What Could Have Saved Fukushima From Its Severe Accident

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenji Iino ◽  
Ritsuo Yoshioka ◽  
Masao Fuchigami ◽  
Masayuki Nakao

The Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011 triggered huge tsunami waves that devastated the northeast region of Japan along the Pacific coastline. The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) owned Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (Fukushima-1) survived the earthquake, however, not the tsunami that followed. Four of the 6 reactor units underwent Station Blackout. Unit 5 lost all its own AC power, however, it shared AC power with Unit 6. Units 1, 3, and 4 had hydrogen explosions that destroyed their reactor buildings, and even worse, 1, 2, and 3 had core meltdowns to release a large amount of radioactive material to their surroundings. The accident was rated Level 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale, the worst level defined by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Reports and papers have been published by a number of entities including the Japanese Diet, Government, TEPCO, IAEA, and more. They give detail explanation of how the accident developed into a nuclear disaster explaining the direct and background causes and faults made after the accident broke out. Finding the accident process, i.e., how it happened, and its causes of why it happened, are the most important first steps in accident analysis. Figuring out how to prevent similar events in the future, or even if it is possible to do so, however, is equally important for our future. We started our study in 2014 to find what actions TEPCO could have taken before the accident for preventing it from growing into a catastrophe. Then in February 2015, we set the goal of our study group to find answers to the following two questions: A. Was the huge tsunami, induced by a huge earthquake, predictable at Fukushima-1? B. If it was predictable, what preparations at Fukushima-1 could have reduced the severity of the accident? In response to our invitation to experts in the nuclear field, active and retired people gathered from academia, manufacturers, utility companies, and even regulators. After a series of tense discussions, we reached the conclusions that: Aa. Tsunami of the level that hit Fukushima-1 in 2011 was well predictable, and, Ba. The accident would have been much less severe if the plant had prepared a set of equipment, and most of all, had exercised actions against such tsunami. Preparation at the plant to prevent the severe accident consisted of the following items 1 through 7, and drills in 8: 1. A number of 125Vdc and 250Vdc batteries, 2. Portable underwater pumps, 3. Portable AC generators with sufficient gasoline supply to run the pumps, and 4. High voltage AC power truck This set applied only to this specific accident. For preparing against many other situations that could have taken place at Fukushima-1, we recommend having, in addition, the following equipment and modifications. 5. Portable compressor to drive air-operated valves for venting, 6. Watertight modification to RCIC and HPCI control and instrumentation, 7. Fire engines for alternate low pressure water injection after vent (Fukushima-1 had three). Just making these preparations would not have been sufficient. Activating valves with DC batteries, for example, takes disengaging the regular power supply lines and hooking up the batteries. 8. Drills against extended loss of all electric power and seawater pump This item 8, on and off-site drills was the most important preparation that should had been made. All other necessary preparations to save the plant in such cases would have followed logically.

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenji Iino ◽  
Ritsuo Yoshioka ◽  
Masao Fuchigami ◽  
Masayuki Nakao

Abstract The Great East Japan Earthquake on Mar. 11, 2011 triggered huge tsunami waves that attacked Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (Fukushima-1). Units 1, 3, and 4 had hydrogen explosions. Units 1–3 had core meltdowns and released a large amount of radioactive material. Published investigation reports did not explain how the severity of the accident could have been prevented. We formed a study group to find: (A) Was the earthquake-induced huge tsunami predictable at Fukushima-1? (B) If it was predictable, what preparations at Fukushima-1 could have avoided the severity of the accident? Our conclusions were: (a) The tsunami that hit Fukushima-1 was predictable, and (b) the severity could have been avoided if the plant had prepared a set of equipment, and most of all, had exercised actions to take against such tsunami. Necessary preparation included: (1) a number of direct current (DC) batteries, (2) portable underwater pumps, (3) portable alternating current (AC) generators with sufficient gasoline supply, (4) high voltage AC power trucks, and (5) drills against extended loss of all electric power and seawater pumps. This set applied only to this specific accident. A thorough preparation would have added (6) portable compressors, (7) watertight modification to reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) and high pressure coolant injection system (HPCI) control and instrumentation, and (8) fire engines for alternate low pressure water injection. Item (5), i.e., to study plans and carry out exercises against the tsunami would have identified all other necessary preparations.


Author(s):  
Kenji Iino ◽  
Ritsuo Yoshioka ◽  
Masao Fuchigami ◽  
Masayuki Nakao

The Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011 triggered huge tsunami waves that attacked Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (Fukushima-1). Units 1, 3, and 4 had hydrogen explosions. Units 1, 2, and 3 had core meltdowns and released a large amount of radioactive material. Published investigation reports did not explain how the severity of the accident could have been prevented. We formed a study group to find what preparations at Fukushima-1 could have avoided the severity of the accident. We concluded that the severity could have been avoided if the plant had prepared a set of equipment, and had exercised actions to take against such tsunami. Necessary preparation included (1) A number of DC batteries, (2) Portable underwater pumps, (3) Portable AC generators with sufficient gasoline supply, (4) High voltage AC power trucks, and (5) Drills against extended loss of all electric power and seawater pumps. The most important preparation was item (5), i.e., to study plans and carry out exercises against huge tsunami. That alone would have identified all other necessary preparations.


