scholarly journals Research on Power Producer’s Bidding Behavior Based on the Best-Response Dynamic Model

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Jingqi Sun ◽  
Xiaochun Zhang ◽  
Sen Guo
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Response Dynamic ◽  
Best Response Dynamic

As China’s electricity market is facing many problems, the research on power producer’s bidding behavior can promote the healthy and sustainable development of China’s electricity market. As a special commodity, the “electricity” possesses complicated production process. The instable market constraint condition, nonsymmetric information, and a lot of random factors make the producer’s bidding process more complex. Best-response dynamic is one of the classic dynamic mechanisms of the evolutionary game theory, which applies well in the repeated game and strategy evolution that happen among a few bounded rational players with a quick learning capability. The best-response dynamic mechanism is employed to study the power producer’s bidding behavior in this paper, the producer’s best-response dynamic model is constructed, and how the producers would engage in bidding is analyzed in detail. Taking two generating units in South China regional electricity market as the example, the producer’s bidding behavior by following the producer’s best-response dynamic model is verified. The relationships between the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of power producer’s bidding and the market demand, and ceiling and floor price as well as biding frequency are discussed in detail.

scholarly journals Crime, punishment, and evolution in an adversarial game

2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MCBRIDE ◽  
RYAN KENDALL ◽  
MARIA R. D'ORSOGNA ◽  
MARTIN B. SHORT
Keyword(s):  
Multiple Equilibrium ◽  
Response Dynamics ◽  
Alternative Strategies ◽  
Cooperative Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Refinements ◽  
Best Response Dynamics ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Response Dynamic ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Best Response Dynamic

We examine the game theoretic properties of a model of crime first introduced by Short et al. (2010 Phys. Rev. E82, 066114) as the SBD Adversarial Game. We identify the rationalizable strategies and one-shot equilibria under multiple equilibrium refinements. We further show that SBD's main result about the effectiveness of defecting-punishers (“Informants”) in driving the system to evolve to the cooperative equilibrium under an imitation dynamic generalizes to a best response dynamic, though only under certain parameter regimes. The nature of this strategy's role, however, differs significantly between the two dynamics: in the SBD imitation dynamic, Informants are sufficient but not necessary to achieve the cooperative equilibrium, while under the best response dynamic, Informants are necessary but not sufficient for convergence to cooperation. Since a policy of simply converting citizens to Informants will not guarantee success under best response dynamics, we identify alternative strategies that may help the system reach cooperation in this case, e.g., the use of moderate but not too severe punishments on criminals.

scholarly journals Walrasian Dynamics in Multi-Unit Markets

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1812-1819 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simina Brânzei ◽  
Aris Filos-Ratsikas
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Walrasian Equilibrium ◽  
Pure Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Small Loss ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Response Dynamic ◽  
Natural Mechanism ◽  
Best Response Dynamic ◽  
Multiple Units

In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of buyers that have monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept that retain its desirable fairness properties do exist. We study the dynamics of (Walrasian) envy-free pricing mechanisms in this environment, showing that for any such pricing mechanism, the best response dynamic starting from truth-telling converges to a pure Nash equilibrium with small loss in revenue and welfare. Moreover, we generalize these bounds to capture all the (reasonable) Nash equilibria for a large class of (monotone) pricing mechanisms. We also identify a natural mechanism, which selects the minimum Walrasian envy-free price, in which for n=2 buyers the best response dynamic converges from any starting profile. We conjecture convergence of the mechanism for any number of buyers and provide simulation results to support our conjecture.

Analyzing the Customers' Dynamic Confusion in Telecommunication Networks Share Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 15-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Driss Ait Omar ◽  
Hamid Garmani ◽  
Mohamed El Amrani ◽  
Mohamed Baslam ◽  
Mohamed Fakir
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Telecommunication Networks ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Consumer Confusion ◽  
Response Dynamic ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Best Response Dynamic ◽  
Over Time

In this article, the authors have developed a simple oligopolistic model to formalize the interactions between service providers and end-users by considering that the rationality of customers varies over time. This article assessed the impact of the dynamics of consumer confusion on the competition and profitability of service providers who are considered rational and competitive with one another to maximize their respective gains in the face of a confused fraction of consumers while others are not confused. This article shows the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. The authors used the best response dynamic algorithm for learning Nash equilibrium. We have shown that when the number of confused customers is large, the ISP interest this and they offer moderately high prices with low quality of service. On the other hand, over time, rationality increases, forcing the ISPs to change their strategies by offering better services so that their demand increases. We also add that when customer behavior changes quickly, the ISPs follow clearer strategies with customer satisfactory services.

scholarly journals Social Pressure in Networks Induces Public Good Provision

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 4
Author(s):  
David Jimenez-Gomez
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Small Group ◽  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Network Topology ◽  
Social Pressure ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Good Provision

I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well due to a fear of being punished, and this generates contagion in the network. In contrast to earlier models in the literature, contagion happens fast, as part of the best response of fully rational individuals. The network topology has implications for whether contagion starts and the extent to which it spreads. I find conditions under which an agent decides to be the first to contribute in order to generate contagion in the network, as well as conditions for contribution due to a self-fulfilling fear of social pressure.

scholarly journals Evolution of populations with strategy-dependent time delays

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacek Miȩkisz ◽  
Marek Bodnar
Keyword(s):  
Stationary State ◽  
Time Delays ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Small Time ◽  
Stochastic Perturbations ◽  
New Type ◽  
Novel Behavior

AbstractWe address the issue of stability of coexistence of two strategies with respect to time delays in evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that a microscopic model of evolutionary games with a unique mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (a globally asymptotically stable interior stationary state in the standard replicator dynamics) and with strategy-dependent time delays leads to a new type of replicator dynamics. It describes the time evolution of fractions of the population playing given strategies and the size of the population. Unlike in all previous models, an interior stationary state of such dynamics depends continuously on time delays and at some point it might disappear, no cycles are present. In particular, this means that an arbitrarily small time delay changes an interior stationary state. Moreover, at certain time delays, there may appear another interior stationary state.Author summarySocial and biological processes are usually described by ordinary or partial differential equations, or by Markov processes if we take into account stochastic perturbations. However, interactions between individuals, players or molecules, naturally take time. Results of biological interactions between individuals may appear in the future, and in social models, individuals or players may act, that is choose appropriate strategies, on the basis of the information concerning events in the past. It is natural therefore to introduce time delays into evolutionary game models. It was usually observed, and expected, that small time delays do not change the behavior of the system and large time delays may cause oscillations. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of evolutionary games with strategy-dependent time delays, in which payoffs appear some time after interactions of individuals, lead to a new type of replicator dynamics. Unlike in all previous models, interior stationary states of such dynamics depend continuously on time delays. This shows that effects of time delays are much more complex than it was previously thought.

scholarly journals How to Promote Compliance Management in the Electricity Market? An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Cheng Chen ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Yuanyuan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises' choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies' choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

scholarly journals LEARNING TO PLAY BEST RESPONSE IN DUOPOLY GAMES

2004 ◽  
Vol 06 (03) ◽  
pp. 443-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAN WENZELBURGER
Keyword(s):  
Demand Function ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Response Behavior ◽  
Estimation Errors ◽  
Demand Functions ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
Duopoly Market

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly market where firms lack perfect knowledge of the market demand function. They use estimated and therefore misspecified demand functions instead and determine their optimal strategies from the corresponding subjective payoff functions. The central issue of this paper is the question under which conditions a firm can learn the true demand function as well as the response behavior of its competitor from repeated estimations of historical market data. As soon as estimation errors are negligible, a firm is able to play best response in the usual game theoretic sense.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document