demonstrate the practicality and efficiency of the optimization model. [Formula: see text]-constraint method and interactive algorithm are used to solve the model, and furthermore the solutions associated with different free carbon emission quota levels and minimal allocation satisfactions have been generated to examine the influences. Based on the analysis and discussion, the methodology can meet the carbon emission reduction goals and transit to a lower-carbon power generation. It also assists the decision makers to develop desired quota allocation strategy in accordance with their attitudes and actual conditions.

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