Energy in East Europe Through 1980

1974 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-306
Author(s):  
V. V. Strishkov ◽  
G. Markon ◽  
Z. E. Murphy

Eastern Europe is the world’s largest and most tightly knit multinational economic bloc. It is largest in population although its per capita energy output and industrial production lag considerably behind that of other industrial countries. Originally comprised of eight Soviet satelite states welded together by a common political-economic system patterned after that of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe now includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, which are members of the SEV (Soviet Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi, known as Comecon-Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), a highly integrated multinational group. Albania and Yugoslavia, both socialist economies of widely divergent philosophies, are not members of the SEV, although Yugoslavia’s specific status is defined by agreement formalized in 1964. The agreement laid the foundation for Yugoslav participation within the group (it has observer status in half of the Comecon’s 24 Commissions) and cooperation.

1988 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 639-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef C. Brada

In trade among the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), prices of raw materials are lower and those of manufactured goods higher than comparable world prices. Because the Soviet Union is a net exporter of raw materials to, and net importer of manufactures from, the other CMEA countries, it benefits less from CMEA trade than it would from trading with the rest of the world, and the other CMEA members benefit more. This redistribution of the gains from trade is generally seen as a form of subsidization. One explanation of these subsidies is that they represent Soviet payments for political and military benefits provided by East European regimes; another is that the subsidies compensate Eastern Europe for the economic burden imposed by central planning and extensive economic ties to the Soviet Union. I argue that neither of these explanations is consistent with the type of economic and political relations that one would expect of the Soviet and East European regimes. In their place I offer an alternative explanation based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model of comparative advantage. The distribution of CMEA subsidies is shown to reflect the distribution of gains from trade that would arise among any group of economies forming a preferential trading scheme. I also argue that the willingness of members to belong to CMEA, even at the expense of paying subsidies, is that CMEA can be viewed as a club that provides benefits to members while imposing costs that may to some extent be unequal and unpredictable.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 80-104
Author(s):  
Jorge Alberto Lopez-Arevalo ◽  
Francisco Garcia-Fernandez ◽  
Rafael Alejandro Vaquera-Salazar

The aim of this study is to analyze Cuba’s foreign trade with three main partners during the so-called Special Period, a result from the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. With the absence of the Mutual Economic Assistance Council (MEAC), Cuba had to make structural changes in its economy and foreign trade. A center-periphery model of doing business between Cuba and its trade partners was implemented. Under this model, China became Cuba’s main supplier of manufactured goods and Cuba supplied raw materials. Foreign trade in Cuba was limited due to the economic embargo from the United States. Nowadays, the relation between these two countries has become more of a trading collaboration. The United States has turned into one of Cuba’s main food suppliers, while Cuba exports art pieces and antiquities to that country. Russia also became a main exporter of manufactured goods and machinery to Cuba, just as China. In return, Cuba is sending raw materials to both of those countries.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 4-30
Author(s):  
Michael De Groot

Numerous scholars have claimed that the Soviet Union was a primary beneficiary of the 1973–1974 oil crisis. Drawing on archival evidence from Russia and Germany, this article challenges that interpretation, showing that the oil crisis forced Soviet policymakers to confront the limits of their energy industry and the effects of the crisis on their East European allies. Demand for Soviet energy outpaced production, forcing Soviet officials to weigh their need to compensate for economic shortcomings at home against their role as the guarantor of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. The Soviet decision to raise prices within the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Soviet Union's inability to fulfill demand across CMEA compelled the East European governments to purchase oil from Middle Eastern countries at increasing world market prices, crippling their balance of payments and accentuating their other economic shortcomings.


