scholarly journals Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hadi Minooei ◽  
Chaitanya Swamy
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Covering Problems ◽  
Robust Mechanism Design

Book Reviews

2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 589-591
Keyword(s):  
Graduate Students ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
University Of Michigan ◽  
Dynamic Mechanism Design ◽  
Temple University ◽  
The University ◽  
Robust Mechanism Design

Dimitrios Diamantaras of Temple University reviews “An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design,” by Tilman Börgers. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Presents explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design and examines the frontiers of research in mechanism design in a text written for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics who have a good understanding of game theory. Discusses screening; examples of Bayesian mechanism design; examples of dominant strategy mechanisms; incentive compatibility; Bayesian mechanism design; dominant strategy mechanisms; nontransferable utility; informational interdependence; robust mechanism design; and dynamic mechanism design. Börgers is Samuel Zell Professor of the Economics of Risk at the University of Michigan.”

Robust Mechanism Design

10.1142/8318 ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Stephen Morris
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Robust Mechanism Design

scholarly journals Robust mechanism design and social preferences

2017 ◽  
Vol 149 ◽  
pp. 59-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Bierbrauer ◽  
Axel Ockenfels ◽  
Andreas Pollak ◽  
Désirée Rückert
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Robust Mechanism Design

Robust Mechanism Design

2015 ◽  
pp. 164-203
Author(s):  
Börgers Tilman ◽  
Krähmer Daniel ◽  
Strausz Roland
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Robust Mechanism Design
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