Contingency Options for the Drying, Conditioning and Packaging of Magnox Spent Fuel in the UK

Author(s):  
Jenny Morris ◽  
Stephen Wickham ◽  
Phil Richardson ◽  
Colin Rhodes ◽  
Mike Newland

The UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) is responsible for safe and secure management of spent nuclear fuel. Magnox spent fuel is held at some Magnox reactor sites and at Sellafield where it is reprocessed using a number of facilities. It is intended that all Magnox fuel will be reprocessed, as described in the published Magnox Operating Plan (MOP) [1]. In the event, however, that a failure occurs within the reprocessing plant, the NDA has initiated a programme of activities to explore alternative contingency options for the management of wetted Magnox spent fuel. Magnox fuel comprises metallic uranium bar clad in a magnesium alloy, both of which corrode if exposed to oxygen or water. Consequently, contingency options are required to consider how best to manage the issues associated with the reactivity of the metals. Questions of whether Magnox spent fuel needs to be dried, how it might be conditioned, how it might be packaged, and held in temporary storage until a disposal facility becomes available, all require attention. A review of potential contingency options for Magnox fuel was conducted by Galson Sciences Ltd, UKAEA and the NDA. During storage in the presence of water, the corrosion of Magnox fuel produces hydrogen (H2) gas, which requires careful management. When uranium reacts with hydrogen in a reducing environment, the formation of uranium hydride (UH3) may occur, which under some circumstances can be pyrophoric, and might create hazards which may affect subsequent retrieval and/or repackaging (e.g. for disposal). Other factors that may affect the choice of a viable contingency option include criticality safety, environmental impacts, security and Safeguards and economic considerations. At post-irradiation examination (PIE) facilities in the UK, Magnox spent fuel is dried as a result of storage in air at ambient temperatures. Early French UNGG (Uranium Naturel Graphite Gaz) fuel was retrieved from pond storage at Cadarache, dried using a hot gas drying technique, oxidised and packaged in sealed canisters and placed in interim storage at the CASCAD (CASemate CADarache) facility. In the US, spent fuels including the Zircaloy clad Hanford N-Reactor fuels were cold vacuum dried and Idaho legacy aluminium clad metallic uranium fuels were hot vacuum dried; the dried fuel was then packaged in sealed and vented canisters (at Hanford and Idaho, respectively) for interim storage. With regard to conditioning and packaging, several different approaches have been reviewed, including encapsulation in cementitious grout or polymer, high-temperature vitrification or ceramicisation, and solution in acid or alkali solution followed by cementation or vitrification (without reprocessing). All of these approaches require further research in order to be evaluated and developed further for application to formerly wetted Magnox fuel. A variety of containers have been developed for the transport, storage and/or disposal of spent fuel in radioactive waste management programmes worldwide. Wetted Magnox spent fuel could be packaged in a container, with reservations about the potential formation of UH3 in a sealed environment where reducing conditions may develop. The applicability of different combinations of drying, conditioning and packaging techniques to the preparation of Magnox spent fuel for long-term storage and eventual disposal are discussed.

MRS Advances ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (19) ◽  
pp. 991-1003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evaristo J. Bonano ◽  
Elena A. Kalinina ◽  
Peter N. Swift

ABSTRACTCurrent practice for commercial spent nuclear fuel management in the United States of America (US) includes storage of spent fuel in both pools and dry storage cask systems at nuclear power plants. Most storage pools are filled to their operational capacity, and management of the approximately 2,200 metric tons of spent fuel newly discharged each year requires transferring older and cooler fuel from pools into dry storage. In the absence of a repository that can accept spent fuel for permanent disposal, projections indicate that the US will have approximately 134,000 metric tons of spent fuel in dry storage by mid-century when the last plants in the current reactor fleet are decommissioned. Current designs for storage systems rely on large dual-purpose (storage and transportation) canisters that are not optimized for disposal. Various options exist in the US for improving integration of management practices across the entire back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.