1986 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Marrese

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is primarily a forum for bilateral bargaining between the Soviet Union and each of the other CMEA countries. The bilateral negotiations are conducted with tremendous concern for Soviet long-term preferences and for the short-term economic-political stability of East European countries. The CMEA provides the Soviet Union with an effective but cumbersome politico-economic policy-making apparatus that is becoming less effective and increasingly cumbersome over time. From the East European perspective, the CMEA tends to solidify the positions of the East European leaders yet generate long-term economic costs. What are the preferences upon which the CMEA is constructed? How are CMEA characteristics related to these preferences? What are the economic costs and benefits to member countries in static and dynamic terms? Why have costs for all member countries risen over time? How is intra-CMEA trade likely to change during the next decade?


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 988-989 ◽  

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) held its seventeenth session in Bucharest on December 74–20, 1962, attended by delegates from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. A communiqué stated that a permanent currency and finance commission had been set up under the Council to develop cooperation in those fields among COMECON member countries, that international specialization and “socialist division of labor” among members had increased, and that during the first nine months of 7962 over-all trade among member countries had risen by 15 percent and trade in machinery and industrial equipment by 24 percent. The communiqué noted that the COMECON countries were now largely self-sufficient in certain raw materials, manufactures, etc., notably lignite, hard coal, oil and oil products, fertilizers, grain, machinery and industrial equipment, and timber.


1992 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 73-84
Author(s):  
Pratibha C. Kagalkar

Socialism has collapsed. The ideology is in utter chaos in eastern Europe. The Soviet Union is in none too happy condition either. Sharp edges of the ideological conflict between the two global systems have been blunted. Disarray was a gradual process which culminated in the events of 1989 in East Europe. Many have argued that there is no room any more for socialist thrust as the system had failed to deliver the goods. The bipolarisation of the world appears to be gradually fading. Meanwhile the market forces demonstrated their world wide application. President Gorbachev's thought process embodied in the concepts like ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’ unleased a revolutionary wave whose ripples reached far and wide. The declining Socialist surge had in turn led to increasing boost to the ideals like political pluralism. The pertinent point is whether the euphoria generated in the west by the sudden and unexpected turn of events in the eastern block of countries is really suggestive of the collapse of socialist thought and all that went with it. However, this writer believes that all is not over; what has happened is that only a particular variant of socialism has lost its luster. May be socialism in its extreme form has run amuck. It was the failure of its rapid ideological phase, its totalitarian and bureaucratic bungling. At initial stages of Socialism in Russia and China and Eastern Europe it was a triumphant march. It eliminated feudalism, created more equal society and a basic industrial structure next only to United States. But it encountered situations that Marx and Lenin did not forsee. Any ideology that moves away from its central moorings can be counter-productive.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-112
Author(s):  
Janusz Kaliński ◽  

Polish coal played an important role in economic relations between the People's Republic of Poland and the USSR. Its resources constituted an important element of the Soviet policy towards Poland. In 1946–1953, the forced deliveries of black fuel were a kind of donation. The Soviet authorities explained them with losses in war reparations as a result of the transfer of German lands on the Oder and Nysa Łużycka to Poland, with rich coal resources in Silesia. The Soviet Union also did not refrain from taking over some of the Polish coal deposits as a result of the forced correction of the borders in the east in 1951. Deliveries of "reparative" coal at lower prices brought Poland serious financial losses and inhibited the development of economic relations with Western countries. The export of coal under trade agreements concluded from 1945 was also economically unfavorable. The Soviet authorities imposed both excessive quotas and difficult financial conditions. From 1949, for this purpose, they used the price and exchange rate mechanism applied by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Only in the 1960s did it become beneficial for Poland, and in the following decades it brought losses. The export of coal to the USSR, which in the 1980s amounted to 30% of total exports, caused a deficit of fuels on the domestic market, made it difficult to use the existing economic potential and maintain an adequate standard of living of the population. The political transformation after 1989, which introduced market regulations to foreign trade, led to the collapse of coal exports to the USSR.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 564-564

The terms of a protocol signed by the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania in January, 1949, when they formed the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were released on June 3, 1949. Under the provisions of the agreement the Council was established to coordinate eastern European economy, standardize industrial production of member nations, provide mutual aid through trade, exchange of experience, loans and investments, for a period of twenty years.


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