scholarly journals EDS Containment Vessel TNT Equivalence Testing

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Crocker ◽  
Brent L. Haroldsen ◽  
Jerome H. Stofleth
Keyword(s):  
Free Volume ◽  
Pressure Vessel ◽  
Project Manager ◽  
Equivalence Testing ◽  
Phase 2 ◽  
Containment Vessel ◽  
Tnt Equivalent ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Tnt Equivalence ◽  
Explosive Destruction

The V26 containment vessel was procured by the Project Manager, Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel (PMNSCM) for use on the Phase-2 Explosive Destruction Systems. It was fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels [1]. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the Code Case, is nine (9) pounds TNT-equivalent for up to 637 detonations. This report documents the results of tests that were performed on the vessel at Sandia National Laboratories to qualify the vessel for explosive use [2]. Three of these explosive tests consisted of: (1) 9lbs bare charge of Composition C-4 (equivalent to 11.25lbs TNT); (2) a 7.2lbs bare charge of Composition C-4 (equivalent to 9lbs TNT); (3) a bare charge of 9lbs cast TNT. The results of these tests are compared in order to provide an understanding of how varying charge size affects vessel response when the ratio of free volume to charge volume is small, and in making direct comparisons between TNT and Composition C-4 for TNT equivalency calculations. In a previous paper [3], the 7.2lbs bare charge of Composition C-4, (2) above, was compared to 7.2lbs of Composition C-4 distributed into 6 charges.

scholarly journals EDS Containment Vessel Explosive Test and Analysis

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Crocker ◽  
Brent L. Haroldsen ◽  
Jerome H. Stofleth ◽  
Mien Yip
Keyword(s):  
New Mexico ◽  
Pressure Vessel ◽  
The Other ◽  
Containment Vessel ◽  
Tnt Equivalent ◽  
Vessel Response

This report documents the results of two of tests that were performed on an explosive containment vessel at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico in July 2013 to provide some deeper understanding of the effects of charge geometry on the vessel response [1]. The vessel was fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels [2]. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the Code Case, is nine (9) pounds TNT-equivalent. One explosive test consisted of a single, centrally located, 7.2 pound bare charge of Composition C-4 (equivalent to 9 pounds TNT). The other test used six each 1.2 pound charges of Composition C-4 (7.2 pounds total) distributed in two bays of three.

Response of the Explosive Destruction System Containment Vessel to Internal Detonations

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brent L. Haroldsen ◽  
John E. Didlake ◽  
Jerome H. Stofleth
Keyword(s):  
Computer Simulation ◽  
Vessel Wall ◽  
Cylindrical Vessel ◽  
Dynamic Strain ◽  
Strain Measurements ◽  
Scaling Relationships ◽  
Containment Vessel ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Internal Volume ◽  
Explosive Destruction

The Explosive Destruction System (EDS) is a transportable system used by the Army to destroy recovered, explosively configured, chemical munitions. The system uses shaped charges to detonate the burster explosives and to cut the munition and access the agent, all inside of a sealed, stainless-steel, containment vessel. Sandia has built four EDS systems. The largest system, with an internal volume of about 620 liters, was designed to handle munitions as large as 8-inch artillery shells. This paper presents an overview of the system with emphasis on the response of the cylindrical vessel to internal detonations. The vessel response was determined through a combination of full-scale testing, sub-scale testing, and computer simulation. Tests with both bare charges and munitions have been conducted in seven vessels ranging in diameter from 19 to 91 centimeters. The paper discusses dynamic strain measurements on the vessel wall and scaling relationships associated with different sized vessels and different quantities of explosives.

scholarly journals Development of Explosion-containment Vessel with 3 kg TNT Equivalent

2019 ◽  
Vol 616 ◽  
pp. 012020
Author(s):  
Kan Zhou ◽  
Ge Huang ◽  
Kai Fang ◽  
Huang Huang ◽  
Haijun Bai
Keyword(s):  
Containment Vessel ◽  
Tnt Equivalent

Experimental Study on a Multiple-Use Spherical Containment Vessel

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Y. Hu ◽  
Q. Dong ◽  
Y. Gu
Keyword(s):  
Time History ◽  
Blast Loading ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Reflected Shock Wave ◽  
Multiple Use ◽  
Spherical Vessel ◽  
Frequency Spectra ◽  
Containment Vessel ◽  
Reflected Shock ◽  
Vessel Response

In this paper, we present experimental results of three explosion tests performed on a multiple-use spherical containment vessel, which has been employed to withstand internal blast loading from 25 kg TNT high explosive in the past ten years. The experimental observations of the blast loading and the vessel response histories are compared, and it can be found that the remarkable strain increase occurs in the second response cycle of the strain-time history may be caused by the effect of the reflected shock wave. The occurrence of strain growth at different locations of the vessel are specially concerned, and details on the vibration modes and frequency spectra of the spherical vessel are investigated. Based on the present experimental results and the previous theories, three possible mechanisms of strain growth are discussed, which leads to a conclusion that the effect of reflected shock waves, modal superposition and nonlinear modal coupling may all contribute to strain growth.

