DTI Nuclear Legacy Programme: Andreeva Bay

Author(s):  
Jane Smith-Briggs

Andreeva Bay is located in the Zapadnaya sea inlet at the extreme North-West of the Kola Peninsula (Russian Federation), about 40km from the Norwegian border. It is rather inaccessible, except by sea and the nearest town with facilities for Western visitors is Murmansk some 80km to the SE. Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) was initially stored in two large pools within building 5, however after serious leaks the fuel was transferred to an external “drystore” constructed by adapting three existing concrete tanks, previously allocated for the storage of liquid radwaste. There are currently approximately 20,000 spent fuel assemblies (SFA) stored within the three tanks. The storage conditions of the assemblies are less than adequate, the steel canisters used to store the assemblies are in poor condition and their standard of manufacture was not good. Shielding is locally inadequate and the concrete roof segments are ill fitting with snowmelt known to enter the tanks. Building 5 still contains some fuel fragments that could not readily be moved. The remaining water and structure remain highly active and this included some 4000Ci in sludge and debris at the bottom of the pool. The UK has agreed to support activities to improve the conditions at Andreeva Bay, with respect to SNF management, and DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) have appointed RWE NUKEM as their project management consultants for their Nuclear Legacy Programme in North-West Russia. A number of projects have been identified by the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy, MINATOM, and these are currently in the project definition stage. These include the characterisation of Building 5, an options study for SNF management at the site, and the construction of a cover for Tank 3a. This paper will describe the current conditions with respect to spent nuclear fuel at Andreeva bay and will discuss the proposed projects under consideration for funding by DTI.

Author(s):  
Steven Laws ◽  
David Wells ◽  
Andrew Herrick

Since 2002, the UK’s Global Threat Reduction Programme managed by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) has provided assistance to the Republic of Kazakhstan with the decommissioning of the BN-350 sodium cooled fast reactor. Assistance has focused on non-proliferation, safety and security projects to ensure the permanent and irreversible shutdown of the reactor and the reduction of security, safety and environmental hazards, particularly those associated with the large inventory of liquid metal coolants (sodium and sodium-potassium alloy) and the presence of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). UK assistance efforts have been co-ordinated with those of the USA and have made use of the UK’s experience in decommissioning its own fast reactor plants at Dounreay. The paper describes work undertaken with UK technical and funding assistance support in the following areas: • Provision of training and technical support in project management and technical topics, including assistance with completion of the BN-350 Decommissioning Plan. • Liquid metal coolant treatment projects, including immobilization of liquid products from the Sodium Processing Facility (SPF) and processing of residual sodium remaining within the drained coolant circuits. • Immobilization of highly active caesium traps, arising from sodium clean-up both during reactor operations and post-shutdown. • Operations to transfer the entire inventory of spent nuclear fuel from the reactor storage pond into dual-use storage and transport casks and then consign these casks to long-term secure storage remote from the reactor site. This activity was part of the major US-Kazakhstan SNF Storage Project. • Surveys of spent fuel route facilities to establish the absence of any significant amount of nuclear material. Key achievements in 2010 were the successful completion of residual sodium processing and completion of the SNF Storage Project. Through 2011, it is intended that the surveys of the fuel storage pond and immobilization of caesium traps will be completed, bringing the current UK assistance activities to an end before March 2012.


2006 ◽  
Vol 985 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Fortner ◽  
A. Jeremy Kropf ◽  
James L. Jerden ◽  
James C. Cunnane

AbstractPerformance assessment models of the U. S. repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada suggest that neptunium from spent nuclear fuel is a potentially important dose contributor. A scientific understanding of how the UO2 matrix of spent nuclear fuel impacts the oxidative dissolution and reductive precipitation of Np is needed to predict the behavior of Np at the fuel surface during aqueous corrosion. Neptunium would most likely be transported as aqueous Np(V) species, but for this to occur it must first be oxidized from the Np(IV) state found within the parent spent nuclear fuel. In this paper we present synchrotron x-ray absorption spectroscopy and microscopy findings that illuminate the resultant local chemistry of neptunium and plutonium within uranium oxide spent nuclear fuel before and after corrosive alteration in an air-saturated aqueous environment. We find the Pu and Np in unaltered spent fuel to have a +4 oxidation state and an environment consistent with solid-solution in the UO2 matrix. During corrosion in an air-saturated aqueous environment, the uranium matrix is converted to uranyl (UO22+) mineral assemblage that is depleted in Np and Pu relative to the parent fuel. The transition from U(IV) in the fuel to a fully U(VI) character across the corrosion front is not sharp, but occurs over a transition zone of ∼ 50 micrometers. We find evidence of a thin (∼ 20 micrometer) layer that is enriched in Pu and Np within a predominantly U(IV) environment on the fuel side of the transition zone. These experimental observations are consistent with available data for the standard reduction potentials for NpO2+/Np4+ and UO22+/U4+ couples, which indicate that Np(IV) may not be effectively oxidized to Np(V) at the corrosion potential of uranium dioxide spent nuclear fuel in air-saturated aqueous solutions.


MRS Advances ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (19) ◽  
pp. 991-1003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evaristo J. Bonano ◽  
Elena A. Kalinina ◽  
Peter N. Swift

ABSTRACTCurrent practice for commercial spent nuclear fuel management in the United States of America (US) includes storage of spent fuel in both pools and dry storage cask systems at nuclear power plants. Most storage pools are filled to their operational capacity, and management of the approximately 2,200 metric tons of spent fuel newly discharged each year requires transferring older and cooler fuel from pools into dry storage. In the absence of a repository that can accept spent fuel for permanent disposal, projections indicate that the US will have approximately 134,000 metric tons of spent fuel in dry storage by mid-century when the last plants in the current reactor fleet are decommissioned. Current designs for storage systems rely on large dual-purpose (storage and transportation) canisters that are not optimized for disposal. Various options exist in the US for improving integration of management practices across the entire back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.


