Tea and Brexit in the Commons

2017 ◽  
Vol 181 (18) ◽  
pp. 489.1-489
Author(s):  
Helena Cotton

Helena Cotton, BVA Public Affairs Manager, describes how BVA engaged a roomful of parliamentarians at our annual Afternoon Tea lobbying event held in the House of Commons on October 9.

1973 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hillel Schwartz

“Oh, Mr. Pym, this breaks the heart,” lamented Sir Richard Grosvenor in the House of Commons in 1629; “if God be God, let us follow him, and if Baal be God, let us follow him, and no longer halt between two opinions.” The Baalites, it was clear to the Commons, were the Arminians, who threatened “the very ruin and desolation if not dissolution of Religion in this land.” Such was the threat of Arminianism that when the Commons presented its Protestations on March 2, the first article read,Whosoever shall bring in innovation in Religion, or by favour or countenance, seek to extend or introduce Popery or Arminianism or other opinions disagreeing from the true and orthodox Church, shall be reputed a capital enemy to this Kingdom and Commonwealth.This was no ordinary condemnation of schism or theological haggling. The members of the Commons shared a strong suspicion of Arminianism as a political as well as religious heresy. They had a clear idea of what English Arminianism was and who was an Arminian. Before 1624, no Englishman had even been accused of Arminianism, either in Parliament or in contemporary literature devoted to religious controversies. How did the definition of English Arminianism develop between 1624 and 1629? How did Arminianism, originally a moderate Dutch Calvinism, come to be considered along with Popery as a treasonable theology?At the turn of the seventeeth century, Jacobus Arminius, Divinity Reader at the University of Leyden, had proposed a theological compromise between Supralapsarian and Infralapsarian Protestantism.


Public Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 443-482
Author(s):  
Andrew Le Sueur ◽  
Maurice Sunkin ◽  
Jo Eric Khushal Murkens

This chapter looks at the circumstances surrounding two events. The first is the 2005 decision of the UK Parliament to set up a committee to examine whether the constitutional conventions governing the relationship between the House of Lords and the House of Commons should be codified. The second is the decision of the Commons (and the Labour government) to press ahead and present the Hunting Bill 2004 for royal assent despite the opposition of the Lords to the policy of a total ban on hunting wild animals with dogs; the Lords preferred a policy of licensed hunting.


1963 ◽  
Vol 13 (52) ◽  
pp. 316-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
H.W. McCready

Gladstone’s dramatic commitment of the liberal party to a policy of home rule for Ireland in 1886 was followed by the Grand Old Man’s two attempts at turning his policy into legislation. The first home rule bill, that of 1886, was defeated in the house of commons and then in a general election: the second, that of 1893, was overwhelmed in the house of lords and then dropped by Gladstone’s fourth government. Though the Gladstonian commitment remained and the liberal party continued to be a home rule party — and though the pros and cons of the union of 1800 remained the major structural feature of British party politics — it was not until 1912 that the liberals did anything further about their major Irish policy. For most of the period 1893-1912 they were, of course, impotent in opposition and consequently in no position to take the initiative on home rule. In 1906, however, they won a landslide victory over their unionist opponents and it is striking that this electoral victory and the great impulse it gave to one of the most dynamic governments in the whole history of British liberalism was not followed, as had the last two liberal victories under Gladstone, by the introduction of a third home rule bill. Had the liberal landslide of 1906 been put behind another home rule measure the whole history of the matter would certainly have been radically different. The house of lords would have been easily overwhelmed; the great advance in constitutional reform for Ireland would have been carried in a spirit of liberal reform rather than of political surrender; the development of Sinn Fein would have been frustrated or at least diverted. But the liberal victory of 1906 was not so used. Home rule was postponed and sidetracked and was taken up again only when the liberal party once more desperately needed Irish votes in the budget election which followed the rejection of Lloyd George’s financial measures by the lords in November 1909. The home rule banner was hoisted afresh by Asquith, the prime minister, in his Albert Hall speechof 10 December 1909 and the third home rule bill appeared in due course in 1912 in direct — and significant — succession to the budget and the parliament act for both of which the Asquith government needed Irish support in the commons.


Author(s):  
Philip Lynch ◽  
Richard Whitaker

Most reports from UK departmental select committees are agreed by consensus, underpinning their reputation for non-partisan working in an adversarial House of Commons. However, divisions (formal votes) are more common than is often assumed, occurring on 9% of reports between 2010 and 2019. This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of unity and divisions on select committees. It finds that the incidence of divisions increases when opposition parties chair committees, when there are more rebellious members of parliament present and when more new members of parliament are in attendance. Brexit provoked significant inter-party and intra-party divisions in the Commons. In committees, divisions on Brexit reports are higher than those on other reports and the Exiting the European Union Committee has a clear Leave-Remain fault line. But, more broadly, the Brexit effect on select committees is limited and unanimity remains the norm even when there are policy differences between parties.


1965 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lotte Glow

Historians of politics of the English Civil War have until recently studied the behaviour of members of Parliament through their speeches on the floor of the Houses. This practice led to the view that parliamentary policy was determined by the ascendancy of one of two opposing factions, composed of the most outspoken and influential members. J. H. Hexter's analysis of the tellers in divisions during the critical period of peace negotiation with the King in 1642 and 1643 expanded this rigid dichotomy and showed that political opinion in the House of Commons was divided into three “Parties,” the less committed centre being most susceptible to the winds of political change. He also showed that policy decisions did not depend solely upon the persuasiveness and stature of the leading politicians, but were shaped according to the temporary allegiances of a body of enthusiastic, though inconsistent, followers. The work of M. Frear Keeler, and of D. Brunton and D. H. Pennington shifted the emphasis further from the leadership to the rank and file by their interest in the background and grass roots of the most insignificant member alongside his more illustrious colleagues.The aim of this article is to examine another aspect of the dynamics of parliamentary politics. It seeks to show how the leadership of the Commons gained control over the members by skilfully delegating vital functions to carefully chosen committees, for the committee system, as it evolved during the early months of the Long Parliament and as it developed during the years of war, met the challenge of the absent Privy Council in providing Parliament with a new and responsible executive.


