Social relationships and social cognition in nonhuman primates

Science ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 234 (4782) ◽  
pp. 1361-1366 ◽  
Author(s):  
D Cheney ◽  
R Seyfarth ◽  
B Smuts
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
Nonhuman Primates

Natural normativity: The ‘is’ and ‘ought’ of animal behavior

Behaviour ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 151 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 185-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frans B.M. de Waal
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Goal Orientation ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
Animal Behavior ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Social Values ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Ample Evidence

The evolution of behavior is sometimes considered irrelevant to the issue of human morality, since it lacks the normative character of morality (‘ought’), and consist entirely of descriptions of how things are or came about (‘is’). Evolved behavior, including that of other animals, is not entirely devoid of normativity, however. Defining normativity as adherence to an ideal or standard, there is ample evidence that animals treat their social relationships in this manner. In other words, they pursue social values. Here I review evidence that nonhuman primates actively try to preserve harmony within their social network by, e.g., reconciling after conflict, protesting against unequal divisions, and breaking up fights amongst others. In doing so, they correct deviations from an ideal state. They further show emotional self-control and anticipatory conflict resolution in order to prevent such deviations. Recognition of the goal-orientation and normative character of animal social behavior permits us to partially bridge the is/ought divide erected in relation to human moral behavior.

Imaginary companions and peer acceptance

2004 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 204-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tracy R. Gleason
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
Social Impact ◽  
Social Preference ◽  
Peer Acceptance ◽  
Pretend Play ◽  
Early Research ◽  
Imaginary Companions ◽  
Imaginary Companion ◽  
Do So

Early research on imaginary companions suggests that children who create them do so to compensate for poor social relationships. Consequently, the peer acceptance of children with imaginary companions was compared to that of their peers. Sociometrics were conducted on 88 preschool-aged children; 11 had invisible companions, 16 had personified objects (e.g., stuffed animals animated by the child) and 65 had no imaginary companion. The three groups were compared on positive and negative nominations, social preference, social impact, and total number of reciprocal friends. Given the positive correlation between pretend play and social competence, fantasy predisposition was used as a covariate. The groups did not differ on number of positive nominations by peers, total number of reciprocal friends, or social preference scores. However, compared to their peers, children with personified objects had higher social impact scores, largely as a result of negative nominations. Attention is thus called to the differences between personified object and invisible imaginary companions, and to the underlying social cognition that may be involved in their creation.

Social Cognition and Social Relationships

2003 ◽  
pp. 268-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fredda Blanchard-Fields ◽  
Carolyn Cooper
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Relationships

scholarly journals Theory of mind in nonhuman primates

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. M. Heyes
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Primate Behavior ◽  
Conditional Discrimination Training ◽  
Role Taking ◽  
Self Recognition ◽  
Substantial Progress

Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, role-taking, and perspective-taking suggests that in every case where nonhuman primate behavior has been interpreted as a sign of theory of mind, it could instead have occurred by chance or as a product of nonmentalistic processes such as associative learning or inferences based on nonmental categories. Arguments to the effect that, in spite of this, the theory of mind hypothesis should be accepted because it is more parsimonious than alternatives or because it is supported by convergent evidence are not compelling. Such arguments are based on unsupportable assumptions about the role of parsimony in science and either ignore the requirement that convergent evidence proceed from independent assumptions, or fail to show that it supports the theory of mind hypothesis over nonmentalist alternatives. Progress in research on theory of mind requires experimental procedures that can distinguish the theory of mind hypothesis from nonmentalist alternatives. A procedure that may have this potential is proposed. It uses conditional discrimination training and transfer tests to determine whether chimpanzees have the concept “see.” Commentators are invited to identify flaws in the procedure and to suggest alternatives.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document