Author(s):  
Vladyslav Soloviov

In this paper accounting of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) burnup of RBMK-1000 with actinides and full isotopic composition has been performed. The following characteristics were analyzed: initial fuel enrichment, burnup fraction, axial burnup profile in the fuel assembly (FA) and fuel weight. As the results show, in the first 400 hours after stopping the reactor, there is an increase in the effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) due to beta decay of 239Np into 239Pu. Further, from 5 to 50 years, there is a decrease in keff due to beta decay of 241Pu into 241Am. Beyond 50 years there is a slight change in the criticality of the system. Accounting for nuclear fuel burnup in the justification of nuclear safety of SNF systems will provide an opportunity to increase the volume of loaded fuel and thus significantly reduce technology costs of handling of SNF.


Author(s):  
Frantisek Svitak ◽  
Karel Svoboda ◽  
Josef Podlaha

In May 2004, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative agreement was signed by the governments of the United States and the Russian Federation. The goal of this initiative is to minimize, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, the existing threat of misuse of nuclear and radioactive materials for terrorist purposes, particularly highly enriched uranium (HEU), fresh and spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and plutonium, which have been stored in a number of countries. Within the framework of the initiative, HEU materials and SNF from research reactors of Russian origin will be transported back to the Russian Federation for reprocessing/liquidation. The program is designated as the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program and is similar to the U.S. Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program, which is underway for nuclear materials of United States origin. These RRRFR activities are carried out under the responsibilities of the respective ministries (i.e., U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Russian Federation Rosatom). The Czech Republic and the Nuclear Research Institute Rez, plc (NRI) joined Global Threat Reduction Initiative in 2004. During NRI’s more than 50 years of existence, radioactive and nuclear materials had accumulated and had been safely stored on its grounds. In 1995, the Czech regulatory body, State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS), instructed NRI that all ecological burdens from its past activities must be addressed and that the SNF from the research reactor LVR-15 had to be transported for reprocessing. At the end of November 2007, all these activities culminated with the unique shipment to the Russian Federation of 527 fuel assemblies of SNF type EK-10 (enrichment 10% U235) and IRT-M (enrichment 36% and 80% U235) and 657 irradiated fuel rods of EK-10 fuel, which were used in LVR-15 reactor.


Author(s):  
Donald Wayne Lewis

In the United States (U.S.) the nuclear waste issue has plagued the nuclear industry for decades. Originally, spent fuel was to be reprocessed but with the threat of nuclear proliferation, spent fuel reprocessing has been eliminated, at least for now. In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 [1] was established, authorizing development of one or more spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste geological repositories and a consolidated national storage facility, called a “Monitored Retrievable Storage” facility, that could store the spent nuclear fuel until it could be placed into the geological repository. Plans were under way to build a geological repository, Yucca Mountain, but with the decision by President Obama to terminate the development of Yucca Mountain, a consolidated national storage facility that can store spent fuel for an interim period until a new repository is established has become very important. Since reactor sites have not been able to wait for the government to come up with a storage or disposal location, spent fuel remains in wet or dry storage at each nuclear plant. The purpose of this paper is to present a concept developed to address the DOE’s goals stated above. This concept was developed over the past few months by collaboration between the DOE and industry experts that have experience in designing spent nuclear fuel facilities. The paper examines the current spent fuel storage conditions at shutdown reactor sites, operating reactor sites, and the type of storage systems (transportable versus non-transportable, welded or bolted). The concept lays out the basis for a pilot storage facility to house spent fuel from shutdown reactor sites and then how the pilot facility can be enlarged to a larger full scale consolidated interim storage facility.


Author(s):  
Krista Nicholson ◽  
John McDonald ◽  
Shona Draper ◽  
Brian M. Ikeda ◽  
Igor Pioro

Currently in Canada, spent fuel produced from Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is in the interim storage all across the country. It is Canada’s long-term strategy to have a national geologic repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel for CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors. The initial problem is to identify a means to centralize Canada’s spent nuclear fuel. The objective of this paper is to present a solution for the transportation issues that surround centralizing the waste. This paper reviews three major components of managing and the transporting of high-level nuclear waste: 1) site selection, 2) containment and 3) the proposed transportation method. The site has been selected based upon several factors including proximity to railways and highways. These factors play an important role in the site-selection process since the location must be accessible and ideally to be far from communities. For the containment of the spent fuel during transportation, a copper-shell container with a steel structural infrastructure was selected based on good thermal, structural, and corrosion resistance properties has been designed. Rail has been selected as the method of transporting the container due to both the potential to accommodate several containers at once and the extensive railway system in Canada.


Molecules ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 1429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Víctor Vicente Vilas ◽  
Sylvain Millet ◽  
Miguel Sandow ◽  
Luis Iglesias Pérez ◽  
Daniel Serrano-Purroy ◽  
...  

To reduce uncertainties in determining the source term and evolving condition of spent nuclear fuel is fundamental to the safety assessment. ß-emitting nuclides pose a challenging task for reliable, quantitative determination because both radiometric and mass spectrometric methodologies require prior chemical purification for the removal of interfering activity and isobars, respectively. A method for the determination of 90Sr at trace levels in nuclear spent fuel leachate samples without sophisticated and time-consuming procedures has been established. The analytical approach uses a commercially available automated pre-concentration device (SeaFAST) coupled to an ICP-DRC-MS. The method shows good performances with regard to reproducibility, precision, and LOD reducing the total time of analysis for each sample to 12.5 min. The comparison between the developed method and the classical radiochemical method shows a good agreement when taking into account the associated uncertainties.


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