scholarly journals Contrastive Hinge Epistemology

Theoria ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgio Volpe
Keyword(s):  
Hinge Epistemology

scholarly journals Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology

Synthese ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 197 (11) ◽  
pp. 4975-5007
Author(s):  
Chris Ranalli
Keyword(s):  
World Views ◽  
Epistemic Relation ◽  
Entitlement Theory ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Theory ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
Rational Evaluation

Abstract This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that the answer to this question depends on what hinge commitments are and what our epistemic relation to them is supposed to be. I argue for two core claims. First, that non-epistemic theories of hinge commitments provide adequate support for pessimism. Nevertheless, such theories have highly implausible consequences in the context of deep disagreement. Secondly, at least one epistemic theory of hinge commitments, the entitlement theory, permits optimism about such disagreements. As such, while hinge epistemology is mainly pessimistic about deep disagreement, it doesn’t have to be.

Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Drew Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Deep Disagreements ◽  
To Come

Abstract Why is it that some instances of disagreement appear to be so intractable? And what is the appropriate way to handle such disagreements, especially concerning matters about which there are important practical and political needs for us to come to a consensus? In this paper, I consider an explanation of the apparent intractability of deep disagreement offered by hinge epistemology. According to this explanation, at least some deep disagreements are rationally unresolvable because they concern ‘hinge’ commitments that are unresponsive to rational considerations. This explanation, if correct, seems to have troubling implications for how we should respond to deep disagreement. If my position on a topic is not responsive to rational considerations, then what choice have I but to dogmatically hold to that position, and simply dismiss the views of those with whom I disagree? I address this problem by identifying an attitude of intellectual humility that is appropriate to have towards one's hinge commitments, and suggest that this attitude provides the basis for a non-rational, constructive way to resolve deep disagreement.

Replies to Commentators

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 281-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annalisa Coliva
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
Epistemic Relativism ◽  
Hinge Epistemology

The paper contains the replies to the comments made by Alan Millar, Yuval Avnur, Giorgio Volpe, and Maria Baghramian on my Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. It addresses, in particular, the nature of perceptual justification, the truth of hinges, my response to Humean skepticism and the issue of epistemic relativism.

scholarly journals Dobradiças, Vertigem Epistémica e Moralidade

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (53) ◽  
pp. 125-140
Author(s):  
Nuno Venturinha ◽  
Keyword(s):  
On Certainty ◽  
The Third ◽  
Inexact Knowledge ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Hinge Propositions ◽  
Rational Evaluation

This paper explores central themes of Duncan Pritchard’s epistemology intimately related to the Wittgensteinian idea of a “hinge epistemology”. The first section calls attention to the eminently empirical character of our “hinges”. The second section focuses on Pritchard’s notion of “arational hinge commitments”, more specifically his distinction between the pair “über hinge commitments”/“über hinge propositions” and the pair “personal hinge commitments”/“personal hinge propositions”. The third section brings to the discussion Timothy Williamson’s view of “inexact knowledge” and examines another pair of notions introduced by Pritchard, namely “antiskeptical hinge commitments”/“antiskeptical hinge propositions”. I conclude with a reevaluation of the diagnosis made by Pritchard that, confronted with a sceptical scenario, our “epistemic angst” can be surpassed if we follow Wittgenstein’s teaching in On Certainty about the “structure of rational evaluation”, but that an “epistemic vertigo” can never be ultimately dispelled. My argument is that in a moral scenario there is no room for vertigo.

scholarly journals Ver-como y epistemología hinge

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-37
Author(s):  
Maria Sol Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Visual Experience ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Internal Link ◽  
Hinge Epistemology

This paper aims to stablishes the sense in which propositions included under the perceptual use of ‘seeing-as’, developed by Wittgenstein in the Second Part of Philosophical Investigations, are justifiable from an epistemic point of view. To do this, first, it will be clarified the internal link between ‘visual experience’ and ‘interpretation’ for the type of mentioned cases. Second, it will be shown how the ‘seeing-as’ respects the rule-following paradox’s solution, as long as it does not presuppose any intermediary or need anyone to account for what is perceived, highlighting the notions of ‘practice’, ‘familiarity’ and ‘context’ common both in the aforementioned solution and in the ‘seeing-as’ cases. Third, the general distinction between certainties or ‘hinges’ and ‘epistemic propositions’ presented by Wittgenstein in On Certainty will be applied to cases of aspect perception as a possible field of application of the so called Hinge Epistemology, showing how, in specific cases, the perceptual certainties that shape our way of life and that are groundless, can be recontextualized and merit reasonable justification.Keywords: Wittgenstein, aspect perception, seeing-as, hinges, certainty, justification.

scholarly journals Against Quasi-Fideism

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-243
Author(s):  
Jeroen de Ridder ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Hinge Epistemology

Duncan Pritchard has recently ventured to carve out a novel position in the epistemology of religious belief called quasi-fideism. Its core is an application of ideas from Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to religious belief. Among its many advertised benefits are that it can do justice to two seemingly conflicting ideas about religious belief, to wit: (a) that it is, at least at some level, a matter of ungrounded faith, but also (b) that it can be epistemically rationally grounded. In this paper, I argue that quasi-fideism fails. Its central tenets either have unattractive consequences or are implausible.

Extended rationality: a hinge epistemology

Analysis ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 476-476
Author(s):  
Michael Hymers
Keyword(s):  
Hinge Epistemology
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