Geohazard Management Approach Within Safety Case

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dario Zapata ◽  
Ingrid Pederson ◽  
Sean Keane
Keyword(s):  
Case Report ◽  
Performance Metrics ◽  
Maintenance Phase ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Management Approach ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Independent Evidence ◽  
System Integrity ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
Integrity Management

Safety case is utilized within the Enbridge Pipeline Integrity Management Program as a means to provide evidence that the risks affecting the system have been effectively mitigated (LeBlanc, et al. 2016). The safety case is an independent, evidence-based assessment based on system integrity management processes applied across all pipelines. This paper describes the process in which safety case methodology was implemented to manage geohazard threats. The benefits of assessing geohazard and other integrity threats will also be discussed. The safety case report documents the opportunities to address the identified problems in addition to the relationship between hazards, implemented controls, and associated susceptibility. To demonstrate that adequate safety controls for geohazard threats have been incorporated into the operational and maintenance phase of the pipeline system, the geohazard management component of the safety case was assessed using a bowtie diagram. The results gave visibility to the geohazard program and its effectiveness. Predefined safety performance metrics with probabilistic and deterministic criteria are evaluated to confirm the geohazard program’s continued effectiveness. Results from the safety case assessment identify opportunities for improvement and provide a basis for revision to maintenance, assurance and verification programs. Ultimately the assessment demonstrates that geohazard threats in the pipeline system are being recognized and assessed. The assessment provides evidence that adequate resources and efforts are allocated to mitigate the risk and identifies continuous improvement activities where needed. The safety case report generated as the final portion of an integrity management framework demonstrates risk is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

Optimizing the Management of Excavation and Repair Data From Inline Inspection Programs

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miaad Safari ◽  
David Shaw
Keyword(s):  
Condition Monitoring ◽  
Data Gathering ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Data Uncertainty ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
System Integrity ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
External Corrosion ◽  
Inspection Data ◽  
Superior Approach

Abstract As integrity programs mature over the life of a pipeline, an increasing number of data points are collected from second, third, or further condition monitoring cycles. Types of data include Inline Inspection (ILI) or External Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA) inspection data, validation or remediation dig information, and records of various repairs that have been completed on the pipeline system. The diversity and massive quantity of this gathered data proposes a challenge to pipeline operators in managing and maintaining these data sets and records. The management of integrity data is a key element to a pipeline system Integrity Management Program (IMP) as per the CSA Z662[1]. One of the most critical integrity datasets is the repair information. Incorrect repair assignments on a pipeline can lead to duplicate unnecessary excavations in the best scenario and a pipeline failure in the worst scenario. Operators rely on various approaches to manage and assign repair data to ILIs such as historical records reviews, ILI-based repair assignments, or chainage-based repair assignments. However, these methods have significant gaps in efficiency and/or accuracy. Failure to adequately manage excavation and repair data can lead to increased costs due to repeated excavation of an anomaly, an increase in resources required to match historical information with new data, uncertainty in the effectiveness of previous repairs, and the possibility of incorrect assignment of repairs to unrepaired features. This paper describes the approach adopted by Enbridge Gas to track and maintain repairs, as a part of the Pipeline Risk and Integrity Management (PRIM) platform. This approach was designed to create a robust excavation and repair management framework, providing a robust system of data gathering and automation, while ensuring sufficient oversight by Integrity Engineers. Using this system, repairs are assigned to each feature in an excavation, not only to a certain chainage along the pipeline. Subsequently, when a new ILI results report is received, a process of “Repair Matching” is completed to assign preexisting repairs and assessments to the newly reported features at a feature level. This process is partially automated, whereby pre-determined box-to-box features matched between ILIs can auto-populate repairs for many of the repaired features. The proposed excavation management system would provide operators a superior approach to managing their repair history and projecting historical repairs and assessments onto new ILI reports, prior to assessing the ILI and issuing further digs on the pipeline. This optimized method has many advantages over the conventional repair management methods used in the industry. This method is best suited for operators that are embarking on their second or third condition monitoring cycle, with a moderate number of historical repairs.