Author(s):  
Hsoung-Wei Chou ◽  
Chin-Cheng Huang

After the Fukushima nuclear accident occurred in Japan on March 11, 2011, the compound disaster beyond design basis which may severely impact the nuclear safety has been noticed and paid much more attention. In addition to the original emergency operating procedures (EOPs) and severe accident management guidance (SAMG) of nuclear power plant, the licensee in Taiwan developed the ultimate response guideline (URG) when EOPs and SAMG cannot be performed effectively due to loss of power and water supply by the Fukushima-like compound disaster. Once the URG procedures are initiated, the operators will conduct reactor depressurization, low pressure water injection and containment venting to strictly prevent the core damage and the release of radioactive material. In the paper, the fracture probabilities of boiling water reactor (BWR) pressure vessels with incremental levels of radiation embrittlement under URG operation are evaluated by probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) analysis. First, the models of PFM FAVOR code concerning the beltline shell welds of reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) associated with a very conservative flaw distribution are built. Then, the hypothetical transients of URG operation obtained from the thermal hydraulic analyses for Taiwan domestic BWRs are applied as the loading condition. The analysis results demonstrate that performing URG operation will not cause significant fracture probability for RPV, even at an extremely embrittled condition. The URG procedures can ensure the prevention of core damage as well as maintenance of structural integrity of RPV in the situation of long-term loss of electric power when suffering from the Fukushima-like accidents.


Author(s):  
Zibin Liu ◽  
Dingqing Guo ◽  
Bing Zhang ◽  
Jinkai Wang

The phenomenon of temperature-induced steam generator tube rupture (TI-SGTR) is a typical phenomenon in the severe accident process of nuclear power plants. The occurrence of the phenomenon may result in the radioactive material bypass the containment, causing a large radioactive release. This paper investigates modeling methods of the phenomenon of temperature-induced SGTR in level 2 PSA and presents an optimizing modeling method to calculate the probability of branching probability of TI-SGTR, aiming at improving the rationality and veracity of level 2 PSA.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sang-Won Lee ◽  
Tae Hyub Hong ◽  
Mi-Ro Seo ◽  
Young-Seung Lee ◽  
Hyeong-Taek Kim

The Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident shows that an extreme natural disaster can prevent the proper restoration of electric power for several days, so-called extended SBO. In Korea, the government and industry performed comprehensive special safety inspections on all domestic nuclear power plants against beyond design bases external events. One of the safety improvement action items related to the extended SBO is installation of external water injection provision and equipment to RCS and SG. In this paper, the extended SBO coping capability of APR1400 is examined using MAAP4 to assess the effectiveness of the external water injection strategy. Results show that an external injection into SG is applicable to mitigate an extended SBO scenario. However, an external injection into RCS is only effective when RCS depressurization capacity is sufficiently provided in case of high pressure scenarios. Based on the above results, the technical basis of external injection strategy will be reflected on development of revised severe accident management guideline.


Author(s):  
Tadashi Narabayashi ◽  
Yuuhei Sugano ◽  
Hiroki Imaeda ◽  
Go Chiba ◽  
Nobuaki Sato ◽  
...  

Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident would be terminated, if sufficient accident countermeasures, such as water proof door, mobile power, etc [1, 2]. In case of Europe, it had already installed the heat removal system and filtered containment venting system (FCVS) from the lessons of TMI and Chernobyl Accidents. The new regulatory standard in Japan, the filtered vent system (FCVS) should be installed, and prevent the radioactive material in case of the severe accident and the overpressure breakage prevention of a primary containment vessel (PCV) and also the robustization of the FCVS. The authors examined the severe accident process in the 2nd unit of Fukushima Daiichi NPS, and found the vent by FCVS should be done before water injection into the core. The PCV spray and water injection into the pedestal basement should be also the countermeasures to the severe accident. Countermeasures for an intentional aircraft collision should be installed too. Upon occurrence of a severe accident (SA), vent gas with radioactive fission products is blown out to a scrubbing pool through numerous venturi nozzles. Mist in steam moves upward to a metal fiber filter through a multi-hole baffle plate. After the mist is removed by that filter, radioactive methyl iodine (CH3I) is captured on the surface of a molecular sieve or AgX, made from zeolite particles with silver coating. A FCVS visualized test facility was installed at Hokkaido University. An AgX filter is used down-stream of the scrubbing pool and metal fiver filter. Thickness of AgX filter is very important parameter to obtain enough decontamination factor (DF). The DF for the radioactive iodine exceeds 10,000 at bed depth (AgX filter thickness) greater than 75mm.


