Monkey responses to three different alarm calls: evidence of predator classification and semantic communication

Science ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 210 (4471) ◽  
pp. 801-803 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Seyfarth ◽  
D. Cheney ◽  
P Marler
2012 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 405-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristiane Cäsar ◽  
Richard W. Byrne ◽  
William Hoppitt ◽  
Robert J. Young ◽  
Klaus Zuberbühler

1980 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 1070-1094 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Seyfarth ◽  
Dorothy L. Cheney ◽  
Peter Marler

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Samuel

Research and thinking into the cognitive aspects of language evolution has usually attempted to account for how the capacity for learning even one modern human language developed. Bilingualism has perhaps been thought of as something to think about only once the ‘real’ puzzle of monolingualism is solved, but this would assume in turn (and without evidence) that bilingualism evolved after monolingualism. All typically-developing children (and adults) are capable of learning multiple languages, and the majority of modern humans are at least bilingual. In this paper I ask whether by skipping bilingualism out of language evolution we have missed a trick. I propose that exposure to synonymous signs, such as food and alarm calls, are a necessary precondition for the abstracting away of sound from referent. In support of this possibility is evidence that modern day bilingual children are better at breaking this ‘word magic’ spell. More generally, language evolution should be viewed through the lens of bilingualism, as this is the end state we are attempting to explain.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Bao ◽  
Prithwish Basu ◽  
Mike Dean ◽  
Craig Partridge ◽  
Ananthram Swami ◽  
...  

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Parellada

AbstractThe relation between conceptual analysis and empirical observations when ascribing or denying concepts and beliefs to non-human animals is not straightforward. In order to reflect on this relation, I focus on two theoretical proposals (Davidson’s and Allen’s) and one empirical case (vervet monkeys’ alarm calls), the three of which are permanently discussed and considered in the literature on animal cognition. First, I review briefly Davidson’s arguments for denying thought to non-linguistic animals. Second, I review Allen’s criteria for ascribing concepts to creatures capable of correcting their discriminatory powers by taking into account their previous errors. Allen affirms that this is an empirical proposal which offers good reasons, but not necessary or sufficient conditions, for concept attribution. Against Allen, I argue that his important proposal is not an empirical, but a conceptual one. Third, I resort to vervet monkeys to show that Allen’s criteria, and not Davidson’s, are very relevant for ascribing first-order and denying second-order beliefs to this species and thus make sense of the idea of animal cognition.


2010 ◽  
Vol 79 (2) ◽  
pp. 401-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael G. Anderson ◽  
Dianne H. Brunton ◽  
Mark E. Hauber

1995 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Weary ◽  
Donald L. Kramer

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