Discussion: “Pressure Oscillations in a Water-Cooled Nuclear Reactor Induced by Water-Hammer Waves” (Lieberman, P., and Brown, E. A., 1960, ASME J. Basic Eng., 82, pp. 901–907)

1960 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 908-908
Author(s):  
R. M. Rosser
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Reactor ◽  
Water Hammer ◽  
Pressure Oscillations

Pressure Oscillations in a Water-Cooled Nuclear Reactor Induced by Water-Hammer Waves

1960 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 901-907 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Lieberman ◽  
E. A. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Internal Structure ◽  
Upper Bound ◽  
Nuclear Reactor ◽  
Water Hammer ◽  
Design Criteria ◽  
Water Coolant ◽  
Pressure Loading ◽  
Pressure Oscillations ◽  
Plenum Chamber

Shutdown of the Babcock & Wilcox nuclear reactor water coolant pumps will cause check valves to close which will induce the generation of water hammer in the system. The magnitude, frequency, and duration of possible pressure oscillations in the pipeline and the discharge of the pressure oscillations into the attached plenum chamber were evaluated. Although the plenum chamber contains a great number of suspended rods, it was possible to establish the upper bound for the pressure loading across the internal structure of the plenum chamber at various stations for determination of design criteria.

Nuclear Power Plant Fires and Explosions: Part IV — Water Hammer Explosion Mechanisms

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Leishear
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Reactor ◽  
Water Hammer ◽  
Compression Process ◽  
Flammable Gas ◽  
Piping Systems ◽  
Fukushima Daiichi ◽  
Accident Conditions

Water hammers, or fluid transients, compress flammable gasses to their autognition temperatures in piping systems to cause fires or explosions. While this statement may be true for many industrial systems, the focus of this research are reactor coolant water systems (RCW) in nuclear power plants, which generate flammable gasses during normal operations and during accident conditions, such as loss of coolant accidents (LOCA’s) or reactor meltdowns. When combustion occurs, the gas will either burn (deflagrate) or explode, depending on the system geometry and the quantity of the flammable gas and oxygen. If there is sufficient oxygen inside the pipe during the compression process, an explosion can ignite immediately. If there is insufficient oxygen to initiate combustion inside the pipe, the flammable gas can only ignite if released to air, an oxygen rich environment. This presentation considers the fundamentals of gas compression and causes of ignition in nuclear reactor systems. In addition to these ignition mechanisms, specific applications are briefly considered. Those applications include a hydrogen fire following the Three Mile Island meltdown, hydrogen explosions following Fukushima Daiichi explosions, and on-going fires and explosions in U.S nuclear power plants. Novel conclusions are presented here as follows. 1. A hydrogen fire was ignited by water hammer at Three Mile Island. 2. Hydrogen explosions were ignited by water hammer at Fukushima Daiichi. 3. Piping damages in U.S. commercial nuclear reactor systems have occurred since reactors were first built. These damages were not caused by water hammer alone, but were caused by water hammer compression of flammable hydrogen and resultant deflagration or detonation inside of the piping.

scholarly journals Assessment of water hammer effects on boiling water nuclear reactor core dynamics

2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anis Bousbia-Salah
Keyword(s):  
Pressure Wave ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Reactor ◽  
Reactor Core ◽  
Water Hammer ◽  
Pressure Wave Amplitude ◽  
Sensitivity Studies ◽  
Rapid Transients ◽  
Complex Phenomena

Complex phenomena, as water hammer transients, occurring in nuclear power plants are still not very well investigated by the current best estimate computational tools. Within this frame work, a rapid positive reactivity addition into the core generated by a water hammer transient is considered. The numerical simulation of such phenomena was carried out using the coupled RELAP5/PARCS code. An over all data comparison shows good agreement between the calculated and measured core pressure wave trends. However, the predicted power response during the excursion phase did not correctly match the experimental tendency. Because of this, sensitivity studies have been carried out in order to identify the most influential parameters that govern the dynamics of the power excursion. After investigating the pressure wave amplitude and the void feed back responses, it was found that the disagreement between the calculated and measured data occurs mainly due to the RELAP5 low void condensation rate which seems to be questionable during rapid transients. .

Water Hammer Simulation in a Steel Pipeline System with a Sudden Cross-section Change

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Malesinska ◽  
Michal Kubrak ◽  
Mariusz Rogulski ◽  
Pierfabrizio Puntorieri ◽  
Vincenzo Fiamma ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Model ◽  
Cross Section ◽  
Laboratory Data ◽  
Sudden Change ◽  
Water Hammer ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Transient Wave ◽  
Pressure Oscillations ◽  
Wave Nature ◽  
Cross Section Change

Abstract Contractions and expansions are common features in various types of pipeline systems. The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of a sudden cross-section change on transient pressure waves. The paper presents laboratory data and numerical calculations of pressure oscillations during the valve-induced water hammer in serially connected steel pipes. Five different variants of experiments were conducted which included recording pressure changes at the downstream end of the pipeline system. The more sections with different diameters there are connected in series, the more complex the transient wave recorded is. Laboratory data indicate a significant influence of individual pipeline sections on the final course of pressure oscillations. Transient equations were solved using the explicit MacCormack scheme. In order to numerically simulate water hammer in pipe series, the improved junction boundary condition was established. It involves assigning two sets of values, which describe flow parameters, to the connection node thus causing it to act as two separate nodes. The numerical model was calibrated with the unsteady friction factor. The derivation of equations that take into account a sudden change in diameter in the connected pipes allowed the reproduction of the wave nature of the water hammer phenomenon, results were satisfactory as compared to experimental data. Numerical model correctly reproduced pressure wave interactions and pressure amplitudes.

Nuclear Power Plant Fires and Explosions: Part III — Hamaoka Piping Explosion

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Leishear
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Noble Metals ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Reactor ◽  
Reactor Core ◽  
Water Hammer ◽  
Preventive Action ◽  
Hydrogen Ignition ◽  
Accident Conditions

An explosion that burst a steel pipe like a paper fire cracker at the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station, Unit-1 is investigated in this paper, which is one of a series of papers investigating fires and explosions in nuclear power plants. The accumulation of flammable hydrogen and oxygen due to radiolysis has long been recognized as a potential problem in nuclear reactors, where radiolysis is the process that decomposes water into hydrogen and oxygen by radiation exposure in the reactor core. Hydrogen ignition and explosion has long been considered the cause of this Hamaoka piping explosion, but the cause of ignition was considered to be a minor fluid transient, or water hammer, that ignited flammable gasses in the piping, which was made possible by the presence of catalytic noble metals inside the piping. The theory presented here is that a much larger pressure surge occurred due to water hammer during operations. In fact, calculations presented here serve as proof of principle that this explosion mechanism may be present in many operating nuclear power plants. Chubu Electric, the operator of the Hamaoka plant, took appropriate actions to prevent this type of explosion in their plants in the future. In fact, this accident indicates one potential preventive action from explosions for other operating plants. Ensure that a system high point is available, where mixed hydrogen and oxygen may be removed during routine operations and during off-normal accident conditions, such as nuclear reactor meltdowns and loss of coolant accidents.

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