Author(s):  
Kenichi Kanda ◽  
Yoshihisa Nishi ◽  
Kazuma Abe ◽  
Satoshi Nishimura ◽  
Koichi Nakamura ◽  
...  

Accident analyses of the Fukushima-Daiichi unit-2 nuclear power plant were performed with MAAP (Modular Accident Analysis Program) version 5.03. We assumed RCIC, SRV operation and alternative water injection in order to reproduce the measured pressure and temperature values in RPV and PCV. From parametric studies, it was found that the analysis results were in good agreement with the measured data. In this paper, the results of the parametric studies are reported. Furthermore, spatial discretization of compartments (such as rooms in the reactor building, etc.) into small parts successfully demonstrated the transient distribution and deposition of fission products (FPs) across the rooms. Such special discretization is particularly important for the forensic investigation of severe accidents and the deposited amount in the R/B might be estimated by using this detailed model.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Nakayama ◽  
T. Takemi ◽  
H. Nagai

Abstract. A significant amount of radioactive material was accidentally discharged into the atmosphere from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant from 12 March 2011, which produced high contaminated areas over a wide region in Japan. In conducting regional-scale atmospheric dispersion simulations, the computer-based nuclear emergency response system WSPEEDI-II developed by Japan Atomic Energy Agency was used. Because this system is driven by a meso-scale meteorological (MM) model, it is difficult to reproduce small-scale wind fluctuations due to the effects of local terrain variability and buildings within a nuclear facility that are not explicitly represented in MM models. In this study, we propose a computational approach to couple an LES-based CFD model with a MM model for detailed simulations of turbulent winds with buoyancy effects under real meteorological conditions using turbulent inflow technique. Compared to the simple measurement data, especially, the 10 min averaged wind directions of the LES differ by more than 30 degrees during some period of time. However, distribution patterns of wind speeds, directions, and potential temperature are similar to the MM data. This implies that our coupling technique has potential performance to provide detailed data on contaminated area in the nuclear accidents.


Author(s):  
Sei Hirano ◽  
Daisuke Hirasawa ◽  
Yoshihisa Kiyotoki ◽  
Keisuke Sakemura ◽  
Keiji Sasaki ◽  
...  

Abstract Background: When terminal stage of Severe Accident (SA) with no coolant injection at a nuclear power plant, the equipment that has cooled and solidified through water injection to a molten core that has ex-vessel and fallen outside of the pressure vessel will then be required to operate autonomously by heat detection, without external signals or power (e.g. electricity, air). The fusible plug operation is triggered by fusible alloy which receives heat from molten core and will melt. Because the fusible plug is also the boundary of Suppression Pool (S/P), high reliability is required for sealing performance. It is for that reason that Hitachi GE Nuclear Energy Ltd. (Hitachi-GE) has developed a fusible plug to serve as a device necessary to operate this system. Features of the Fusible Plug: The autonomous operation of the fusible plug is triggered by the melting of a fusible alloy, which is part of the fusible plug. However, the fusible alloy has a remarkably low mechanical strength and therefore is not suitable as a strength member. As such, it is necessary to ensure reliable plug sealing without applying a load to the fusible alloy so as to prevent the fusible plug from malfunctioning during normal operation. Therefore, to reduce the load to be applied to the fusible alloy, Hitachi-GE has developed a fusible plug structure that operates autonomously by detecting the ambient temperature without using the fusible alloy as a strength member. We have performed a verification test using this fusible plug and confirmed that it satisfies the predetermined performance requirements. Future Actions: Hitachi-GE is holding discussions on using the fusible plug at nuclear power plants in Japan. In the future, we plan to expand to the overseas.


Author(s):  
Zhiyi Yang ◽  
Yimin Chong ◽  
Chun Li ◽  
Jiajia Zhang

New nuclear safety objectives and principles are being studied in main nuclear power countries and organizations after Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident, to further improve the safety level of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Based on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Specific Safety Requirements (No.SSR-2/1), “Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design” (HAF102-2016) is issued in China. The concept “design extension condition (DEC)” is put forward, which is intend to enhance the plant’s capability to withstand accidents that are more severe than Design Basis Accidents (DBA). DEC could include conditions without significant fuel degradation (DEC-A in this paper) and conditions with core melting (DEC-B in this paper), e.g. severe accident. In this paper, the DEC-A and its application was discussed preliminarily, firstly, the development and connotation was introduced, then the identification of DEC-A, and the safety analysis principles of DEC-A were mainly described. This study may play a valuable role for implementation of new nuclear safety requirements in China.


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