The packer filter: an efficient mechanism for user-level network code

1987 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Mogul ◽  
R. Rashid ◽  
M. Accetta
Keyword(s):  
Network Code ◽  
Efficient Mechanism

The packer filter: an efficient mechanism for user-level network code

1987 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 39-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Mogul ◽  
R. Rashid ◽  
M. Accetta
Keyword(s):  
Network Code ◽  
Efficient Mechanism

QoS-aware energy-efficient mechanism for sleeping mode ONUs in enhanced EPON

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
AliAkbar Nikoukar ◽  
I-Shyan Hwang ◽  
Andrew Tanny Liem ◽  
Chien-Jung Wang
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficient ◽  
Efficient Mechanism

SEC permits abbreviated tender and exchange offers for non-convertible high-yield and investment-grade debt securities

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 28-29
Author(s):  
Ian B. Blumenstein ◽  
J. Eric Maki ◽  
John T. Owen
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
High Yield ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Efficient Mechanism ◽  
Practical Guidance ◽  
Traditional Structures ◽  
Investment Grade ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose – To advise companies of a recent SEC no-action letter relating to tender and exchange offers for certain debt securities. Design/methodology/approach – Reviews various conditions allowing an issuer to use a shortened timeframe in which certain debt tender/exchange offers need be kept open for as few as five business days. Findings – The abbreviated debt tender/exchange offer structure contemplated by the no-action letter provides a more efficient mechanism for conducting debt tender/exchange offers in certain circumstances. Practical implications – Issuers conducting a debt tender/exchange offer should consider whether the new abbreviated structure is more effective in achieving their objectives than the more traditional structures. Originality/value – Practical guidance from experienced securities regulatory lawyers that gives an overview of important developments in debt tender/exchange offer practice.

Stock and Option Proportions in Executive Compensation

2011 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 169-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phelim P. Boyle ◽  
Ranjini Jha ◽  
Shannon Kennedy ◽  
Weidong Tian
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Efficient Mechanism ◽  
Opposite Conclusion

There is controversy about the relative merits of stock and options in executive compensation. Some observers contend that stock is a more efficient mechanism, while others reach the opposite conclusion. We focus on the manager's risk-taking incentives and derive an optimal compensation contract by using the concept of a comparable benchmark and imposing a volatility constraint in a principal-agent framework. We demonstrate a joint role for both stock and options in the optimal contract. We show that firms with higher volatility should use more options in compensating their executives and provide empirical evidence supporting this testable implication.

scholarly journals Opposite Fluxes of Glutamine and Alanine in the Splanchnic Area Are an Efficient Mechanism for Nitrogen Sparing in Rats

1998 ◽  
Vol 128 (9) ◽  
pp. 1487-1494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hubert W. Lopez ◽  
Corinne Moundras ◽  
Christine Morand ◽  
Christian Demigné ◽  
Christian Rémésy
Keyword(s):  
Efficient Mechanism
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