Structural Integrity Management Framework for Mobile Installations

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Stacey ◽  
J. V. Sharp
Keyword(s):  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Hazard Identification ◽  
Management Policy ◽  
Audit Review ◽  
Offshore Installations ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
Systems Maintenance ◽  
The Uk

This paper presents a primary integrity management (PIM) framework for mobile installations (semi-submersibles and self elevating installations) and permanently moored floating installations (FPSOs, FSUs, etc.). The primary integrity of self-elevating and floating installations depends on both the primary structure and additional systems. The framework is based upon the UK regulatory requirements for offshore installations, including the need for a thorough review of the safety case accounting for any changes in condition and future plans and verification of the primary integrity management (PIM) process. Requirements and guidance are provided for all aspects of the integrity management process covering: • primary integrity hazard identification and risk control; • resources, organisation and management, including competency assurance; • information management and documentation; • primary integrity management policy, objectives and strategy; • inspection, examination and testing; • evaluation of structure and other primary systems; • maintenance, repair and upkeep; • audit, review and continual improvement. The framework also contains guidance based on the application of existing standards and industry published documents. Finally, guidance is given on the implementation of the framework.

Life Extension Issues for Ageing Offshore Installations

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Stacey ◽  
M. Birkinshaw ◽  
J. V. Sharp
Keyword(s):  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Life Extension ◽  
Original Design ◽  
The North ◽  
Design Life ◽  
Offshore Installations ◽  
Need To Evaluate ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
The North Sea ◽  
The Uk

With many offshore installations in the UK sector of the North Sea now reaching or being in excess of their original anticipated design life, there is a particular need to evaluate approaches to structural integrity management by offshore operators. Ageing processes can affect the structural integrity of the installation and demonstration of adequate performance beyond its original design life is thus a necessary requirement. This paper addresses the issues relevant to the life extension of ageing installations.

Hull Structure Integrity Management in Floating Structures–FSO Puteri Dulang Case

2014 ◽  
Vol 69 (7) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ajith Kumar Thankappan ◽  
M. Fazli B. M. Yusof
Keyword(s):  
Fatigue Life ◽  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Structural Response ◽  
Offshore Structures ◽  
Design Phase ◽  
Floating Structures ◽  
Offshore Installations ◽  
Hull Structure ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
New Buildings

This paper highlights the key differences in practices employed in managing hull structure integrity of permanently moored floating offshore structures as against sailing vessels which are subject to periodic dry docking. During the design phase, the structural integrity management over the life of a sailing vessel is primarily taken into account by means of Class prescribed Nominal Design Corrosion Values which are added to minimum scantling requirements calculated based on strength and fatigue criteria. In contrast, for permanently moored offshore installations like FPSOs, FSOs etc. the hull structure integrity over the entire design life of the asset is a key design consideration both for new buildings and conversions. Analytic methods and tools (primarily those developed by Class Societies) are available to evaluate the strength requirements (based on yielding, buckling and ultimate strength criteria) and fatigue life of the hull structure. Typically three levels of analysis with increasing degree of complexity and analysis time are used to predict the structural response and fatigue life of the Hull during design phase. The degree of detailed analysis required needs to be determined in light of the expected optimization in terms of savings in scantlings for new building or for steel renewal requirements in case of conversions.

Developments in Structural Integrity Safety Cases for Highest Reliability Components in the UK

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Jelfs ◽  
M. Hayashi ◽  
A. Toft
Keyword(s):  
Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Structural Reliability ◽  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Advisory Group ◽  
Design Assessment ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
The Uk

