Towards Automation 2.0: A Neurocognitive Model for Environment Recognition, Decision-Making, and Action Execution

2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemarie Velik ◽  
Gerhard Zucker ◽  
Dietmar Dietrich
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amélie J. Reynaud ◽  
Clara Saleri Lunazzi ◽  
David Thura

ABSTRACTA growing body of evidence suggests that decision-making and action execution are governed by partly overlapping operating principles. Especially, previous work proposed that a shared decision urgency/movement vigor signal, possibly computed in the basal ganglia, coordinates both deliberation and movement durations in a way that maximizes the reward rate. Recent data support one aspect of this hypothesis, indicating that the urgency level at which a decision is made influences the vigor of the movement produced to express this choice. Here we investigated whether conversely, the motor context in which a movement is executed determines decision speed and accuracy. Twenty human subjects performed a probabilistic decision task in which perceptual choices were expressed by reaching movements toward targets whose size and distance from a starting position varied in distinct blocks of trials. We found strong evidence for an influence of the motor context on most of the subjects’ decision policy but contrary to the predictions of the “shared regulation” hypothesis, we observed that slow movements executed in the most demanding motor blocks in terms of accuracy were often preceded by faster and less accurate decisions compared to blocks of trials in which big targets allowed expression of choices with fast and inaccurate movements. These results suggest that decision-making and motor control are not regulated by one unique “invigoration” signal determining both decision urgency and action vigor, but more likely by independent, yet interacting, decision urgency and movement vigor signals.NEW & NOTEWORTHYRecent hypotheses propose that choices and movements share optimization principles derived from economy, possibly implemented by one unique context-dependent regulation signal determining both processes speed. In the present behavioral study conducted on human subjects, we demonstrate that action properties indeed influence perceptual decision-making, but that decision duration and action vigor are actually independently set depending on the difficulty of the movement executed to report a choice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 155-171
Author(s):  
Aleksandra M. Herman ◽  
Manos Tsakiris

Abstract The sense of agency describes the experience of controlling one’s body to cause desired effects in the world. We explored whether this is influenced by interoceptive processes. Specifically, we investigated whether the sense of agency changes depending on where, in the cardiac cycle (systole or diastole), the action was executed and where the outcome of the action occurred. In two experiments, participants completed decision-making task to win/lose money. Explicit (ratings of control) and implicit (temporal judgement) measures of agency were differentially affected by cardiovascular state. Implicit agency scores were affected by the cardiac phase at the point of action execution. Explicit ratings of control were affected by the type of (free vs. instructed) and by outcome valence (win vs. lose). The time of the action was uniformly distributed across the cardiac cycle. These results show interoceptive impact on agency, but that cardiac cycle may affect explicit and implicit agency differently.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 918-926 ◽  
Author(s):  
Balazs Aczel ◽  
Aba Szollosi ◽  
Bence Palfi ◽  
Barnabas Szaszi ◽  
Pascal J. Kieslich

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Balazs Aczel ◽  
Aba Szollosi ◽  
Bence Palfi ◽  
Szaszi Barnabas ◽  
Pascal J. Kieslich

In this study, we aimed to explore whether action execution is an inherent part of the decision-making process. According to the hypothesis of embodied choice, the decision-making process is bidirectional as action dynamics exert their backward influence on decision processes through changing the cost and value of the potential options. This influence takes place as moving toward one option increases the commitment to and, therefore, the likelihood of choosing that option. This commitment effect can be the result of either (a) the continuous act of getting closer to this option or (b) the increased movement cost associated with changing the movement direction to select a different option. To disentangle the potential influence of these two factors, we developed the Guided Movement Task, a choice task designed to bias participant’s computer-mouse movements by constraining the allowed movement space by a corridor. Using this task, we created different conditions in which the participants’ mouse cursor, after being guided toward one of the options, either had equal or unequal distances to the choice options. By this manipulation, we could test whether the continuous act of getting closer to an option in itself is sufficient to influence people’s decisions—a claim of “strong embodiment.” In two experiments, we found that the likelihood of choosing an option only increased when the distances between the two options were unequal after the initial movement but not when they were equal. These results disagree with the hypothesis that action execution is an inherent part of the decision-making process.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel D. McDougle ◽  
Peter A. Butcher ◽  
Darius Parvin ◽  
Fasial Mushtaq ◽  
Yael Niv ◽  
...  

AbstractDecisions must be implemented through actions, and actions are prone to error. As such, when an expected outcome is not obtained, an individual should not only be sensitive to whether the choice itself was suboptimal, but also whether the action required to indicate that choice was executed successfully. The intelligent assignment of credit to action execution versus action selection has clear ecological utility for the learner. To explore this scenario, we used a modified version of a classic reinforcement learning task in which feedback indicated if negative prediction errors were, or were not, associated with execution errors. Using fMRI, we asked if prediction error computations in the human striatum, a key substrate in reinforcement learning and decision making, are modulated when a failure in action execution results in the negative outcome. Participants were more tolerant of non-rewarded outcomes when these resulted from execution errors versus when execution was successful but the reward was withheld. Consistent with this behavior, a model-driven analysis of neural activity revealed an attenuation of the signal associated with negative reward prediction error in the striatum following execution failures. These results converge with other lines of evidence suggesting that prediction errors in the mesostriatal dopamine system integrate high-level information during the evaluation of instantaneous reward outcomes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 124 (2) ◽  
pp. 497-509
Author(s):  
Amélie J. Reynaud ◽  
Clara Saleri Lunazzi ◽  
David Thura

Recent hypotheses propose that choices and movements share optimization principles derived from economy, possibly implemented by one unique context-dependent regulation signal determining both processes’ speed. In the present behavioral study conducted on human subjects, we demonstrate that action properties indeed influence perceptual decision-making, but that decision duration and action vigor are actually independently set depending on the difficulty of the movement executed to report a choice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Marti-Marca ◽  
Gustavo Deco ◽  
Ignasi Cos

Abstract Motor decision-making is often described as a sequential process, beginning with the assessment of available options and leading to the execution of a selected movement. While this view is likely to be accurate for decisions requiring significant deliberation, it would seem unfit for choices between movements in dynamic environments. In this study, we examined whether and how non-selected motor options may be considered post-movement onset. We hypothesized that a change in reward at any point in time implies a dynamic reassessment of options, even after an initial decision has been made. To test this, we performed a decision-making task in which human participants were instructed to execute a reaching movement from an origin to a rectangular target to attain a reward. Reward depended on arrival precision and on the specific distribution of reward presented along the target. On a third of trials, we changed the initial reward distribution post-movement onset. Our results indicated that participants frequently change their initially selected movements when a change is associated with an increase in reward. This process occurs quicker than overall, average reaction times. Finally, changes in movement are not only dependent on reward but also on the current state of the motor apparatus.


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