Author(s):  
Donald Wayne Lewis

In the United States (U.S.) the nuclear waste issue has plagued the nuclear industry for decades. Originally, spent fuel was to be reprocessed but with the threat of nuclear proliferation, spent fuel reprocessing has been eliminated, at least for now. In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 [1] was established, authorizing development of one or more spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste geological repositories and a consolidated national storage facility, called a “Monitored Retrievable Storage” facility, that could store the spent nuclear fuel until it could be placed into the geological repository. Plans were under way to build a geological repository, Yucca Mountain, but with the decision by President Obama to terminate the development of Yucca Mountain, a consolidated national storage facility that can store spent fuel for an interim period until a new repository is established has become very important. Since reactor sites have not been able to wait for the government to come up with a storage or disposal location, spent fuel remains in wet or dry storage at each nuclear plant. The purpose of this paper is to present a concept developed to address the DOE’s goals stated above. This concept was developed over the past few months by collaboration between the DOE and industry experts that have experience in designing spent nuclear fuel facilities. The paper examines the current spent fuel storage conditions at shutdown reactor sites, operating reactor sites, and the type of storage systems (transportable versus non-transportable, welded or bolted). The concept lays out the basis for a pilot storage facility to house spent fuel from shutdown reactor sites and then how the pilot facility can be enlarged to a larger full scale consolidated interim storage facility.


Author(s):  
H. Geiser ◽  
J. Schro¨der

The idea of using casks for interim storage of spent fuel arose at GNS after a very controversial political discussion in 1978, when total passive safety features (including aircraft crash conditions) were required for an above ground spent fuel storage facility. In the meantime, GNS has loaded more than 1000 casks at 25 different storage sites in Germany. GNS cask technology is used in 13 countries. Spent fuel assemblies of PWR, BWR, VVER, RBMK, MTR and THTR as well as vitrified high level waste containers are stored in full metal casks of the CASTOR® type. Also MOX fuel of PWR and BWR has been stored. More than two decades of storage have shown that the basic requirements (safe confinement, criticality safety, sufficient shielding and appropriate heat transfer) have been fulfilled in any case — during normal operation and in case of severe accidents, including aircraft crash. There is no indication of problems arising in the future. Of course, the experience of more than 20 years has resulted in improvements of the cask design. The CASTOR® casks have been thoroughly investigated by many experiments. There have been approx. 50 full and half scale drop tests and a significant number of fire tests, simulations of aircraft crash, investigations with anti tank weapons, and an explosion of a railway tank with liquid gas neighbouring a loaded CASTOR® cask. According to customer and site specific demands, different types of storage facilities are realized in Germany. Firstly, there are facilities for long-term storage, such as large ventilated central storage buildings away from reactor or ventilated storage buildings at the reactor site, ventilated underground tunnels or concrete platforms outside a building. Secondly, there are facilities for temporary storage, where casks have been positioned in horizontal orientation under a ventilated shielding cover outside a building.


Author(s):  
Daniel F. Parvin ◽  
Thomas Huys

On the sites of Belgoprocess several thousands of drums containing conditioned legacy waste are stored. A significant number of these waste packages are 220 litre drums containing radioactive waste embedded into inactive bitumen. Most of the radioactive waste in these drums was generated during the development and production of MOX-fuels and the operation of the Eurochemic reprocessing plant. The current state of a number of these packages is no longer acceptable for long term storage. In order to make the waste packages acceptable for interim storage a repackaging process was developed. The process involves the repackaging of the waste items into 400 or 700 litre waste drums and a non-destructive gamma-ray assay (NDA) measurement performed on the new package. The aim of the NDA measurement is to detect significant quantities of fissile material in order to demonstrate compliance with the operational limits of the storage building. Since the waste items are destined for geological disposal, there is no specific need for a detection limit in the order of milligrams of plutonium as required for surface disposal. To meet this NDA requirement Babcock International Group supplied, calibrated and commissioned an open geometry system from its HRGS product range. The DrumScan® HRGS Solo assay system was delivered to the Belgoprocess site in 2009 after completing a series of factory acceptance tests performed in the UK. In May 2009 after successful completion of the site acceptance tests performed in Belgium, the system has been undergoing extensive testing and validation by Belgoprocess in order to demonstrate acceptance and compliance to the Belgian Radioactive Waste Agency, NIRAS/ONDRAF. After a careful evaluation of the qualification file, NIRAS/ONDRAF approved the system for operational measurements at the end of 2010. This paper provides a detailed description of the NDA requirement, calibration methodology, system validation tests and overall measurement performance of the system.