Gross failure of certain components in nuclear power plant has the potential to lead to intolerable radiological consequences. For these components, UK regulatory expectations require that the probability of gross failure must be shown to be so low that it can be discounted, i.e. that it is incredible. For prospective vendors of nuclear power plant in the UK, with established designs, the demonstration of “incredibility of failure” can be an onerous requirement carrying a high burden of proof. Requesting parties may need to commit to supplementary manufacturing inspection, augmented material testing requirements, enhanced defect tolerance assessment, enhanced material specifications or even changes to design and manufacturing processes. A key part of this demonstration is the presentation of the structural integrity safety case argument. UK practice is to develop a safety case that incorporates the notion of ‘conceptual defence-in-depth’ to demonstrate the highest structural reliability. In support of recent Generic Design Assessment (GDA) submissions, significant experience has been gained in the development of so called “incredibility of failure” arguments. This paper presents an overview of some of the lessons learned relating to the identification of the highest reliability components, the development of the structural integrity safety arguments in the context of current GDA projects, and considers how the UK Technical Advisory Group on Structural Integrity (TAGSI) recommendations continue to be applied almost 15 years after their work was first published. The paper also reports the approach adopted by Horizon Nuclear Power and their partners to develop the structural integrity safety case in support of the GDA process to build the UK’s first commercial Boiling Water Reactor design.

Offshore Safety Assessment and Safety-Based Decision-Making—The Current Status and Future Aspects

1999 ◽  
Vol 122 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Wang ◽  
O. Kieran
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Safety Assessment ◽  
Safety Analysis ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Safety Critical ◽  
Critical Elements ◽  
Offshore Installations ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Further Development

The offshore installations (safety case) regulations were developed in the UK in 1992 and came into force in 1993 in response to the accepted findings of the Piper Alpha enquiry. Recently, “the offshore installations and wells (design and construction, etc.) regulations” (DCR 1996) were introduced to offshore safety analysis. From the earliest stages of the installation’s life cycle, operators must ensure that all safety-critical elements in both the software and system domains be assessed. Hazards can be identified and the risks associated with them can be assessed and evaluated using a number of techniques and decision-making strategies, all aimed at producing an installation with lifetime safety integrity. In this paper, following a brief review of the current status of offshore safety regulation in the UK, several offshore safety assessment frameworks are presented. These include top-down, bottom-up, probabilistic, and subjective approaches. The conditions under which each approach may be applied effectively and efficiently are discussed. Probabilistic safety-based decision-making and subjective safety-based decision-making are then studied. Two examples are used to demonstrate the decision-making approaches. Recommendations on further development in offshore safety analysis are suggested. [S0892-7219(00)00901-8]

Building the UK ABWR: Developments in Structural Integrity Safety Cases for Highest Reliability Components in the UK

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Jelfs ◽  
James O’Neill ◽  
Angus Beveridge
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Advisory Group ◽  
Manufacturing Processes ◽  
Design And Manufacturing ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
Safety Cases ◽  
The Uk ◽  
High Level

Nuclear power plants contain certain components whose gross failure would lead to intolerable radiological consequences. In the UK, a common terminology used for such components is Very High Integrity (VHI). If it is not possible to engineer lines of protection for these components, a safety case must demonstrate to UK regulators that the probability of gross failure is demonstrably so low that it can be discounted. A previous paper [Ref. 1] has described, at a high level, how the structural integrity safety case for a nuclear new build project in the UK — the UK Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (UK ABWR) is being structured. As described in [Ref. 1], the structural integrity safety case for the UK ABWR is based on the guidance provided by the UK Technical Advisory Group on Structural Integrity (TAGSI) and aims to demonstrate a multi-legged safety case with robust and independent legs giving confidence of defense in depth. Design to the internationally recognized ASME code [Refs. 2, 3, 4] is supplemented by a significant number of beyond code requirements such as supplementary inspection and inspection qualification, augmented material testing requirements, defect tolerance assessment to the well-established R6 procedure [Ref. 5], and demonstration that design and manufacturing processes have reduced risks to As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). This paper provides an updated position of the progress made on the UK ABWR project. It also provides more specific details on the activities the future licensee, Horizon Nuclear Power, has performed in support of the demonstration that design and manufacturing processes have reduced risks to ALARP. This kind of additional work is vital to providing the UK regulator with confidence that the risk of failure of VHI components has been reduced to ALARP.

