Life expectancy in England between the rich and poor widens for both men and women

BMJ ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 339 (jul09 2) ◽  
pp. b2775-b2775
Author(s):  
H. Mooney
2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-104
Author(s):  
Ene-Margit Tiit

The paper estimates the probability of living until the age of a grandparent and a great-grandparent in different cohorts of Estonian population. The objects of comparison are men and women born in 1939, 1959, 1989 and nowadays (2016). It turned out that (assuming the stability of demographic behaviour) people born in 1989 have the highest probability to see the grandchildren and also great-grandchildren. In the case of people born in 21st century, the probability is going down in spite of increasing life expectancy. The reason for this feature is massive postponing of family creation.


2002 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 647-663 ◽  
Author(s):  
GAIL WILSON

This paper discusses the material aspects of globalisation and the effects of the movements of trade, capital and people around the world on older men and women. While some older people have benefited, most notably where pensions and health care are well developed, the majority of older men and women are among the poor who have not. Free trade, economic restructuring, the globalisation of finance, and the surge in migration, have in most parts of the world tended to produce harmful consequences for older people. These developments have been overseen, and sometimes dictated, by inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) such as the International Monetary Foundation (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), while other IGOs with less power have been limited to anti-ageist exhortation. Globalisation transfers resources from the poor to the rich within and between countries. It therefore increases social problems while simultaneously diminishing the freedom and capacity of countries to make social policy. Nonetheless, the effects of globalisation, and particularly its financial dimensions, on a nation's capacity for making social policy can be exaggerated. Political will can combat international economic orthodoxy, but the evident cases are the exception rather than the rule.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. e73979 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilma J. Nusselder ◽  
Marcel T. Slockers ◽  
Luuk Krol ◽  
Colette T. Slockers ◽  
Caspar W. N. Looman ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Phillip Cantu ◽  
Connor M Sheehan ◽  
Isaac Sasson ◽  
Mark D Hayward

Abstract Objectives To examine changes in Healthy Life Expectancy (HLE) against the backdrop of rising mortality among less educated white Americans during the first decade of the 21st century. Method This study documented changes in HLE by education among U.S. non-Hispanic whites, using data from the U.S. Multiple Cause of Death public-use files, the Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample (IPUMS) of the 2000 Census and the 2010 American Community Survey, and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Changes in HLE were decomposed into contributions from: (1) change in age-specific mortality rates; and (2) change in disability prevalence, measured via Activities of Daily Living (ADL) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL). Results Between 2000 and 2010, HLE significantly decreased for white men and women with less than 12 years of schooling. By contrast, HLE increased among college-educated white men and women. Declines or stagnation in HLE among less educated whites reflected increases in disability prevalence over the study period, whereas improvements among the college educated reflected decreases in both age-specific mortality rates and disability prevalence at older ages. Discussion Differences in HLE between education groups increased among non-Hispanic whites from 2000 to 2010. In fact, education-based differences in HLE were larger than differences in total life expectancy. Thus, the lives of less educated whites were not only shorter, on average, compared with their college-educated counterparts, but they were also more burdened with disability.


Author(s):  
Minsung Sohn ◽  
Xianhua Che ◽  
Sungwon Lim ◽  
Hee-Jung Park

The aim of this study was to measure the magnitude and distribution of a Korean’s lifetime dental expenses depending on age and sex, by constructing a hypothetical lifetime and life table of survival. Additionally, we estimated the difference in life expectancy between men and women and its impact on dental expenses. We used the 2015 Korea Health Panel Survey to calculate the total dental expenditure, including expenses paid directly by patients and those paid by insurers. We generated survival profiles to simulate dental expenses during a typical lifetime (from birth to age 95) using the abridged life table (five-year intervals for age groups) in 2015 from the South Korean Statistical Information Service. We independently calculated the remaining dental expenses for survivors of all ages. The results showed that an estimate of average lifetime dental expenditure was $31,851 per capita: $31,587 for men and $32,318 for women. Nearly 33% of the average per capita lifetime dental expenditure was attributable to the longer life expectancy of women, with no statistically significant difference in lifetime dental expenditure between men and women. Many survivors incurred 70% of their lifetime dental expenses before age 65. The results highlighted the need for policymakers to address spending on age-specific dental care owing to extended life expectancy, given the disproportionate share of healthcare resources supporting the elderly.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (8) ◽  
pp. 191232
Author(s):  
Bradley D. Mattan ◽  
Jasmin Cloutier

Although high status is often considered a desirable quality, this may not always be the case. Different factors may moderate the value of high status along a dimension such as wealth (e.g. gender, perceiver income/education). For example, studies suggest men may value wealth and control over resources more than women. This may be especially true for high-income men who already have control over substantial resources. Other work suggests that low-income men and women may have different experiences in educational contexts compared to their richer peers who dominate norms at higher levels of education. These experiences may potentially lead to different attitudes about the wealthy among low-income men and women. In this registered report, we proposed two key predictions based on our review of the literature and analyses of pilot data from the Attitudes, Identities and Individual Differences (AIID) study ( n = 767): (H1) increasing income will be associated with increased pro-wealthy bias for men more than for women and (H2) income will also moderate the effect of education on implicit pro-wealthy bias, depending on gender. Overall, men showed greater implicit pro-wealthy bias than did women. However, neither of our hypotheses that income would moderate the effects of gender on implicit pro-wealthy bias were supported. These findings suggest implicit pro-wealthy bias among men and are discussed in the context of exploratory analyses of gender differences in self-reported beliefs and attitudes about the rich and the poor.


Hypertension ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 280-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oscar H. Franco ◽  
Anna Peeters ◽  
Luc Bonneux ◽  
Chris de Laet

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