2002 ◽  
Vol 757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yngve Albinsson ◽  
Arvid Ödegaard-Jensen ◽  
Virginia M. Oversby ◽  
Lars O. Werme

ABSTRACTSweden plans to dispose of spent nuclear fuel in a deep geologic repository in granitic rock. The disposal conditions allow water to contact the canisters by diffusion through the surrounding bentonite clay layer. Corrosion of the canister iron insert will consume oxygen and provide actively reducing conditions in the fluid phase. Experiments with spent fuel have been done to determine the dissolution behavior of the fuel matrix and associated fission products and actinides under conditions ranging from inert atmosphere to reducing conditions in solutions. Data for U, Pu, Np, Cs, Sr, Tc, Mo, and Ru have been obtained for dissolution in a dilute NaHCO3 groundwater for 3 conditions: Ar atmosphere, H2 atmosphere, and H2 atmosphere with Fe(II) in solution. Solution concentrations forU, Pu, and Mo are all significantly lower for the conditions that include Fe(II) ions in the solutions together with H2 atmosphere, while concentrations of the other elements seem to be unaffected by the change of atmospheres or presence of Fe(II). Most of the material that initially dissolved from the fuel has reprecipitated back onto the fuel surface. Very little material was recovered from rinsing and acid stripping of the reaction vessels.


Author(s):  
D. Keith Morton ◽  
Spencer D. Snow ◽  
Tom E. Rahl ◽  
Tom J. Hill ◽  
Richard P. Morissette

The Department of Energy (DOE) has developed a set of containers for the handling, interim storage, transportation, and disposal in the national repository of DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF). This container design, referred to as the standardized DOE SNF canister or standardized canister, was developed by the Department’s National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) working in conjunction with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) and the DOE spent fuel sites. This canister had to have a standardized design yet be capable of accepting virtually all of the DOE SNF, be placed in a variety of storage and transportation systems, and still be acceptable to the repository. Since specific design details regarding the storage, transportation, and repository disposal of DOE SNF were not finalized, the NSNFP recognized the necessity to specify a complete DOE SNF canister design. This allowed other evaluations of canister performance and design to proceed as well as providing standardized canister users adequate information to proceed with their work. This paper is an update of a paper [1] presented to the 1999 American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Pressure Vessels and Piping (PVP) Conference. It discusses recent progress achieved in various areas to enhance acceptance of this canister not only by the DOE complex but also fabricators and regulatory agencies.


Author(s):  
Robert S. Dyer ◽  
Ella Barnes ◽  
Randall L. Snipes ◽  
Steinar Ho̸ibra˚ten ◽  
Valery Sveshnikov ◽  
...  

Northwest Russia contains large quantities of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that potentially threaten the environmental security of the surrounding Arctic Region. The majority of the SNF from Russian decommissioned nuclear submarines is currently stored either onboard submarines or in floating storage vesssels in Northwest Russia. Some of the SNF is damaged, stored in an unstable condition, or of a type that cannot currently be reprocessed. Most of the existing storage facilities being used in Northwest Russia do not meet health and safety and physical security requirements. Existing Russian transport infrastructure and reprocessing facilities cannot meet the requirements for moving and reprocessing this fuel. Therefore, additional interim storage capacity is required. The removal, handling, interim storage, and shipment of the fuel pose technical, ecological, and security challenges. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense and the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Oak Ridge National Laboratory, along with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, is working closely with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (RF) to develop an improved and integrated management system for interim storage of military SNF in NW Russia. The cooperative effort consists of three subprojects involving the development of: (1) a prototype dual-purpose, metal-concrete container for both transport and long-term storage of RF military SNF, (2) the first transshipment/interim storage facility for these containers, and (3) improved fuel preparation and cask loading procedures and systems to control the moisture levels within the containers. The first subproject, development of a prototype dual-purpose container, was completed in December 2000. This was the first metal-concrete container developed, licensed, and produced in Russia for both the transportation and storage of military SNF. These containers are now in serial production. Russia plans to use these containers for the transport and interim storage of military SNF from decommissioned nuclear submarines at naval installations in the Arctic and Far East. The second subproject, the design, construction, and licensing of the first transshipment/interim storage facility in Russia, was completed in September 2003. This facility can provide interim storage for up to nineteen 40-tonne SNF containers filled with SNF for a period not to exceed two years. The primary objective of building this transshipment/interim storage facility in Murmansk, Russia was to remove a bottleneck in the RF transportation infrastructure for moving containers, loaded with SNF, from the arctic region to PO “Mayak” for reprocessing or longer-term storage. The third subproject addresses the need to improve fuel conditioning and cask operating procedures to ensure safe storage of SNF for at least 50 years. This will involve the review and improvement of existing RF procedures and systems for preparing and loading the fuel in the specially designed casks for transport and long-term storage. This subproject is scheduled for completion in December 2003. Upon completion, these subprojects are designed to provide a physically secure, accountable, and environmentally sound integrated solution that will increase the capacity for removal and transfer of SNF from decommissioned RF submarines in the Russian Federation to PO “Mayak” in central Russia.