Criticality Rating of Ageing Fixed Offshore Structures

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Gupta ◽  
D. Sanderson ◽  
A. Stacey
Keyword(s):  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Offshore Structures ◽  
Structural Failure ◽  
Offshore Installations ◽  
Integrity Management

The effective structural integrity management of the ever-increasing population of ageing offshore installations on the UKCS requires the identification of key parameters which provide a measure of the criticality of installations to structural failure, thus enabling priorities to be set. This paper describes a model for the evaluation of the criticality rating of fixed offshore installations.

Removal of Topside Units in a Single Lift: The Repsol Yme Field Case Study

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beatriz Alonso Castro ◽  
Terje Birkenes ◽  
Huib Oosterveld
Keyword(s):  
North Sea ◽  
Ballast Water ◽  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Dry Weight ◽  
The North ◽  
Offshore Installations ◽  
Safety And Health ◽  
The North Sea ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Water Tanks

Decommissioning is an emerging sector in the UK and Norway, accounting for 2% of total industry expenditure in 2010 increasing to 8% in 2017. In accordance with existing regulations in the North Sea (OSPAR), dumping, and leaving wholly or partly in place disused offshore installations within the maritime area is prohibited. Over the next eight years, 200 platforms are expected to be removed in the North Sea. There are a number of methods to remove offshore installations: Piece small, Reverse installation and Single lift. In the Single lift approach the jacket or the topside is removed in one piece, minimizing significantly the time offshore and therefore the safety and health incidents. But the Piece Small and Reverse Installation are the most common methods and are established and secure although are time consuming and labor intensive [1]. Several potential candidates for single lift technology at varying levels of technical readiness were considered in the past. The majority of the concepts remained on the drawing board, while some were awaiting project commitment. The only that was matured further than this is the Pioneering Spirit. Yme, its first commercial lift, gave this concept the “proven” status. The Yme MOPU, owned by Repsol, was a jack-up type platform standing on three steel legs of 3.5 m diameter. The dry weight of the MOPU was approximately 13,500 t. The Yme MOPU was a challenging unit to remove mainly for three reasons: The platform motions due to the lack of stiffness in the leg support, its position in contact with the caisson wellhead platform, and the fact that the legs could not be pre-cut before the operation. The method selected to remove the platform was Single lift, using the dynamically positioned platform installation and removal vessel Pioneering Spirit. The lifting arrangement consisted of 12 lift beams combined and connected in pairs to yokes. Five specifically designed yokes were installed. The yokes connect the TLS with the MOPU. The structural integrity of each interface was assessed with FE analysis. The Ballast system was used to provide additional clearance. Pioneering Spirit has a total of eighty-seven ballast water tanks, including four so called ‘Quick Drop Ballast Water Tanks’. The removal of the MOPU was performed successfully the 22nd August 2016, after two days work offshore.

Use of Capability Maturity Modelling to Ensure Ageing and Life Extension are Adequately Considered in Structural Integrity Management

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. V. Sharp ◽  
G. Ersdal ◽  
D. Galbraith
Keyword(s):  
Continental Shelf ◽  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Life Extension ◽  
Capability Maturity ◽  
Offshore Installations ◽  
Ageing Processes ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Norwegian Continental Shelf

An increasing number of offshore installations are in the life extension stage of life, with ageing processes needing to be taken into account. This is particularly important for structural integrity. Capability Maturity Modelling enables the levels of maturity in processes associated with the management of ageing to be identified and improved if required. The paper describes the model and how it has been used for assessing the management of structural integrity for installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.

Structural Integrity Management Framework for Fixed Jacket Structures

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Stacey ◽  
M. Birkinshaw ◽  
J. V. Sharp ◽  
P. May
Keyword(s):  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Good Practice ◽  
Offshore Structures ◽  
Management Framework ◽  
Offshore Installations ◽  
Jacket Structures ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Offshore Industry

In recent years, a significant amount of effort has been expended by HSE and the offshore industry on the development of good practice for structural integrity management in the new code for offshore structures, ISO 19902. However, a review of the structural integrity management of fixed offshore installations operated on the UKCS has indicated that duty holders adopt varying approaches, in terms of both the methods used and effectiveness. The elements of a framework for the management of the structural integrity of fixed jacket structures are presented.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document