Implementation of Social Choice Functions by Mechanisms

2014 ◽  
pp. 223-236
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Social Choice Functions

Full Implementation under Ambiguity

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-178
Author(s):  
Huiyi Guo ◽  
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Maxmin Expected Utility ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Social Choice Functions ◽  
Bayesian Implementation ◽  
Pareto Efficient ◽  
Choice Set

This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient conditions for implementation. As applications, we implement the set of ambiguous Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice functions, the maxmin core, the maxmin weak core, and the maxmin value. (JEL D71, D81, D82)

scholarly journals Self-selective social choice functions

2007 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Semih Koray ◽  
Arkadii Slinko
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Social Choice Functions
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