Are Truthful Bidders Paying too Much? Efficiency and Revenue in Display Ad Auctions

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Paul Sutterer ◽  
Stefan Waldherr ◽  
Martin Bichler
Keyword(s):  
Ad Auctions

scholarly journals Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Decarolis ◽  
Maris Goldmanis ◽  
Antonio Penta
Keyword(s):  
Ad Auctions

Multi-armed bandits for bid shading in first-price real-time bidding auctions

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Tuomo Tilli ◽  
Leonardo Espinosa-Leal
Keyword(s):  
Real Time ◽  
Economic Benefit ◽  
Real Data ◽  
Demand Side ◽  
Production Environment ◽  
Online Advertisements ◽  
Ad Auctions ◽  
Real Scenario ◽  
Second Price Auctions ◽  
Naive Approach

Online advertisements are bought through a mechanism called real-time bidding (RTB). In RTB, the ads are auctioned in real-time on every webpage load. The ad auctions can be of two types: second-price or first-price auctions. In second-price auctions, the bidder with the highest bid wins the auction, but they only pay the second-highest bid. This paper focuses on first-price auctions, where the buyer pays the amount that they bid. This research evaluates how multi-armed bandit strategies optimize the bid size in a commercial demand-side platform (DSP) that buys inventory through ad exchanges. First, we analyze seven multi-armed bandit algorithms on two different offline real datasets gathered from real second-price auctions. Then, we test and compare the performance of three algorithms in a production environment. Our results show that real data from second-price auctions can be used successfully to model first-price auctions. Moreover, we found that the trained multi-armed bandit algorithms reduce the bidding costs considerably compared to the baseline (naïve approach) on average 29%and optimize the whole budget by slightly reducing the win rate (on average 7.7%). Our findings, tested in a real scenario, show a clear and substantial economic benefit for ad buyers using DSPs.

scholarly journals Optimising trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctions

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Bachrach ◽  
Sofia Ceppi ◽  
Ian A. Kash ◽  
Peter Key ◽  
David Kurokawa
Keyword(s):  
Trade Offs ◽  
Ad Auctions

Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions

2011 ◽  
pp. 391-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Feldman ◽  
Reshef Meir ◽  
Moshe Tennenholtz
Keyword(s):  
Ad Auctions ◽  
Revenue Enhancement

Prediction and Welfare in Ad Auctions

2014 ◽  
pp. 267-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mukund Sundararajan ◽  
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Ad Auctions
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