The Development of a Facilities Integrity Management Program Recommended Practice for Canadian Energy Pipelines

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reena Sahney ◽  
Mike Reed ◽  
Darren Skibinsky
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Performance Metrics ◽  
Systems Approach ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Main Challenge ◽  
Transmission Pipeline ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Major Equipment

The Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA) is a voluntary, non-profit industry association representing major Canadian transmission pipeline companies. With the advent of changes in both CSA Z6621 as well as the National Energy Board Onshore Pipeline Regulations (OPR)2, the membership determined a Recommended Practice regarding a Management Systems Approach for Facilities Integrity was needed. As such, the Pipeline Integrity Working Group (PIWG) within CEPA formed a task group to support the initiative. The outlined approach was intended to have two main philosophical underpinnings: it must comprehensively support safe pipeline system operations and it must provide a practical mechanism for implementing a management systems approach for Facilities Iintegrity. The main challenge in developing a framework for a Facilities Integrity Management System lies in the broad range of equipment and system types that the management system must encompass. That is, equipment, in the context of Facilities Integrity Management, must encompass not only station equipment (such as rotating equipment, valves, meters etc.,) but also categories such as high pressure station piping and fuel lines. Further, there was the recognition that Operators already have an array of tools, processes and techniques in place to manage their various equipment and systems. In light of these observations, the Recommended Practice describes a framework that uses major equipment types as a key differentiator. This is an approach that can be easily aligned with existing corporate computerized maintenance management systems (CMMS) such as SAP™ or Maximo™. Once the equipment categorization has been established, the Recommended Practice then provides guidance regarding the specific requirements that should be addressed for each equipment category based on the framework in CSA Z662-11 Annex N. Specific suggestions are provided in the areas of: alignment with corporate goals and objectives, scope, definitions, performance metrics, risk assessments, competency of personnel, change management as well as documentation. The approach also maximizes the opportunity to leverage existing systems and processes to the extent possible. Overall the Recommended Practice should provide operators with a practical way to achieve a greater degree of rigor and alignment of facilities integrity management while ensuring detailed study and analysis is focused in the most appropriate areas.

Testing of Acoustic Emission Technology to Detect Cracks and Corrosion in the Marine Environment

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (02) ◽  
pp. 106-110
Author(s):  
Ge Wang ◽  
Michael Lee ◽  
Chris Serratella ◽  
Stanley Botten ◽  
Sam Ternowchek ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Acoustic Emission ◽  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Pilot Project ◽  
Development Project ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Inspection Planning ◽  
Structural Degradation ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Acoustic Emission Technology

Real-time monitoring and detection of structural degradation helps in capturing the structural conditions of ships. The latest nondestructive testing (NDT) and sensor technologies will potentially be integrated into future generations of the structural integrity management program. This paper reports on a joint development project between Alaska Tanker Company, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), and MISTRAS. The pilot project examined the viability of acoustic emission technology as a screening tool for surveys and inspection planning. Specifically, testing took place on a 32-year-old double-hull Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) trade tanker. The test demonstrated the possibility of adapting this technology in the identification of critical spots on a tanker in order to target inspections. This targeting will focus surveys and inspections on suspected areas, thus increasing efficiency of detecting structural degradation. The test has the potential to introduce new inspection procedures as the project undertakes the first commercial testing of the latest acoustic emission technology during a tanker's voyage.

Learnings From Data Management and Integration Efforts on the Enbridge Pipeline System

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garry L. Sommer ◽  
Brad S. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Data Management ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Data Alignment ◽  
Commercial Market ◽  
History Of ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Management Effort ◽  
Analysis System

Enbridge Pipelines Inc. operates one of the longest and most complex pipeline systems in the world. A key aspect of the Enbridge Integrity Management Program (IMP) is the trending, analysis, and management of data collected from over 50 years of pipeline operations. This paper/presentation describes Enbridge’s challenges, learnings, processes, and innovations for meeting today’s increased data management/integration demands. While much has been written around the premise of data management/integration, and many software solutions are available in the commercial market, the greatest data management challenge for mature pipeline operators arises from the variability of data (variety of technologies, data capture methods, and data accuracy levels) collected over the operating history of the system. Ability to bring this variable data set together is substantially the most difficult aspect of a coordinated data management effort and is critical to the success of any such project. Failure to do this will result in lack of user confidence and inability to gain “buy-in” to new data management processes. In 2001 Enbridge began a series of initiatives to enhance data management and analysis. Central to this was the commitment to accurate geospatial alignment of integrity data. This paper/presentation describes Enbridge’s experience with development of custom software (Integrated Spatial Analysis System – ISAS) including critical learnings around a.) Data alignment efforts and b.) Significant efforts involved in development of an accurate pipe centreline. The paper/presentation will also describe co-incident data management programs that link to ISAS. This includes enhanced database functionality for excavation data and development of software to enable electronic transfer of data to this database. These tools were built to enable rapid transfer of field data and “real time” tool validation through automated unity plots of tool defect data vs. that measured in the field.