1965 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lotte Glow

It has been said that the Civil War was won by committees. Recent writers on this subject have begun to show how parliamentary policy and its execution was forged in the committee chambers rather than on the crowded floor of the House of Commons. This article is concerned with the personnel of these committees, in particular with those men who were not famous for their political activities and attitudes. Obviously, a core of leaders was needed in order to direct the business of the committees, to give continuity to their proceedings and to ensure that their work was in accord with the policy of the Commons. But the political ‘parties’ were relatively small, and with all the enthusiasm in the world their members could not attend personally to all aspects of government, civil and military. This study is concerned with the men who had no known political views but who contributed a great deal of time and effort to the running of parliamentary affairs. Because of their relative obscurity in the House it will be useful to ask why they were chosen to serve on certain committees, how their background and activity compared with that of their more ‘political’ colleagues, and how they reacted to situations where they were required to take a political stand. Above all, it will be possible to judge whether these men formed a coherent group rather than a random collection of individuals. These men owed their positions to their administrative skill rather than to their political affiliations. As administrators they were responsible to the legislature, and during a time of intensified state intervention, they became analogous to a non-political civil service, ready to execute the policy decisions of the party leaders.


1996 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 339-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lemmings

ABSTRACTThis article is an analysis of the hysterical debates in the house of commons over the 1753 Marriage Act, placed in the context of the failure of existing marriage law to prevent clandestine marriage and bigamy, and the crucial importance of the marriage market for the male propertied elite. It shows that the proponents of the act appealed strongly to the patriarchal and material instincts of the majority in the Commons, while its principal opponents, who claimed to stand for affective marriage and championed the interests of women, actually represented the exploitative marital and sexual behaviour typical of many Georgian men. The article concludes that the passage of the Marriage Act in these circumstances absolutely contradicts some historians' theories about the progress of ‘affective individualism’ among the elite, and implies rather the continuance of patriarchy and the use of marriage for economic and political advantage.


1968 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 207-222

MS 4 consists of eight foolscap folios, five written on both sides, one partly written on one side only, and two blank. It was originally folded, and the endorsement on the back of f. 8 would have been on the outside of the packet so formed. It is the first half of a detailed and circumstantial account of the report made to a joint committee of both Whole Houses by the Duke of Buckingham and Prince Charles on 24 February 1624. The subject of the report was the recent failure of the negotiations for a Spanish marriage, which had been dragging on for about ten years. So great was the interest of members in this report that special precautions were ordered to ensure that no one who was not a bona fide member of parliament should be admitted, and these precautions are hinted at in the opening sentences. Because this meeting was not a formal session of either house, report of the proceedings had to be made in both the Lords and the Commons. The Lord Keeper's report, delivered on Friday, 27 February, is fully recorded in the Lords Journal, The substance is naturally much the same as the contents of this document, but the style is completely different. As befitted a formal relation, the Lord Keeper omitted the circumstantial details which make this account vivid and interesting; the direct speech, and the Prince's interjections and comments. The House of Commons received a similar report on the same day from Sir Richard Weston and Sir Francis Cottington, both of whom had been personally involved in the negotiations. The version of this report printed in the Commons Journal is very sketchy and disjointed, being taken from the hasty jottings of MS Tanner 392.


1979 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman L. Jones

‘Supremacy and Uniformity’, wrote A. F. Pollard, ‘occupied less of the time of parliament [in 1559] … than did the scramble for episcopal lands …’ This fact, apparent to anyone who glances at the Journal of the House of Commons for 1559, has been ignored by historians who wrote before Pollard and by those who wrote after him. Concerned only with bills dealing with religion, scholars failed to recognize that proposals concerning the distribution of ecclesiastical lands dominated the session. During the two months before Easter private land bills monopolized the Commons' time for three weeks, ruining any timetable the government might have had and helping to persuade, if not forcing, the queen to continue the session after Easter.


1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert T. Nightingale

The connection between public opinion and public policy is slighter in foreign affairs than in any other sphere of politics. In normal times, international relations have little palpable impact upon the life of the people, and are obscured by more vivid domestic issues until war or some sudden crisis throws a high light on their significance. Even since the Great War, although public realization of the importance of foreign affairs has begun to be aroused in the late belligerent countries—in England at any rate—direct contact between popular opinion and government action is still both sporadic and uncertain.What is true of the British nation is almost equally true of its representative assembly. Parliament has but little power over foreign affairs. Some of the most momentous changes in the country's relations with other Powers have, in the present century, been accomplished without reference to the House of Commons, and often without even its knowledge. Like the people themselves, the people's representatives exercise only an inconsiderable control over that branch of public affairs which is at present of more vital concern than any other.Most British foreign secretaries, indeed, regard their actions as matters of exclusively executive concern. A cabinet of twenty ministers, already overworked in their own departments, is not, however, a body which can conduct the country's foreign relations. On his own subject, the Foreign Secretary dominates his ministerial colleagues. Experience shows that he can avoid consultation with all the cabinet save two or three of the principal ministers.


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