Dynamic Response Formulation for Pneumatically Driven Liquid in a Pressure Vessel

1991 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard B. Loucks
Keyword(s):  
Mass Flow Rate ◽  
Aluminum Powder ◽  
Mass Flow ◽  
Flow Rate ◽  
Pressure Vessel ◽  
Ideal Gas ◽  
Liquid Oxygen ◽  
Mean Flow ◽  
Containment Vessel ◽  
Thermal Output

Abstract The Thermal Radiation Simulator (TRS) at the U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory uses aluminum powder reacting with liquid oxygen to create a large jet like flame. The flame acts as a large thermally radiant wall, exposing targets to a nuclear weapon equivalent. The aluminum powder is driven pneumatically to the combustion chamber from a pressurized containment vessel. Unfortunately the thermal output of the flame oscillates with large amplitude relative to the mean yield. The fluctuating mass flow rate of aluminum powder from the aluminum powder containment vessel seemed the cause of the unstable output. A computer model of the aluminum vessel was constructed to determine the pressure dynamics in the pressure vessel. The aluminum powder was assumed to behave as a Newtonian liquid. The pneumatic fluid was assumed to be an ideal gas. The model concentrated inside the vessel and at the exit. The result was to determine the mass flow rate of aluminum from the exit given the inlet gas pressures. The model did reveal the source of mass flow fluctuations not to be caused directly by the existing pneumatic set-up. The variation was shown to be perturbated by forces outside the pressure vessel. Once the outside influence was eliminated, the model showed a clean mean flow rate of aluminum powder. The results were applied to the TRS and the thermal output was stabilized.

Probability of Fracture for HFIR Pressure Vessel Caused by Random Crack Size or by Random Toughness

1994 ◽  
Vol 116 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.-J. Chang
Keyword(s):  
Fracture Toughness ◽  
Pressure Vessel ◽  
Crack Depth ◽  
Crack Size ◽  
Distribution Functions ◽  
Probability Curve ◽  
Pressure Pulses ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Point Pressure ◽  
Probability Of Fracture

The probability of fracture (or the fracture fragility) for a range of internal pressure-pulses for the HFIR pressure vessel is obtained. The fracture is assumed to be caused by randomly distributed cracks and by fracture toughness of variable magnitudes. The probability curve is applied to estimate the vessel fracture strength against the pressure-pulses of hypothetical accident. Both the crack population and the fracture toughness are assumed to be random variables of given distribution functions. Possible hoop stress is based on the numerical solution of the vessel response after a point pressure-pulse is applied at the center of the reactor vessel. The fluid-structure interaction and radiation embrittlement are both considered in the analysis. Only elastic fracture mechanics is used. The probability of vessel fracture for a single crack caused by either a variable crack depth or a variable toughness is first derived. Then the probability of fracture with multiple number of cracks is obtained. The probability of fracture is further extended to include different levels of confidence and variability.

An Overview of the Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. Fetterman ◽  
Alexander W. Harkness ◽  
Matthew C. Smith ◽  
Creed Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Steam Generator ◽  
Pressure Vessel ◽  
Straight Tube ◽  
Plant Design ◽  
Operating Cycle ◽  
Pressurized Water ◽  
Power Sources ◽  
Containment Vessel ◽  
Small Modular Reactor ◽  
Safety Systems

The Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor (SMR) incorporates an integral pressurized water reactor (iPWR) design in which all components associated with the nuclear steam supply system are housed within one pressure vessel. The Westinghouse SMR design also utilizes many of the key features from the AP1000® plant, including passive safety systems. The Westinghouse SMR will be fueled by a derivative of the successful 17×17 Robust Fuel Assembly (RFA) product. An 89 assembly core with an active height of 8 feet will provide a 24 month operating cycle with a power output of 800 MWt. Derived from the AP1000 plant and adapted to operate inside the reactor pressure vessel, 37 control rod drive mechanisms provide reactor shutdown and reactivity control capabilities. Eight seal less pumps provide a nominal reactor coolant flow of 100,000 gallons per minute. An innovative evolution of a straight tube steam generator produces a saturated mixture that is delivered to a steam separating drum located outside of the containment vessel. The steam generator along with the integral pressurizer is attached to the reactor vessel with a single closure flange located near the center of gravity of the reactor assembly and is designed to be removed during refueling operations. Like the AP1000 plant, the Westinghouse SMR relies on the natural forces of gravity and natural circulation to provide core and containment cooling during accident conditions. The passive cooling systems provide sufficient heat removal for seven days without the need for offsite AC power sources. The Westinghouse SMR also includes traditional active components such as diesel generators and pumps; however these components are not required for the safe shutdown of the plant. At a diameter of 32 feet, approximately 25 of the Westinghouse SMR containment vessels can fit within the envelope of the AP1000 containment building. This compact containment will be completely submerged in water during power operation providing a heat sink for postulated accidents. For protection against external threats, the containment vessel and plant safety systems are located below ground level. At approximately one fifth the net electrical output of the AP1000 plant, the Westinghouse SMR is designed to address infrastructure challenges associated with replacing America’s aging fossil fuel plants by providing a safe, clean and reliable energy source. The challenges associated with economies of scale are offset with a compact and simplified plant design, rail shippable components and modular construction.