Advanced Integrity Management Framework for Pipelines

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Len LeBlanc ◽  
Walter Kresic ◽  
Sean Keane ◽  
John Munro
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Improvement ◽  
Program Effectiveness ◽  
Level Structure ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Management Framework ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
High Level

This paper describes the integrity management framework utilized within the Enbridge Liquids Pipelines Integrity Management Program. The role of the framework is to provide the high-level structure used by the company to prepare and demonstrate integrity safety decisions relative to mainline pipelines, and facility piping segments where applicable. The scope is directed to corrosion, cracking, and deformation threats and all variants within those broad categories. The basis for the framework centers on the use of a safety case to provide evidence that the risks affecting the system have been effectively mitigated. A ‘safety case’, for the purposes of this methodology is defined as a structured argument demonstrating that the evidence is sufficient to show that the system is safe.[1] The decision model brings together the aspects of data integration and determination of maintenance timing; execution of prevention, monitoring, and mitigation; confirmation that the execution has met reliability targets; application of additional steps if targets are not met; and then the collation of the results into an engineering assessment of the program effectiveness (safety case). Once the program is complete, continuous improvement is built into the next program through the incorporation of research and development solutions, lessons learned, and improvements to processes. On the basis of a wide range of experiences, investigations and research, it was concluded that there are combinations of monitoring and mitigation methods required in an integrity program to effectively manage integrity threats. A safety case approach ultimately provides the structure for measuring the effectiveness of integrity monitoring and mitigation efforts, and the methodology to assess whether a pipeline is sufficiently safe with targets for continuous improvement. Hence, the need for the safety case is to provide transparent, quantitative integrity program performance results which are continually improved upon through ongoing revalidations and improvement to the methods utilized. This enables risk reduction, better stakeholder awareness, focused innovation, opportunities for industry information sharing along with other benefits.

Hydrostatic Pressure Testing Program for a Liquid Petroleum Products Pipeline

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert V. Hadden ◽  
Kevin J. De Leenheer
Keyword(s):  
Water Treatment ◽  
Petroleum Products ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Sewer System ◽  
Testing Program ◽  
Water Transportation ◽  
Pipe Line ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Products Pipeline

As part of its Integrity Management Program, Trans Mountain Pipe Line hydrostatically tests sections of its pipeline system with water transported to test sites through the pipeline. After completion of the testing, the water continues through the pipeline to a water treatment facility where it is treated and discharged to the municipal sewer system. Hydrostatic testing of an operating pipeline, although simple in concept, is a major undertaking. This paper will outline the technical aspects of Trans Mountain’s hydrostatic testing program including: test water transportation, environmental constraints, coordination of test activities and water treatment.

Are Integrity Management Programs Making a Difference?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joe Paviglianiti ◽  
Alan Murray ◽  
Tijani (TJ) Elabor
Keyword(s):  
Stress Corrosion ◽  
Failure Mechanism ◽  
Stress Corrosion Cracking ◽  
Performance Metrics ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Future Improvement ◽  
Making A Difference ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Pipeline Safety ◽  
Incident Rates

As a result of numerous stress corrosion cracking incidents in the 1980s and early 1990 the National Energy Board (NEB) held an Inquiry1 in 1995 on the SCC failure mechanism and how to prevent failures. One of the recommendations of the Inquiry was Companies were to develop a SCC management program to proactively identify and mitigate SCC. Based on the apparent success of the SCC programs in significantly reducing SCC failures, the NEB revised its Onshore Pipeline Regulations in 1999 (OPR-99)2 to require companies to develop an integrity management program (IMP) for all hazards. This paper discusses the evolution of integrity management program (IMP) requirements and evaluates incident rates and other performance metrics to determine if there is evidence that IMPs have contributed to the improvement of safety of pipelines. The paper highlights the challenges associated with gathering incident and IMP performance metrics and evaluating the data to determine if there is a correlation between the implementation of IMP and pipeline safety. In addition, the analysis discusses the challenges associated with comparing data between different countries and regulatory jurisdictions. Suggestions for future improvement are identified.

