Integrated Blast Resistance Model of Nuclear Power Plant Auxiliary Facilities

Author(s):  
Irad Brandys ◽  
David Ornai ◽  
Yigal Ronen

Standards, guidelines, manuals, and researches refer mainly to the required protection of a nuclear power plant (NPP) containment structure (where the reactor's vessel is located) against different internal and external extreme events. However, there is no consideration regarding the man-made extreme event of external explosion resulting from air bomb or cruise missile. A novel integrated blast resistance model (IBRM) of NPP's reinforced concrete (RC) auxiliary facilities due to an external above ground explosion based on two components is suggested. The first is structural dynamic response analysis to the positive phase of an external explosion based on the single degree-of-freedom (SDOF) method combined with spalling and breaching empirical correlations. The second is in-structure shock analysis, resulting from direct-induced ground shock and air-induced ground shock. As a case study, the resistance of Westinghouse commercial NPP AP1000 control room, including a representative equipment, to an external above ground blast loading of Scud B-100 missile at various standoff distances ranging from 250 m (far range) till contact, was analyzed. The structure's damage level is based on its front wall supports' angle of rotation and the ductility ratio (dynamic versus elastic midspan displacement ratio). Due to the lack of specific structural damage demands and equipment's dynamic capacities, common protective structures standards and manuals are used while requiring that no spalling or breaching shall occur in the control room while it remains in the elastic regime. The engineering systems and equipments' spectral motions should be less than their capacity. The integrated blast resistance model (IBRM) of the structure and its equipment may be used in wider researches concerning other NPP's auxiliary facilities and systems based upon their specifications.

Author(s):  
Jia Qianqian ◽  
Guo Chao ◽  
Li Jianghai ◽  
Qu Ronghong

The nuclear power plant with two modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTR-PM) is under construction now. The control room of HTR-PM is designed. This paper introduces the alarm displays in the control room, and describes some verification and validation (V&V) activities of the alarm system, especially verification for some new human factor issues of the alarm system in the two modular design. In HTR-PM, besides the regular V&V similar to other NPPs, the interference effect of the alarm rings of the two reactor modules at the same time, and the potential discomfort of the two reactor operators after shift between them are focused. Verifications at early stage of the two issues are carried on the verification platform of the control room before the integrated system validation (ISV), and all the human machine interfaces (HMIs) in the control room, including the alarm system are validated in ISV. The test results on the verification platform show that the alarm displays and rings can support the operators understand the alarm information without confusion of the two reactors, and the shift between the two reactor operators have no adverse impact on operation. The results in ISV also show that the alarm system can support the operators well.


2008 ◽  
Vol 238 (12) ◽  
pp. 3522-3527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheue-Ling Hwang ◽  
Jhih-Tsong Lin ◽  
Guo-Feng Liang ◽  
Yi-Jan Yau ◽  
Tzu-Chung Yenn ◽  
...  

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katya Lee Le Blanc ◽  
Gordon Ross Bower ◽  
Rachael Ann Hill ◽  
Zachary Alexander Spielman ◽  
Brandon Charles Rice

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