The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game

Science ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 300 (5626) ◽  
pp. 1755-1758 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. G. Sanfey
2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 939-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Brüne ◽  
Cumhur Tas ◽  
Julia Wischniewski ◽  
Anna Welpinghus ◽  
Christine Heinisch ◽  
...  

PLoS ONE ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (9) ◽  
pp. e108462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haruto Takagishi ◽  
Michiko Koizumi ◽  
Takayuki Fujii ◽  
Joanna Schug ◽  
Shinya Kameshima ◽  
...  

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (8) ◽  
pp. 1372-1382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy R. Koscik ◽  
Daniel Tranel

People tend to assume that outcomes are caused by dispositional factors, for example, a person's constitution or personality, even when the actual cause is due to situational factors, for example, luck or coincidence. This is known as the “correspondence bias.” This tendency can lead normal, intelligent persons to make suboptimal decisions. Here, we used a neuropsychological approach to investigate the neural basis of the correspondence bias, by studying economic decision-making in patients with damage to the ventromedial pFC (vmPFC). Given the role of the vmPFC in social cognition, we predicted that vmPFC is necessary for the normal correspondence bias. In our experiment, consistent with expectations, healthy (n = 46) and brain-damaged (n = 30) comparison participants displayed the correspondence bias during economic decision-making and invested no differently when given dispositional or situational information. By contrast, vmPFC patients (n = 17) displayed a lack of correspondence bias and invested more when given dispositional than situational information. The results support the conclusion that vmPFC is critical for normal social inference and the correspondence bias. The findings help clarify the important (and sometimes disadvantageous) role of social inference in economic decision-making.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (12) ◽  
pp. 170543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron D. Lightner ◽  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Edward H. Hagen

Many studies have documented framing effects in economic games. These studies, however, have tended to use minimal framing cues (e.g. a single sentence labelling the frame), and the frames did not involve unambiguous offer expectations. Results often did not differ substantially from those in the unframed games. Here we test the hypothesis that, in contrast to the modal offer in the unframed ultimatum game (UG) (e.g. 60% to the proposer and 40% to the responder), offers in a UG explicitly framed either as a currency exchange or a windfall will closely conform to expectations for the frame and diverge substantially from the modal offer. Participants recruited from MTurk were randomized into one of two conditions. In the control condition, participants played a standard UG. In the treatment conditions, players were provided a vignette explicitly describing the frame with their roles: some were customers and bankers in a currency exchange, and others were in a windfall scenario. We predicted (i) that modal offers in the currency exchange would involve an asymmetric split where greater than 80% went to customers and less than 20% went to bankers, and (ii) that variation in windfall offers would converge onto a 50–50 split with significantly less variation than the control condition. Our first prediction was confirmed with substantial effect sizes ( d  = 1.09 and d  = −2.04), whereas we found no evidence for our second prediction. The first result provides further evidence that it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about economic decision-making from decontextualized games.


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