Author(s):  
Tadahiro Katsuta

Political and technical advantages to introduce spent nuclear fuel interim storage into Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle are examined. Once Rokkasho reprocessing plant starts operation, 80,000 tHM of spent Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel must be stored in an Away From Reactor (AFR) interim storage site until 2100. If a succeeding reprocessing plant starts operating, the spent LEU will reach its peak of 30,000 tHM before 2050, and then will decrease until the end of the second reprocessing plant operation. Throughput of the second reprocessing plant is assumed as twice of that of Rokassho reprocessing plant, indeed 1,600tHM/year. On the other hand, tripled number of final disposal sites for High Level Nuclear Waste (HLW) will be necessary with this condition. Besides, large amount of plutonium surplus will occur, even if First Breeder Reactors (FBR)s consume the plutonium. At maximum, plutonium surplus will reach almost 500 tons. These results indicate that current nuclear policy does not solve the spent fuel problems but rather complicates them. Thus, reprocessing policy could put off the problems in spent fuel interim storage capacity and other issues could appear such as difficulties in large amount of HLW final disposal management or separated plutonium management. If there is no reprocessing or MOX use, the amount of spent fuel will reach over 115,000 tones at the year of 2100. However, the spent fuel management could be simplified and also the cost and the security would be improved by using an interim storage primarily.


Author(s):  
Masumi Wataru ◽  
Hisashi Kato ◽  
Satoshi Kudo ◽  
Naoko Oshima ◽  
Koji Wada ◽  
...  

Spent nuclear fuel coming from a Japanese nuclear power plant is stored in the interim storage facility before reprocessing. There are two types of the storage methods which are wet and dry type. In Japan, it is anticipated that the dry storage facility will increase compared with the wet type facility. The dry interim storage facility using the metal cask has been operated in Japan. In another dry storage technology, there is a concrete overpack. Especially in USA, a lot of concrete overpacks are used for the dry interim storage. In Japan, for the concrete cask, the codes of the Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers and the governmental technical guidelines are prepared for the realization of the interim storage as well as the code for the metal cask. But the interim storage using the concrete overpack has not been in progress because the evaluation on the stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of the canister is not sufficient. Japanese interim storage facilities would be constructed near the seashore. The metal casks and concrete overpacks are stored in the storage building in Japan. On the other hand, in USA they are stored outside. It is necessary to remove the decay heat of the spent nuclear fuel in the cask from the storage building. Generally, the heat is removed by natural cooling in the dry storage facility. Air including the sea salt particles goes into the dry storage facility (Figure 1). Concerning the concrete overpack, air goes into the cask body and cools the canister. Air goes along the canister surface and is in contact with the surface directly. In this case, the sea salt in the air attaches to the surface and then there is the concern about the occurrence of the SCC. For the concrete overpack, the canister including the spent fuel is sealed by the welding. The loss of sealability caused by the SCC has to be avoided. To evaluate the SCC for the canister, it is necessary to make clear the amount of the sea salt particles coming into the storage building and the concentration on the canister. In present, the evaluation on that point is not sufficient. In this study, the concentration of the sea salt particles in the air and on the surface of the storage facility are measured inside and outside of the building. For the measurement, two sites of the dry storage facility using the metal cask are chosen. This data is applicable for the evaluation on the SCC of the canister to realize the interim storage using the concrete overpack.


1981 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Allard ◽  
U. Olofsson ◽  
B. Torstenfelt ◽  
H. Kipatsi ◽  
K. Andersson

The long-lived actinides and their daughter products largely dominate the biological hazards from spent nuclear fuel already from some 300 years after the discharge from the reactor and onwards . Therefore it is essential to make reliable assessments of the geochemistry of these elements in any concept for long-term storage of spent fuel or reprocessing waste, etc.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document