Bank failures, mortality and the Great Depression: Table 1

2012 ◽  
Vol 66 (5) ◽  
pp. 477.2-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
José A Tapia Granados
2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas L Ziebarth

I examine the causal effect of bank failures during the Great Depression using the quasi-experimental setup of Richardson and Troost (2009). The experiment is based on Mississippi being divided into two Federal Reserve districts, which followed different policies for liquidity provision. This translated into variation in bank failures across the state. Employing a plant-level sample from the Census of Manufactures, I find that banking failures had a negative effect on revenue stemming from a fall in physical output. I find no effect on employment at the plant-level and a large decline at the county-level. (JEL E32, E44, G21, G33, N12, N22, N92)


Author(s):  
Charles W. Calomiris

Deposit withdrawal pressures on banks, which sometimes take the form of sudden runs, have figured prominently in the discussion of public policy toward banks and the construction of safety nets such as deposit insurance and the lender of last resort. This chapter examines historical evidence from the Great Depression, and other episodes, on the factors that prompted withdrawals, the discussion of contagious runs, and the public policy implications. The historical evidence is presented in detail and is connected to the debate over the proper roles of deposit market discipline via the threat of withdrawals, the insurance of deposits, and lender-of-last-resort support for banks facing withdrawal pressures.


2016 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 478-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natacha Postel-Vinay

This article reassesses the causes of Chicago state bank failures during the Great Depression by tracking the evolution of their balance sheets in the 1920s. I find that all banks suffered tremendous deposit withdrawals; however banks that failed earlier in the 1930s had invested more in mortgages in the 1920s. The main problem with mortgages was their lack of liquidity, not their quality. Banks heavily engaged in mortgages did not have enough liquid assets to face the withdrawals, and failed. This article thus reasserts the importance of pre-crisis liquidity risk management in preventing bank failures.


1986 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 455-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Milton Esbitt

Bank failures in Chicago during 1930–1932 are examined to determine whether failures were attributable to poor management practices or to worsening economic conditions. Non-Loop state-chartered banks were divided into those which did not fail and those which failed in 1930, 1931, and 1932. Portfolio variables which contemporary writers held were indicative of poor management practices are used in a multiple discriminant analysis. Using semiannual bank call reports from December 1927 through December 1929, support was found for the poor management hypothesis only for banks destined to fail in 1931


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