Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Distributed Infrastructure for Common Good

In the fourth chapter of the book “The economy of the common good”, the nature of economics as a science and research practices in their theoretical and empirical aspects are discussed. The author considers the processes of modeling, empirical verification of models and evaluation of research quality. In addition, the features of economic cognition and the role of mathematics in economic research are analyzed, including the example of relevant research in game theory and information theory.

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Economic Significance of Social Capital

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2011-12-46-65 ◽

2011 ◽

pp. 46-65 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

L. Polishchuk ◽

R. Menyashev

Keyword(s):

Social Capital ◽

Collective Action ◽

Common Good ◽

Economic Conditions ◽

Formal Institutions ◽

Transmission Channels ◽

Economic Significance ◽

Bonding And Bridging ◽

The Impact

The paper deals with economics of social capital which is defined as the capacity of society for collective action in pursuit of common good. Particular attention is paid to the interaction between social capital and formal institutions, and the impact of social capital on government efficiency. Structure of social capital and the dichotomy between its bonding and bridging forms are analyzed. Social capital measurement, its economic payoff, and transmission channels between social capital and economic outcomes are discussed. In the concluding section of the paper we summarize the results of our analysis of the role of social capital in economic conditions and welfare of Russian cities.

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Minimizing Missed Opportunities: Modeling Relationships between the State and Business in Russia

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2009-7-42-61 ◽

2009 ◽

pp. 42-61

Author(s):

A. Oleynik

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Empirical Evidence ◽

Common Good ◽

The State ◽

Power Relationships ◽

Individual Decision ◽

Missed Opportunities ◽

Power Domination ◽

Individual Decision Making ◽

Optimal Outcomes

Power involves a number of models of choice: maximizing, satisficing, coercion, and minimizing missed opportunities. The latter is explored in detail and linked to a particular type of power, domination by virtue of a constellation of interests. It is shown that domination by virtue of a constellation of interests calls for justification through references to a common good, i.e. a rent to be shared between Principal and Agent. Two sources of sub-optimal outcomes are compared: individual decision-making and interactions. Interactions organized in the form of power relationships lead to sub-optimal outcomes for at least one side, Agent. Some empirical evidence from Russia is provided for illustrative purposes.

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