Long-distance quantum cryptography with entangled photons

Quantum cryptography: Theoretical protocols for quantum key distribution and tests of selected commercial QKD systems in commercial fiber networks

International Journal of Quantum Information ◽

10.1142/s0219749916300023 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 14 (02) ◽

pp. 1630002

Author(s):

Monika Jacak ◽

Janusz Jacak ◽

Piotr Jóźwiak ◽

Ireneusz Jóźwiak

Keyword(s):

Quantum Cryptography ◽

Quantum Key Distribution ◽

Key Distribution ◽

Current Status ◽

Entangled Photons ◽

Fiber Networks ◽

System Improvement ◽

Metropolitan Networks

The overview of the current status of quantum cryptography is given in regard to quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, implemented both on nonentangled and entangled flying qubits. Two commercial R&D platforms of QKD systems are described (the Clavis II platform by idQuantique implemented on nonentangled photons and the EPR S405 Quelle platform by AIT based on entangled photons) and tested for feasibility of their usage in commercial TELECOM fiber metropolitan networks. The comparison of systems efficiency, stability and resistivity against noise and hacker attacks is given with some suggestion toward system improvement, along with assessment of two models of QKD.

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Cryptanalysis of a Practical Quantum Key Distribution with Polarization-Entangled Photons

Quantum Information and Computation ◽

10.26421/qic5.3-1 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 5 (3) ◽

pp. 181-186

Author(s):

Th. Beth ◽

J. Muller-Quade ◽

R. Steinwandt

Keyword(s):

Quantum Cryptography ◽

Quantum Key Distribution ◽

Key Distribution ◽

Key Exchange ◽

Authentication Scheme ◽

Entangled Photons ◽

Key Exchange Protocol

Recently, a quantum key exchange protocol has been described\cite{PFLM04}, which served as basis for securing an actual bank transaction by means of quantum cryptography \cite{ZVS04}. The authentication scheme used to this aim has been proposed by Peev et al. \cite{PML04}. Here we show, that this authentication is insecure in the sense that an attacker can provoke a situation where initiator and responder of a key exchange end up with different keys. Moreover, it may happen that an attacker can decrypt a part of the plaintext protected with the derived encryption key.

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