A Differential Game Approach to Dynamic Competitive Decisions Toward Human-Computer Collaboration

Author(s):  
Alparslan Emrah Bayrak ◽  
Christopher McComb ◽  
Jonathan Cagan ◽  
Kenneth Kotovsky

Abstract Partnership between humans and computers has a significant potential to extend the ability of humans to address complex design problems. This paper presents a decision-making process for computers to effectively collaborate with humans in the solution of complex problems under dynamic competition. In the proposed process, the computers learn strategies and objectives from prior experimental data and provide strategy suggestions to human collaborators. The study integrates clustering and sequential learning methods from machine learning with a differential game formulation based on model predictive control to find dynamic Nash equilibrium solutions to zero-sum games. The application of the proposed approach is demonstrated on the real-time strategy game Starcraft II that offers a dynamic competitive problem comparable in complexity to real-world applications. The results show that the proposed approach can successfully identify a variety of opening strategies in the experimental data for the initial phase of the process. The game-theoretic strategies in the later phases provide useful suggestions for low-performing players but are unnecessarily conservative for high-performing players where there is little opportunity for improvement. These results suggest a need for an assessment of the opponent expertise and a human intuition to judge the appropriateness of the game-theoretic suggestions for further improvement.

2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (03) ◽  
pp. 477-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZHILI TANG

The Taguchi robust design concept is combined with the multi-objective deterministic optimization method to overcome single point design problems in Aerodynamics. Starting from a statistical definition of stability, the method finds, Nash equilibrium solutions for performance and its stability simultaneously.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Li Miao ◽  
Shuai Li

Internet of Things (IoT) has played an important role in our daily life since its emergence. The applications of IoT cover from the traditional devices to intelligent equipment. With the great potential of IoT, there comes various kinds of security problems. In this paper, we study the malware propagation under the dynamic interaction between the attackers and defenders in edge computing-based IoT and propose an infinite-horizon stochastic differential game model to discuss the optimal strategies for the attackers and defenders. Considering the effect of stochastic fluctuations in the edge network on the malware propagation, we construct the Itô stochastic differential equations to describe the propagation of the malware in edge computing-based IoT. Subsequently, we analyze the feedback Nash equilibrium solutions for our proposed game model, which can be considered as the optimal strategies for the defenders and attackers. Finally, numerical simulations show the effectiveness of our proposed game model.


2021 ◽  
pp. 232102222110243
Author(s):  
M. Punniyamoorthy ◽  
Sarin Abraham ◽  
Jose Joy Thoppan

A non-zero sum bimatrix game may yield numerous Nash equilibrium solutions while solving the game. The selection of a good Nash equilibrium from among the many options poses a dilemma. In this article, three methods have been proposed to select a good Nash equilibrium. The first approach identifies the most payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, while the second method selects the most risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. The third method combines risk dominance and payoff dominance by giving due weights to the two criteria. A sensitivity analysis is performed by changing the relative weights of criteria to check its effect on the ranks of the multiple Nash equilibria, infusing more confidence in deciding the best Nash equilibrium. JEL Codes: C7, C72, D81


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (4) ◽  
pp. 83-101
Author(s):  
Tariq Elahi ◽  
John A. Doucette ◽  
Hadi Hosseini ◽  
Steven J. Murdoch ◽  
Ian Goldberg

AbstractWe present a game-theoretic analysis of optimal solutions for interactions between censors and censorship resistance systems (CRSs) by focusing on the data channel used by the CRS to smuggle clients’ data past the censors. This analysis leverages the inherent errors (false positives and negatives) made by the censor when trying to classify traffic as either non-circumvention traffic or as CRS traffic, as well as the underlying rate of CRS traffic. We identify Nash equilibrium solutions for several simple censorship scenarios and then extend those findings to more complex scenarios where we find that the deployment of a censorship apparatus does not qualitatively change the equilibrium solutions, but rather only affects the amount of traffic a CRS can support before being blocked. By leveraging these findings, we describe a general framework for exploring and identifying optimal strategies for the censorship circumventor, in order to maximize the amount of CRS traffic not blocked by the censor. We use this framework to analyze several scenarios with multiple data-channel protocols used as cover for the CRS. We show that it is possible to gain insights through this framework even without perfect knowledge of the censor’s (secret) values for the parameters in their utility function.


Axioms ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 66
Author(s):  
Aviv Gibali ◽  
Oleg Kelis

In this paper we present an appropriate singular, zero-sum, linear-quadratic differential game. One of the main features of this game is that the weight matrix of the minimizer’s control cost in the cost functional is singular. Due to this singularity, the game cannot be solved either by applying the Isaacs MinMax principle, or the Bellman–Isaacs equation approach. As an application, we introduced an interception differential game with an appropriate regularized cost functional and developed an appropriate dual representation. By developing the variational derivatives of this regularized cost functional, we apply Popov’s approximation method and show how the numerical results coincide with the dual representation.


Axioms ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Valery Y. Glizer

A finite-horizon two-person non-zero-sum differential game is considered. The dynamics of the game is linear. Each of the players has a quadratic functional on its own disposal, which should be minimized. The case where weight matrices in control costs of one player are singular in both functionals is studied. Hence, the game under the consideration is singular. A novel definition of the Nash equilibrium in this game (a Nash equilibrium sequence) is proposed. The game is solved by application of the regularization method. This method yields a new differential game, which is a regular Nash equilibrium game. Moreover, the new game is a partial cheap control game. An asymptotic analysis of this game is carried out. Based on this analysis, the Nash equilibrium sequence of the pairs of the players’ state-feedback controls in the singular game is constructed. The expressions for the optimal values of the functionals in the singular game are obtained. Illustrative examples are presented.


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