Integrity Management Program for Geo-Hazards in the OCENSA Pipeline System

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugo García ◽  
Carlos Nieves ◽  
Juan Diego Colonia
Keyword(s):  
Management Program ◽  
Andes Mountains ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
The Andes ◽  
Oil Pipelines ◽  
Differential Settling ◽  
The Face ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
The Caribbean ◽  
Geological Formations

Oil pipelines systems for hydrocarbons transportation are linear projects that can reach great lengths. For this reason, theirs paths may cross different geological formations, soil types, navigable or torrential waters; and they may face geotechnical and hydrological instability problems such as creeping slopes, geological faults, landslides, scour and differential settling which causes different relative movements between the soil and the pipeline. The OCENSA (Oleoducto Central S.A) 30″ and 36″ diameter system was built in 1997 to transport crude oil from the eastern foothills of the Andes to the Caribbean Coast along some 830 km of the Eastern Andes mountains range and the spurs of the central Andes mountains range of Colombia: it was a major challenge to secure the integrity of the pipeline in the face of natural events.

Research on Oil and Gas Station Integrity Management System

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Honglong Zheng ◽  
Muyang Ai ◽  
Lijian Zhou ◽  
Mingfei Li ◽  
Ting Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Management Approach ◽  
Integrity Assessment ◽  
Gas Stations ◽  
Pumping Stations ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Gas Station ◽  
And Performance

As a preventative management mode, integrity management which is significantly effective is now applicable in modern industry. Based on the successful application of integrity management for the pipeline, managers expect an extension of the integrity management program for the oil and gas stations such as pumping stations, so as to make the best arrangement of resources and guarantee the safety of station facilities. The differences between station integrity management system in China and abroad are analyzed. It is claimed that the oil and gas station integrity management is more difficult and complicated in China. An integrity management program is developed for the oil and gas stations in China. The authors summarily introduce the station integrity management framework, and determine the processes and elements of management. For the main parts of the stations are plenty of facilities, the authors attempt to carry out the management on each category of facilities in particular. According to the characteristics and working status, field facilities can be classified into three categories: static facilities, dynamic facilities, and electrical instruments. For all these facilities, integrity management approach consists of five steps: data collection, risk assessment, integrity assessment, repair & maintenance, and performance evaluation. Station integrity management system comprises five aspects: system documents, standards & specifications, supporting technologies, management platforms and applications. This paper should be considered as a reference for the oil and gas station integrity managers in the future.

A GIS-Based System to Assess the Environmental Consequence of a Liquid Pipeline Rupture at Watercourse Crossings

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Ripley ◽  
Elisa Scordo ◽  
Alex Baumgard
Keyword(s):  
Initial Study ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Vulnerability Factors ◽  
Environmental Consequence ◽  
Resource Limitations ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Socio Economic Factors

BGC Engineering Inc. (BGC) was retained by a large pipeline operator to develop a GIS-based system to assess and rank the environmental consequence of a pipeline rupture on watercourse crossings within their pipeline system. Several physical, biological and socio-economic factors contribute to the environmental consequence of a pipeline rupture on a watercourse. This study examined select spatial and vulnerability factors, and did not consider biologic or economic impacts. Three factors were selected as part of the initial study to prioritize the pipeline watercourse crossings according to: (1) size of the watercourse at the pipeline crossing, (2) proximity of each individual crossing to larger downstream watercourses, and (3) pipeline liquid flow rate volume. A spatial analysis was conducted to determine the first two factors, while input for the third factor was provided by the pipeline operator. Watercourse size was determined using Strahler’s stream order classification (Strahler 1952), while proximity to larger downstream watercourses was assessed using a Geographic Information System (GIS). This paper presents an overview of the data sources and methods used to develop an initial screening tool for identifying high consequence crossings within a pipeline system, and highlights the challenges encountered with acquiring and processing data to include in a consequence rating system. As with other pipeline risk assessments, the main challenges of this work include data availability, data integrity and resource limitations. This system is intended to fit within the pipeline operator’s current geohazard integrity management program and direct resources for a multi-year baseline field inspection program.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document