Numerical Simulation and Measurements of Reaction Load for an Impulsively Loaded Pressure Vessel

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Fister ◽  
Kevin Fehlmann ◽  
Dusan Spernjak
Keyword(s):  
Pressure Vessel ◽  
Load Transfer ◽  
National Laboratory ◽  
Pressure Vessels ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Direct Reaction ◽  
Numerical Predictions ◽  
Tnt Equivalent ◽  
Primary Model ◽  
Physics Experiments

Abstract Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) designs and utilizes impulsively loaded pressure vessels for the confinement of experimental configurations involving explosives. For physics experiments with hazardous materials, a two-barrier containment system is needed, where an impulsively (or, explosively) loaded pressure vessel is assembled as an inner confinement vessel, inside an outer containment vessel (subject to quasi-static load in the event of confinement vessel breach). Design of the inner and outer vessels and support structure must account for any directional loads imparted by the blast loading on the inner vessel. Typically there is a shock-attenuating assembly between the inner confinement and outer containment pressure barriers, which serves to mitigate any dynamic load transfer from inner to outer vessel. Depending on the shock-attenuating approach, numerical predictions of these reaction loads can come with high levels of uncertainty due to model sensitivities. Present work here focuses on the numerical predictions and measurements of the reaction loads due to detonating 30 g of TNT equivalent in the Inner Pressure Confinement Vessel (IPCV) for proton imaging of small-scale shock physics experiments at LANL. Direct reaction load measurements from IPCV testing is presented alongside numerical predictions. Using the experimental measurements from the firing site, we refine the tools and methodology utilized for reaction load predictions and explore the primary model sensitivities which contribute to uncertainties. The numerical tools, modeling methodology, and primary drivers of model uncertainty identified here will improve the capability to model detonation experiments and enable design load calculations of other impulsively loaded pressure vessels with higher accuracy.

Development of 1000 MWe Advanced Boiling Water Reactor

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kazuo Hisajima ◽  
Ken Uchida ◽  
Keiji Matsumoto ◽  
Koichi Kondo ◽  
Shigeki Yokoyama ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Pressure Vessel ◽  
Cooling System ◽  
Reactor Pressure Vessel ◽  
Boiling Water ◽  
Boiling Water Reactor ◽  
Water Reactor ◽  
Decay Heat ◽  
Containment Vessel ◽  
Main Steam ◽  
Reactor Pressure

1000 MWe Advanced Boiling Water Reactor has only two main steam lines and six reactor internal pumps, whereas 1350 MWe ABWR has four main steam lines and ten reactor internal pumps. In order to confirm how the differences affect hydrodynamic conditions in the dome and lower plenum of the reactor pressure vessel, fluid analyses have been performed. The results indicate that there is not substantial difference between 1000 MWe ABWR and 1350 MWe ABWR. The primary containment vessel of the ABWR consists of the drywell and suppression chamber. The suppression chamber stores water to suppress pressure increase in the primary containment vessel and to be used as the source of water for the emergency core cooling system following a loss-of-coolant accident. Because the reactor pressure vessel of 1000 MWe ABWR is smaller than that of 1350 MWe ABWR, there is room to reduce the size of the primary containment vessel. It has been confirmed feasible to reduce inner diameter of the primary containment vessel from 29m of 1350 MWe ABWR to 26.5m. From an economic viewpoint, a shorter outage that results in higher availability of the plant is preferable. In order to achieve 20-day outage that results in 97% of availability, improvement of the systems for removal of decay heat is introduced that enables to stop all the safety-related decay heat removal systems except at the beginning of an outage.

scholarly journals Design Basis of an Impulsively Loaded Vessel for Specific Loading Configurations

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mien Yip ◽  
Brent Haroldsen
Keyword(s):  
Explosive Charge ◽  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Structural Response ◽  
Geometric Configurations ◽  
Specific Loading ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Vessel Integrity ◽  
Explosive Destruction ◽  
Significant Factors

For an impulsively loaded containment vessel, such as the Sandia Explosive Destruction System (EDS), the traditional notion of a single-value explosive rating may not be sufficient to qualify the vessel for many real-life loading situations, such as those involving multiple munitions placed in various geometric configurations. Other significant factors, including detonation timing, geometry of explosive(s), and standoff distances, need to be considered for a more accurate assessment of the vessel integrity. It is obvious that the vessel structural response from an explosive charge detonated at the geometric center of the vessel will be very different from the structural response from the same explosive charge detonated next to the vessel wall. It is, however, less obvious that the same explosive can produce vastly different vessel response if it is detonated at one end versus at the middle versus from both ends. The goal of this paper is to identify some of the effects that non-trivial loading situations have on the vessel structural integrity. The metric for determining vessel integrity is based on Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Based on the findings of this work, it may be necessary to qualify impulsively loaded containment vessels for specific explosive configurations, which should include the quantity, geometry and location of the explosives, as well as the detonation points.

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