International Trade Agreements and Political Economy

10.1142/8386 ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Riezman
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
International Trade Agreements

Does WTO Accession Help Domestic Reform? The Political Economy of SOE Reform Backsliding in Vietnam

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
TU-ANH VU-THANH
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
External Pressure ◽  
The Political ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
Soe Reform ◽  
Lock In ◽  
Domestic Reform

AbstractConventional wisdom holds that international trade agreements can serve as a source of external pressure and credible commitment to overcome opposition and to lock in domestic economic reforms. This belief, however, underestimates the ability of politicians not only to circumvent these pressures, but to leverage international trade agreements to advance their own policy preferences – preferences that may be highly anti-reformist. Thus, trade agreements do not necessarily induce reforms and, in certain circumstances, they can even be counterproductive. Through an analysis of aggregate data and 40 interviews with senior politicians, government officials, and state-owned enterprise managers in Vietnam, this paper illustrates these insights by analyzing the political economy of SOE reform backsliding on the eve of Vietnam's accession to the WTO.

Book Reviews

2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 552-553
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Public Affairs ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreement ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
Princeton University

Pravin Krishna of Johns Hopkins University reviews, “Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements” by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores the role of domestic politics in governments' decisions to enter trade pacts. Discusses a political economy theory of international trade agreements; systemic influences on preferential trade agreement formation; regime type, veto players, and preferential trade agreement formation; and auxiliary hypotheses about domestic politics and trade agreements. Mansfield is Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Milner is B. C. Forbes Professor of Public Affairs at Princeton University.”

A Political Economy Theory of International Trade Agreements

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward D. Mansfield ◽  
Helen V. Milner
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Market Access ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Trade Barriers ◽  
International Trade Agreements ◽  
Political Conditions ◽  
Preferential Trading Arrangements ◽  
Over Time

This chapter presents a theory of the domestic political conditions that lead countries to enter into formal trade agreements. More specifically, it attempts to explain the establishment of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), institutions in which member-states reciprocally lower their trade barriers on each other's products and thereby grant each member preferential market access. The focus is on why and when countries have chosen to enter such agreements, understanding that there is substantial variability in the spread of PTAs over time and the countries that join them. Why have some countries joined many PTAs, while others have joined very few, and what explains the timing of PTA formation? The chapter first presents a rationalist theory of domestic politics to explain the pattern of PTAs. It then develops seven auxiliary hypotheses that follow from the logic of the present model to further explore the model's implications.

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