Innovative Federal Reserve Policies During the Great Financial Crisis

10.1142/10891 ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas D Evanoff ◽  
George G Kaufman ◽  
A G Malliaris
2021 ◽  
pp. 229-234
Author(s):  
Jesús Huerta de Soto

The severe financial crisis and resulting worldwide economic recession we have been forecasting for years are finally unleashing their fury. In fact, the reckless policy of artificial credit expansion that central banks (led by the American Federal Reserve) have permitted and orchestrated over the last fifteen years could not have ended in any other way. The expansionary cycle that has now come to a close was set in motion when the American economy emerged from its last recession in 2001 and the Federal Reserve reembarked on the major artificial expansion of credit and investment initiated in 1992, an expansion unbacked by a parallel increase in voluntary household saving. For many years, the money supply in the form of banknotes and deposits has grown at an average rate of over ten percent per year (which means that every seven years the total volume of money circulating in the world has doubled). The media of exchange originating from this severe fiduciary inflation have been placed on the market by the banking system as newly created loans granted at extremely low (and even negative in real terms) interest rates. The above fueled a speculative bubble in the shape of a substantial rise in the prices of capital goods, real estate assets, and the securities that represent them and are exchanged on the stock market, where indexes soared. Curiously, as in the «roaring» years prior to the Great Depression of 1929, the shock of monetary growth has not significantly influenced the prices of the subset of goods and services at the final-consumer level of the production structure (approximately only one third of all goods). The decade just past, like the 1920s, has seen a remarkable increase in productivity as a result of the introduction on a massive scale of new technologies and significant entrepreneurial innovations which, were it not for the «money and credit binge,» would have given rise to a healthy and sustained reduction in the unit price of the goods and services all citizens consume. Moreover, the full incorporation of the economies of China and India into the globalized market has gradually raised the real productivity of consumer goods and services even further. The absence of a healthy «deflation» in the prices of consumer goods in a period of such considerable growth in productivity as that of recent years provides the main evidence that the monetary shock has seriously disturbed the economic process. Economic theory teaches us that, unfortunately, artificial credit expansion and the (fiduciary) inflation of media of exchange offer no shortcut to stable and sustained economic development, no way of avoiding the necessary sacrifice and discipline behind all voluntary saving. (In fact, particularly in the United States, voluntary saving has not only failed to increase, but in some years has even fallen to a negative rate.) Indeed, the artificial expansion of credit and money is never more than a short-term solution, and often not even that. In fact, today there is no doubt about the recessionary consequence that the monetary shock always has in the long run: newly created loans (of money citizens have not first saved) immediately provide entrepreneurs with purchasing power they use in overly ambitious investment projects (in recent years, especially in the building sector and real-estate development). In other words, entrepreneurs act as if citizens had increased their saving, when they have not actually done so.


2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 495-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic S. Mishkin

Author(s):  
Alan N. Rechtschaffen

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke classified derivatives as a “vulnerability” of the financial system that led to the financial crisis. He explained that derivatives concentrated risk within particular financial institutions and markets without sufficient regulatory oversight. The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—Dodd-Frank—constituted a seismic shift in the regulation of financial institutions and markets in a massive effort to address regulatory shortcomings in derivatives markets. This chapter discusses the Dodd-Frank regulatory regime. Topics covered include the Dodd-Frank and derivatives trading; jurisdiction and registration; clearing, exchange, capital and margin, and reporting requirements; analysis of the provisions of Dodd-Frank on derivatives trading; rationale behind the exemptions and exclusions; the Lincoln Rule; Futures Commission Merchants; and criticisms of Dodd-Frank's derivatives trading provisions.


1986 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-102
Author(s):  
Gene Wilson ◽  
Gene D. Sullivan

With public attention increasingly focused on the farm financial crisis, it seems fitting to examine in some depth the financial positions and lending experiences of agricultural banks. We will briefly present our perceptions of the farm situation and why conditions have deteriorated in the farm sector over the past decade. An overall look at national and regional farm debt follows with emphasis on the share extended by commercial banks. Following a look at the general banking environment, we then turn to a comprehensive examination of the situation in the Southeast defined here as the states partially or totally included in the Sixth Federal Reserve District (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee).


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 173-184
Author(s):  
Calum Watt

Ten years on from the 2008 global financial crisis, this article sets in dialogue two French treatments – by the novelist Mathieu Larnaudie and the philosopher Bernard Stiegler – of footage of the 2008 testimony of Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the US Federal Reserve, before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The article introduces and compares the concepts of ‘effondrement’ and ‘prolétarisation’ developed by the two writers in relation to the Greenspan hearing, and analyses how both understand the question of ideology as it emerges in the hearing. Informed by interviews conducted by the author with Larnaudie and Stiegler, the piece concludes by discussing the notion common to both writers that Greenspan is a ‘saint’ of the crisis.


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen G Cecchetti

Realizing that their traditional instruments were inadequate for responding to the crisis that began on August 9, 2007, Federal Reserve officials improvised. Beginning in mid-December 2007, they implemented a series of changes directed at ensuring that liquidity would be distributed to those institutions that needed it most. Conceptually, this meant America's central bankers shifted from focusing solely on the size of their balance sheet, which they use to keep the overnight interbank lending rate close to their chosen target, to manipulating the composition of their assets as well. In this paper, I examine the Federal Reserve's conventional and unconventional responses to the financial crisis of 2007–2008.


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