Importance of perceptual representation in the visual control of action

Purpose: Penetrating eye trauma with an intraocular foreign body is very frequent, especially in men in their productive age. Pars plana vitrectomy would be the standard surgical method at our department. However, in indicated cases (metallic intraocular bodies in the posterior eye segment in young patients with well transparent ocular media without detached ZSM and without any evident vitreoretinal traction) transscleral extraction of the intraocular foreign body is performed using the exo magnet, eventually endo magnet with a minimal PPV without PVD induction under the visual control of endo-illumination. Materials and Methods: Between June 2003 and June 2018, 66 eyes of 66 patients diagnosed with a penetrating eye trauma caused by an intraocular foreign body located in the posterior eye segment were treated. In 18 eyes (27,3 %) with a metallic foreign body in vitreous (body) or in retina, no PPV or a minimal PPV without PVD was used as a surgical method. In the remaining 48 eyes (72,7 %), a standard 20G, respectively 23G PPV method were used together with PVD induction and the foreign body extraction via endo or exo magnet. Conclusions: As demonstrated by our survey/study, in the cases of a thoroughly considered indication an experimented vitreoretinal surgeon can perform a safe NCT transscleral extraction from the posterior eye segment via exo magnet, eventually endo magnet under the visual control of a contact display system with a minimal PPV. Thereby, the surgeon can enhance the patient´s chance to preserve their own lens and its accommodative abilities as well as reduce the risk of further surgical interventions of the afflicted eye.

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Autonomous Visual Control of a Mobile Robot

10.21236/ada422533 ◽

1994 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Michael R. Blackburn ◽

Hoa G. Nguyen

Keyword(s):

Mobile Robot ◽

Visual Control

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Statistical and Variational Methods for Problems in Visual Control

10.21236/ada531631 ◽

2009 ◽

Author(s):

Allen Tannenbaum

Keyword(s):

Variational Methods ◽

Visual Control

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Direct Realism and Illusion

10.1093/oso/9780190854751.003.0008 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

J. Christopher Maloney

Keyword(s):

Perceptual Experience ◽

Direct Realism ◽

Perceptual Representation ◽

Perceptual Error ◽

Standard Response ◽

Perceptual Representations ◽

Ambiguous Stimuli ◽

Physical Objects ◽

Apparent Problem

The supposed problem of perceptual error, including illusion and hallucination, has led most theories of perception to deny formulations of direct realism. The standard response to this apparent problem adopts the mistaken presupposition that perception is indeed liable to error. However, the prevailing conditions of observation are themselves elements of perceptual representation, functioning in the manner of predicate modifiers. They ensure that the predicates applied in perceptual representations do indeed correctly attribute properties that perceived physical objects actually instantiate. Thus, perceptual representations are immune to misrepresentation of the sort misguidedly supposed by the spurious problem of perceptual misrepresentation. Granted the possibility that perceptual attribution admits of predicate modification, it is quite possible that perceptual experience permits both rudimentary and sophisticated conceptualization. Moreover, such treatment of perceptual predication rewards by providing an account of aspect alteration exemplified by perception of ambiguous stimuli.

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Intentionalism, Cognition, and Representation

10.1093/oso/9780190854751.003.0002 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

J. Christopher Maloney

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Science ◽

Mental Representation ◽

Phenomenal Character ◽

Conscious Perception ◽

Perceptual Representation ◽

Perceptual State ◽

Content Of Experience

This chapter continues consideration of reductive intentionalism without embracing the doctrine, framing it in the context of cognitive science. Cognition, including perception, is representation. An agent’s cognitive, perhaps perceptual, state is a relation binding the agent to a proposition by means of her mental representation. Intentionalism would explicate the phenomenal character of a perceiver's experience in terms of the content of her prevailing perceptual representation. While minimal intentionalism maintains that the phenomenal character of the perceiver's experience merely supervenes on her representation's content, maximal intentionalism would reduce character to content. For maximal intentionalism maintains that phenomenal character is simply what introspection finds. Yet, according to maximal intentionalism, introspection, when tuned to conscious perception, detects only the content of experience. Hence, the maximalist identifies phenomenal character with the content carried by perceptual representation.

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